Israel’s attack on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria last week did not end Israeli-Syrian diplomacy, as some initially feared. In fact, it may have accelerated it.
That does not mean the attack was without risk. Striking an airbase shortly after a Turkish delegation reportedly visited the site could have triggered a direct clash with Turkey on Syrian soil.
But the strike also concentrated minds. On Sunday, five days later, Mossad head Roman Gofman and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani met in Jordan for US-mediated talks aimed at lowering tensions and preventing another such incident.
The meeting was significant not only because of who attended, but because it marked the resumption of a diplomatic process suspended since the outbreak of the Iran war at the end of February.
According to reports, the talks dealt with reviving Israeli-Syrian security negotiations and preventing mounting Israeli-Turkish tensions from spilling over into Syrian territory.
The sides also reportedly discussed establishing a special operations or coordination room in Jordan under US supervision. Its purpose would be to provide a channel through which Israel, Syria and possibly Turkey could communicate and prevent misunderstandings from escalating into military confrontations.
That Turkey is now a central part of the Israeli-Syrian agenda is itself one consequence of the Abu al-Duhur attack, and something Jerusalem welcomes.
IDF strike placed Turkish involvement in Syria at international forefront
Before the strike, Ankara’s growing military involvement in Syria was largely treated as an issue between Turkey and Syria. Israel’s action placed it at the forefront of the international agenda. It served notice that Jerusalem views a Turkish military presence in Syria not as an internal Syrian issue, but as a potential threat to Israeli security.
Regardless of whether one accepts Israel’s intelligence assessment that Turkey was going to move weapons systems ad personnel into the airbase or Syria’s insistence that no Turkish base was planned, the danger is now impossible to ignore. Turkey is heavily invested in rebuilding and training Syria’s army, while Israel has now made clear that there are limits to the Turkish military presence it is willing to tolerate.
The choice of Jordan as the venue for the talks-and as the possible home of a deconfliction mechanism-is also telling.
Earlier rounds of Israeli-Syrian talks were held in places such as Paris and Baku, far from the region. Jordan, by contrast, borders both Israel and Syria and has a vested interest in preventing a possible war on its doorstep.
Jordan also offers an instructive reminder.
Diplomatic relations between Jerusalem and Amman are cold and frequently confrontational, despite the peace treaty between the two countries. The two governments disagree sharply and publicly over the Palestinians, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Yet beneath that political hostility, they maintain extensive security coordination because it benefits them both.
Israel and Syria are obviously in a different position: They remain formally at war and have no diplomatic relations. But Jordan demonstrates that political warmth is not a prerequisite for practical security coordination. That may be what Washington is seeking for Israel and Syria at this stage- not warm relations, certainly not a peace treaty, but a mechanism to prevent their disputes from repeatedly threatening to erupt into war.
Which is essentially what is currently on the table.
Damascus wants Israel to withdraw to the positions it held before the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in December 2024 and to restore the 1974 disengagement framework. It also rejects Israeli demands placing limits on the weapons systems it can introduce and the degree of military assistance it can accept from Turkey.
Israel, meanwhile, reportedly wants southern Syria to remain demilitarized, restrictions placed on Syrian weaponry, guarantees for the Druze, and an end to Turkish military activity in Syria.
Those positions remain far apart. Damascus sees Israeli demands as an infringement on its sovereignty, while Israel views Syria’s insistence on rebuilding its military with Turkish assistance as providing an open door for a very hostile regional power to establish itself on Israel’s northern border.
The talks in Jordan will not quickly bridge that gap. But they may help establish rules for managing it.
Diplomatic fallout from strike includes gains despite criticism
Israel may therefore have gained something diplomatically from the Abu al-Duhur strike, despite the fierce criticism it generated. Turkey’s military presence in Syria is now the subject of a US-mediated process, not merely an Israeli concern that Ankara and Damascus can easily dismiss.
But Israel must be careful not to overplay its hand.
A demand that there be no Turkish military activity anywhere in Syria is much more than either Damascus or Ankara is likely to accept. Syria regards Turkey as a critical partner in rebuilding the state after more than a decade of civil war. Ankara, meanwhile, has invested too much political, military, and economic capital in the new Syrian order to allow Israel an effective veto over its role there.
The more realistic objective would be clearly defined restrictions. This could mean no Turkish bases or state-of-the-art air defense systems in areas Israel considers vital to its national security; advance notice of significant deployments; and a dependable communications mechanism to prevent either side from misreading the other’s intentions.
The Abu al-Duhur strike did not resolve the problem. It did, however, make clear what is at stake and force the danger of an Israeli-Turkish collision directly onto the diplomatic agenda.
The bombs dropped on Abu al-Duhur’s runways, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said afterward, delivered a message that was not heeded via the established diplomatic channels. The Jordan talks will determine whether that message - so dramatically delivered - can now actually produce a workable arrangement.