Israel looks from the Mediterranean to India for a new strategic front to contain Iran - analysis

This is important because it once again hammers home a discussion that has been going on in Israel for years. Israel’s Ministry of Defense noted, “Addressing the Herzliya Conference, Baram calls for tailored force buildup, a broader alliance stretching from India through the UAE to Greece and Cyprus, and a new US-Israel security MOU built on hard interests and shared values.”

The concept of linking Israel to the Eastern Mediterranean and also to India via the Abraham Accords countries is one of the key elements of Israel’s regional and global outlook.

Warming ties with Greece and Cyprus over the last decade have become a key feature of Israel’s foreign policy. This is not just about diplomatic relations, but also military-to-military exercises, meetings, and defense exports.

Recent reports in Greece have indicated Athens continues to move forward with developing a strong air defense umbrella.

This vision is modeled in some ways on Israel’s integrated, multi-layered air defense concept that has worked so well in recent conflicts. Ekathimerini in Greece noted on June 29 that “Greece is moving to secure approval for a major air defense agreement with Israel, with the government seeking the green light for a €3 billion purchase of Israeli-made systems under a planned ‘Achilles’ Shield’ defense umbrella.”

The report added that “the program includes Rafael’s Spyder All-in-One and David’s Sling systems, as well as the Barak MX system developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), according to Greek defense sources.” This comes in the wake of Rafael's sale of its Spyder system to Romania.

The origins of Israel’s increasingly close ties to Greece, India and Cyprus go back decades. This has been a slow process, like heating water.

However, the long, slow process is now reaching new heights. While ties between Greece and Cyprus are growing, Israel-India ties are also being cemented. The big question mark may concern where Israel-UAE-Bahrain ties are headed. These are Abraham Accords countries.

However, the October 7 war and the recent war in the Gulf have added complexity. The UAE and Gulf states have often been risk-averse on some issues.

This doesn’t mean the UAE doesn’t take some risks. It has involved itself in foreign policy initiatives in Yemen, Libya, Sudan, the Horn of Africa and other places. However, the UAE has also felt frustrated by some of these initiatives.

Baram said that the recent “war has sharpened, for every actor in the region, the price of Iran's military buildup. It has created a shared interest in forging a broader alliance, from India through the UAE to Greece and Cyprus." He argued that Iran might “accelerate its military buildup."

As such, he argued Israel should prepare via a “new regional architecture, first and foremost with our strategic ally, the United States, and with others."

Israel’s prime minister has voiced support for this for years. He has talked about a new Middle East and also sketched out this connection between Israel and India via the Gulf. The problem for Israel’s leadership is that some optimism before October 7 about ties with Saudi Arabia has shifted.

Riyadh wants to see Israel have more moderate politics and have more engagement with the Palestinians. Riyadh isn’t enamored with the violence in the West Bank, the threats by Israeli officials to attack Syria, or talk of Israel having a conflict with “Sunni” powers such as Egypt in the future.

Riyadh is also non-plussed, probably by talk of “settlements” in Gaza. As such, the idea of a trade corridor via Saudi and the Gulf to India can’t happen if Israeli leaders prefer conflict to trade. Riyadh will choose to move trade corridors via Jordan, Syria, Turkey, or other avenues.

This will always be the challenge for Israel in its regional outlook. If we go back to the Abraham Accords and then other regional concepts such as the Negev Forum, the I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US) concept and the N7 Initiative; all of this is predicated on stability, integration and peace.

It’s not a military alliance.

This is one essential difference between Israel-Greece-Cyprus ties and Israel’s ties with the Gulf and India. India and the Gulf don’t want to be dragged into conflict. Greece and Cyprus may be more open to discussing defense because they are concerned about Turkey. Nevertheless, they must also take into account NATO and EU policies in this regard.

Baram made a good point about the need to look more deeply into what each country expects from these relations. "We cannot afford to judge current American policy through a provincial lens.

What some in Israel perceive as weakness or folly, an apparent disregard for every warning sign on the ground, is viewed in Washington as cold, calculated, and clear-eyed risk management in an era of shifting global attention,” he said.

“The difference between us is not in how we understand the threat, but in our priorities: for us, Iran is an existential threat; for the United States, it is a chronic regional challenge, while China and the Indo-Pacific theater remain the core concern. We think Tehran; they think Taiwan."

Baram correctly believes that Iran’s threats to the Gulf have “created a shared interest in forging a broader alliance, from India through the UAE to Greece and Cyprus. Israel's strengths in technology, proven operational experience, and defense innovation, combined with the Gulf's financial power, could enable a new security-economic front,” he said.

“Expanding our strategic partnerships is not a substitute for our partnership with the United States, but it will allow Israel to broaden its room to maneuver and its standing on the international stage, and will allow us to diversify our strategic footing."

Baram’s discussion of strategy illustrates something that has sometimes been sorely lacking. The big picture matters. It also matters what other countries want and how they perceive the situation.

Recent comments by some politicians in Jerusalem have sought to portray Israel as essentially being involved in numerous future conflicts. There is talk about confronting “Sunni” countries, or Syria, Egypt and Turkey.

None of this talk helps Israel’s regional and global role.

Most countries don’t want to be involved in endless war, and they don’t necessarily want a partnership with an Israeli “super-Sparta.” They might prefer a partnership with an Athens, but an Athens before its short-sighted leaders plunged it into the destructive Peloponnesian War. Athens' strategy was essentially sound before the war.

After the war, Athens declined. Sparta basically disappeared over time. No one who thinks broadly about strategy wants this as the future.

Smart strategy for Israel envisions broad ties from the Eastern Mediterranean to India. The US is also working on these issues, including peace in Libya and other global issues. It benefits Israel to think about the long term, rather than more conflict in the region.