Gaza: Where do we go from here?

The debate over Israel’s continued operations in the Gaza Strip has recently resurfaced, following a period in which our attention was focused on other arenas. The renewed discussion has centered primarily on the “15-Point Plan.”

I have chosen to devote this week’s column to trying to bring some clarity to the issue.

The agreement outlined a plan to end the fighting in the Gaza Strip and was signed by Israel and Hamas, alongside the mediating countries—Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. The agreement received international backing through UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

One of the central provisions of the Security Council resolution was to remove responsibility for the Gaza Strip from Hamas and transfer it to the “Board of Peace,” established and chaired by President Trump. The Board assumed responsibility for managing and overseeing implementation of the framework according to its provisions.

The first stage dealt with the release of all the hostages, both living and deceased, and was fully implemented—but not before Hamas attempted to delay its implementation and create obstacles. Israel’s insistence, together with the full backing of President Trump and the Board of Peace, ultimately led to the stage being completed in full.

In return, Israel was required to withdraw tactically from the positions held by IDF forces at the time the agreement was signed, in a manner that would enable the release of the hostages. Israel also committed to allowing large quantities of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip—far beyond what was actually required—despite the clear understanding that a significant portion of it would reach Hamas and contribute to strengthening and rebuilding the organization.

Throughout this period, IDF forces remained inside the Gaza Strip in most of the areas they had captured. The IDF remained in approximately 53% of the Strip, including all the areas commanding the approaches to Israeli communities and the entire Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border.

From the moment the agreement was implemented, and effectively until today, Israel has worked to destroy all Hamas infrastructure in the territory under its control—the area of the “Yellow Line.” Only with time did the true extent of the infrastructure built by Hamas become clear. What had been expected to take two or three months has now continued for ten months.

The next stage was the disarmament of Hamas. This was a fundamental stage, and only after it had been completed in full and to Israel’s satisfaction would Israel be required to carry out a further withdrawal from the territory under its control. Only after that would the stages dealing with the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip begin.

Unsurprisingly, Hamas refused to disarm as agreed and began resorting to the familiar tactics of delay and deception: partial disarmament, collecting weapons in storage facilities, replacing Hamas leaders in Gaza’s government while leaving all 40,000 Hamas officials in place, and more.

Unlike in the past, Israel stood its ground and strictly enforced implementation of the agreement, including preventing movement toward the “Yellow Line.” The Board of Peace also acted differently from the norm we have grown accustomed to from UN bodies in similar cases, backing Israel in the face of Hamas violations of the agreement.

After negotiations with Hamas reached an impasse, the director-general of the Board of Peace, Mladenov, announced that Hamas was in violation of the agreement, thereby effectively allowing Israel to move forward and take action.

Israel resumed its advance on the ground, and today the “Yellow Line” encompasses between 65% and 70% of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Israel resumed targeted strikes against Hamas operatives involved in the continued planning and advancement of terrorist attacks, as well as against operatives who took part in the October 7 assault on Israel.

In its attempt to keep the disarmament process from moving forward, Hamas tried every familiar tactic, including the resignation of the Hamas prime minister and the announcement that governing authority would be transferred to officials who were ostensibly not declared Hamas members. To its surprise, Israel refused to accept these cosmetic changes, and the pressure on the organization continued.

As part of the effort to move the process forward, the “15-Point Agreement” was drafted between the Board of Peace and Hamas. It was intended to establish the mechanism by which Hamas would surrender its weapons. Israel is not a party to that agreement.

This is where disagreements began to emerge. Israel, primarily because of public pressure and the proximity of elections, announced its opposition to moving forward according to the provisions set out in the 15-Point Agreement.

It should be remembered that Israel is not a party to that agreement and retains the right not to proceed to the next stage if the conditions are not fulfilled. Reports about Hamas demanding an Israeli withdrawal before disarming, seeking to retain its light weapons and insisting that collected weapons remain stored inside the Gaza Strip do not mean that its demands were accepted, nor do they bind Israel.

In my view, beyond the public dimension and the understandable pressure ahead of elections, Israel would have been better advised to make fewer public declarations at this stage and focus its dialogue on the Board of Peace, which thus far has acted fairly and safeguarded Israel’s interests in the negotiations.

Naturally, we would like to bring the campaign to an end and destroy Hamas both militarily and as a governing force, as defined in the first of the war’s objectives. At the same time, we must look at the situation as it is.

The agreement was signed because of Israel’s desire to bring home all the hostages and out of an understanding that the issue was damaging Israel’s internal fabric. Its effects reached even into the ranks of the military. We remember the statement attributed to the IDF Chief of Staff before Operation Gideon’s Chariots II, according to which, if the operation endangered the hostages, it could constitute a manifestly unlawful order.

As the prime minister understood it, he had pushed the IDF and the defense establishment to the limits of what was possible. From his perspective, it was therefore right to enter into an agreement that preserved Israel’s achievements, brought the hostages home and, regrettably, left Hamas alive at this stage.

Anyone familiar with Hamas and its conduct knew with certainty that Hamas would not honor the agreement and would not disarm. Therefore, at some point, we would return to fighting and complete the mission.

Moreover, the agreement was built on an “if they give, they get” principle, rather than the approach that had been customary in Israel since the Camp David Accords: Israeli withdrawals and concessions in the first stage in exchange for a non-binding piece of paper from the other side.

This agreement, like its counterpart with the Lebanese government, first and foremost requires Hamas to implement the next stage before Israel is required to take action on its part. That is how it should be.

It is also important to remember the enormous burden placed on the IDF in general, and on the ground forces in particular, given the campaign against Iran and the fighting in Lebanon, Syria, and Judea and Samaria.

It was right to sign the agreement when we did, and it is right today to stand by what was agreed and ensure that Hamas fully disarms before any further progress is made.

Israel would also be right to move forward in accordance with Article 17 of the original agreement and begin moving civilians, following screening and security checks, from Hamas-controlled territory into territory that Israel has already captured and cleared.

Such movement, including with the assistance of the stabilization force (ISF), would allow Hamas to be further weakened, reduce the amount of humanitarian aid reaching its hands, and provide good preparation for organizing the population for a reality of migration, or “voluntary departure.”

In conclusion, we must not become complacent. We must remain vigilant and insist on the agreement being implemented down to the smallest detail.

As long as we continue to stand our ground and act according to the current security doctrine of “enforcement and prevention,” while striving for decisive victory rather than containment, we are moving in the right direction.

I am less concerned about the Board of Peace, which thus far has safeguarded Israel’s interests, and more concerned about the identity and composition of Israel’s government following the upcoming elections, and the need for it to be a national Zionist government that will preserve the current firm course of action.

A government that includes the Muslim Brotherhood or post-Zionist parties could render the debate with Hamas and the mediators irrelevant and approve sweeping concessions that would endanger the security of the residents of the Gaza border communities and the achievements we have secured through three years of difficult fighting.