In two separate incidents on Tuesday afternoon, the IDF said that it had killed armed Hezbollah operatives approaching its positions in the Ali Taher Ridge, which is at the edge of Israel’s security zone.
Despite the two incidents interrupting the relative calm on the Lebanese front since Saturday and Sunday, the broader ceasefire seemed to hold.
During the first incident, the IDF stated that a group of Hezbollah terrorists approached the ridge and were struck by the military in response. According to local Lebanese media, the IDF killed two and wounded two.
In a second incident later in the afternoon, the military said it attacked four Hezbollah fighters who had likewise approached the ridge in a bulldozer and on a motorcycle.
The IDF said that the vehicles were an attempt to disguise the Hezbollah terrorists as civilians. However, the IDF said its forces were still able to identify them as a threat, with some reports stating they were trying to enter a nearby tunnel.
Hezbollah said Israel broke ceasefire but didn't respond militarily
According to the Israeli military, its troops fired warning shots to deter the Hezbollah operatives from approaching.
When the Hezbollah fighters continued their approach, the IDF troops opened fire at them directly, striking at least one fighter.
It was unclear what happened to the other Hezbollah operatives, and also unclear why the IDF fired warning shots only in the second incident, but not during the first.
In both cases, Hezbollah said that the IDF had violated the ceasefire, though at press time, it had not responded with any drone or rocket attacks.
Similar incidents occurred after the November 2024 ceasefire between the two sides, as Hezbollah regularly tested how strongly the IDF would enforce its positions within southern Lebanon.
In another dramatic development, the 30 or so Hezbollah operatives trapped in a tunnel near Tibnin – which was recently surrounded by IDF soldiers – are being allowed to live without surrendering for now, pending negotiations about IDF withdrawals.
All of this is concurrent with Israel and Lebanon’s new round of direct talks in Washington. These talks addressed a wide range of issues, including when and to what extent the IDF will withdraw from southern Lebanon.
Israel is offering modest withdrawals, possibly from places like Tibnin and the Ali Taher Ridge, which the IDF took over only last week.
In one IDF proposal, it said it would withdraw from some of the newest areas it has taken over to see if the Lebanese army would properly clean out Hezbollah from those areas.
Some Israeli officials have drawn a distinction between withdrawing from areas where Hezbollah would have a direct line of fire on Israel’s northern villages and areas where this would not be the case.
However, the Lebanese government and Hezbollah are both pushing for a faster and wider withdrawal.
There are multiple options for withdrawal
Until May 26, Israel had not crossed over the Litani River or the Wadi Saluki area, and the IDF could withdraw to that initial line.
Second: there are at least three lines of Lebanese villages in southern Lebanon that the IDF has overrun, and it could withdraw back to any of those lines. For example, in fall 2024, most of the IDF’s forces had advanced only to the first line of villages.
This could involve reverting the IDF’s infiltration of 10 kilometers into southern Lebanon to merely three to five kilometers into the country.
The IDF may eventually withdraw to its five outposts, which it retreated to in February 2025. That particular withdrawal, however, took four months to occur.
Currently, it is expected that any IDF withdrawals will first test both Hezbollah’s continued ceasefire compliance and the Lebanese army’s willingness to confront and deal with Hezbollah.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz have given the impression that the IDF will remain in parts of southern Lebanon for months or even years to pressure Hezbollah into disarming.
The two sides are also negotiating how to manage controversial incidents that may undermine the ceasefire.
On the one hand, there are de-escalation efforts involving Iran, the US, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Qatar, but these are occurring without Israel.
On the other hand, there is direct Israel-US coordination on these issues, and it is expected that there will be intense negotiations between Israel, the US, and the Lebanese government on these issues.
Before the most recent war, US Lieutenant General Joseph Clearfield was the main coordinator with Israel and Lebanon on these issues, with support from around 30 other American military officials.
CENTCOM was unsure at press time about whether Clearfield and the 30 officials would return to the same role or if their roles would shift during the upcoming negotiations.
Given recent history, the IDF was highly skeptical that the Lebanese army would be successful in containing Hezbollah.
In late 2024, the IDF complained that the Lebanese army was afraid of Hezbollah and was not nearly aggressive enough in handling the issues that Israel brought to its attention regarding Hezbollah’s ceasefire violations.
Then, by April 2025, the IDF told The Jerusalem Post that the Lebanese army had improved and acted on 500 separate complaints by Israel against Hezbollah.
By July 2025, however, the IDF said that the Lebanese army was losing its resolve to confront Hezbollah.
Part of the issue is systemic, as a large portion of the army is Shi’ite and sympathizes with Hezbollah as the leading force for its tribe when competing with Lebanon’s Sunni and Christian groups.
Another issue is that Hezbollah is still better-armed and seemingly has higher morale than the Lebanese army.