A year after the twelve-day conflict between Israel and Iran, called Operation Rising Lion in Israel, is the conflict as historic as it once seemed? At the time, Israelis had been awoken in the first hours of the morning with an emergency alert on their phones. For many millions, it wasn’t clear what was happening. However, having been through war since October 7, 2023, many were steeled for the conflict ahead. Soon, it became known that Israel had carried out strikes on Iran.
Israel’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear program is one of those ‘waiting for Godot’ moments. It had been discussed for decades. In fact, it was such common knowledge that this was something that would have to happen, that there had even been mock discussions at Israeli universities about such topics as what would happen the ‘day after’ Iran got a bomb. Israel’s prime minister had spent decades preparing the way for this, going to the UN with a cartoonish drawing of a nuclear bomb with a red line.
The big question was not “if” but when. US administrations had lurched back and forth on this topic. Some had sought ways to delay an Iranian bomb, either through various technological means or through a deal. Other countries in the region were concerned. However, it was easier to discuss scenarios than actually do something. The nuclear program in Iran was well known, the sites associated with it had become common knowledge, and we all heard them discussed over the years in the media. Iran was often presented as being only a few weeks or months from the possibility of breaking out with a bomb.
Post-October 7 talk about the Iranian nuclear program
After the October 7 War began, there was continued talk about the Iranian nuclear program. However, it had turned out that while Israel was focused on Iran and the so-called “third circle” threats, Hamas was actually a much larger threat. Hamas had been appeased and viewed as not a serious threat in many security circles. The Iranians had chosen to enrich uranium in response to US President Donald Trump leaving the nuclear deal during his first term. By 2024, the talk was not about enrichment, but weaponization.
The other discussion is now about Iran’s ballistic missile and drone threats. Iran used hundreds of ballistic missiles and long-range one-way attack drones in its attacks on Israel in 2024. Suddenly, there were questions about whether the nuclear program was the main threat. Hundreds of ballistic missiles were also a threat. This was another example of how laser focus on the nuclear program had led to Israel letting its guard down regarding Hamas, ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats.
When Rising Lion was launched, Israel had the support of the Trump administration. In addition, the Iranian attacks in 2024 had proven that Israel’s new ties with US Central Command and other regional countries would help detect and intercept Iranian threats. There was more confidence by June 2025. Iran’s ally Hezbollah was weakened in 2024. The Assad regime had fallen. Hamas was also weakened.
Rising Lion led to important achievements against Iran and its nuclear program. However, some achievements didn’t pan out. Claims that large numbers of ballistic missile launchers were destroyed and many ballistic missile sites were weakened via bombing proved to be either false or, at best, too optimistic. The problem Israel has faced since October 7 has been a tendency toward optimism and many premature claims of victory. For instance, just months after October 7, the IDF was already claiming Hamas was largely defeated in Gaza, its battalion and brigade commanders eliminated, and many Hamas battalions shattered.
There was also a tendency to exaggerate gains against Hezbollah and the Houthis. There was also the same tendency against Iran. For instance, claims in 2024 had appeared to assert that Iran had suffered setbacks to its ballistic missile program because “planetary mixers” had been destroyed. The same hubris would return during Operation Roaring Lion in 2026 when there were claims that Iran could no longer enrich uranium or produce ballistic missiles. Iran has consistently shown it can rebuild its programs.
Rising Lion was important because it appears to have clipped the wings of the nuclear program. The problem is that after the apparent victory in June 2025, the war in February 2026 became necessary again, apparently due to ballistic missile threats. Yet, the war in February and March was also waged to push for regime change. That didn’t pan out. The problem now with the Iran conflicts is that they have entered a familiar pattern Israel has seen on other fronts. This includes a long series of conflicts, conflict management, and diminishing returns. Historically, air warfare has not won wars. Enemies can’t usually be bombed into submission. One conflict is an exception: the Kosovo campaign that the US led in 1999. However, in general, air wars and precision munitions are not enough to win wars.
Israel knows this. It fought a decade-long conflict in Syria called the Campaign Between the Wars against Iranian entrenchment. Yet the entrenchment remained, and Iran moved weapons to Hezbollah, up until the Assad regime was overthrown by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in December 2024. Israel has now shifted to carving out a buffer zone in Syria, and in the early days of the new government, Israel resorted to bombing the new government of Ahmed al-Shara’a. Iran was removed from Syria, but the bombing continued despite a new government that appeared more amenable to Israel. This shows that even when a regime falls, it doesn’t necessarily lead to peace or even to a change in policy in Jerusalem.
A grueling war that didn’t appear to have a clear strategy
The US has entered the picture to try to reduce the conflicts on Israel’s borders. The Trump administration got the Gaza deal, which brought home the hostages. This helped end a grueling war that didn’t appear to have a clear strategy. Hamas still runs half of Gaza. The US also helped with ceasefires in Lebanon. The Trump administration has appeared increasingly agitated by Israel’s strikes on Beirut. Iran is now trying to tie the conflict in Lebanon to Iran. This means that a year after Rising Lion, the region has shifted from a narrowly tailored conflict in June 2025 to a broad conflict spanning thousands of miles.
The US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026 likely hope to replicate June 2025’s success. However, without being narrowly tailored with a clear obtainable objective, they led to regional uncertainty. Iran is blocking the Strait of Hormuz. There has been controversy over talk of a Kurdish offensive in Iran. Iran is a large country, and the bombing campaign sought to go after a large number of targets. Eventually, this led the US to threaten to attack bridges and other infrastructure. This kind of mission creep is the opposite of what has tended to win conflicts such as the Gulf War in 1991 and the Six-Day War.
This means that Rising Lion may be seen as more of a chapter in a long war than a decisive conflict. There were rounds of strikes with Iran in 2024, and now 2025 may be seen as another round. It is an important round because it weakened the nuclear program. Now the challenge is to see if the US will agree to a new deal and seek to remove the enriched uranium from areas that were bombed in 2025. As such, Rising Lion was a curtain raiser to what might come next. History will judge whether it was particularly important or a step on the road to a broader strategy.