IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir and US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Admiral Brad Cooper's recent meeting this past Thursday, which was not made public until now, focused mainly on Iran, though it also had a heavy influence on the weekend Lebanon deal, The Jerusalem Post has learned.
Cooper was also expected to visit the northern region, but had to cut it from his visit due to the escalating fighting between the US and Iran over the Strait of Hormuz.
Officials with knowledge of the visit told the Post that regarding Iran, the meeting focused on both increasing tactical coordination between Israeli and American air, sea, and defense forces and continuing broader joint strategic planning on how each other's military actions could affect the region and the two countries' bilateral interests.
The strategic issue is currently a harder one for the military officials, given that the US and Israeli political and diplomatic strategies on Iran are in a direct clash on several critical points.
However, senior military officials want to minimize friction and avoid problems at the military level.
Regarding Lebanon, Zamir and Cooper were the key military officials determining details relating to Israeli rules of engagement with Hezbollah ceasefire violators and relating to the conditions for the Lebanese army to take over areas from the IDF, such that the IDF can withdraw from certain portions of Lebanon.
Brig.-Gen. Amichai Levin, head of the Strategic Division of the IDF's Planning Directorate, has also been deeply involved in Lebanon-related negotiations.
Lack of clarity on IDF withdrawal plans
As of Sunday, despite the extensive public statements about the Israel-Lebanon-US deal announced over the weekend, it is unclear exactly when and where the IDF will withdraw.
Some believe that the 60-day negotiating period between Iran and the US, which ends in mid-August, will push Washington to push Jerusalem to withdraw faster.
Others believe that as long as a process of withdrawal is happening and Tehran is getting money and an open Strait of Hormuz, the Islamic regime will not force the issue of Israel fully withdrawing from Lebanon on a more rapid basis.
In addition, it is expected to take weeks, if not several months, to retrieve and remove or dilute Iran's enriched uranium from under the rubble of three bombed nuclear facilities.
It is possible that the IDF withdrawal process could ultimately be linked to compliance with that aspect of the deal.
Alternatively, Israel and the US may succeed in separating the withdrawal process from Iran and focus it on how well the Lebanese military keeps Hezbollah out of certain areas of southern Lebanon where it will retake control.
By Thursday night, the Post had already learned that Cooper would be visiting Zamir, but at the time, the visit was framed as in the coming days, when it was likely already underway or had even concluded.
There are multiple withdrawal line options, and Cooper is likely to hone in on Israel’s true apolitical security needs rather than populist, more political rhetoric.
IDF may initially withdraw south of Litani
Until May 26, Israel had not crossed over the Litani River or the Wadi Saluki area, and the IDF could initially withdraw to that prior line.
Next, there are at least three lines of Lebanese villages in southern Lebanon that the IDF has overrun, and it could withdraw to any of those lines. For example, in the fall of 2024, most IDF forces had only advanced to the first line of villages.
This could involve retreating from 10 kilometers or more into southern Lebanon, back to 3 to 5 kilometers.
Eventually, the IDF might even withdraw to its five outposts, which were only several hundred meters into southern Lebanon and to which it retreated in February 2025.
Yet, given that the IDF took four months to withdraw in that round of fighting, it is expected that any IDF withdrawals would first test Hezbollah’s continued ceasefire compliance, as well as the Lebanese army’s willingness to confront and remove Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure from the south of the country.
The IDF was highly skeptical that the Lebanese army would have staying power in holding back Hezbollah, given recent history. For months in late 2024, the IDF complained that the Lebanese army was afraid of Hezbollah and not nearly aggressive enough in handling issues and complaints, which Israel brought to its attention regarding the terror group’s ceasefire violations.
Then, by April 2025, the IDF told the Post that the Lebanese army had improved and acted on 500 separate complaints by Israel against Hezbollah.
However, already by July 2025, the IDF said that the Lebanese army had plateaued and was sinking in its resolve to confront Hezbollah.
Part of the issue is systemic since a large portion of the army is Shi’ite and sympathizes with Hezbollah as the leading force for its tribe when competing with Lebanon’s Sunni and Christian groups.
Another systemic issue is that Hezbollah is still simply better armed and viewed as more determined to fight than the Lebanese army.