US President Donald Trump’s turn on Israel over Iran should surprise no one. It follows the oldest rule of Trumpian foreign policy: allies are useful until the next deal requires their disposal.
For years, many in Jerusalem treated Trump’s affinity for Israel as strategic ballast. He moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and spoke about Israel with a warmth many previous presidents had withheld.
Those decisions were significant, but they were also a poor foundation for national strategy. Personal affection is not a strategic commitment. A president who sees foreign policy as a sequence of transactions will eventually transact with the enemy if the incentives point that way.
Catastrophe for Israel?
Iran has now proved the point. The United States and Iran have signed an interim agreement that extends the ceasefire for 60 days, covers Lebanon, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, waives sanctions, unfreezes Iranian assets, and moves the nuclear file to further talks.
The regime remains in place. Its missile program has not been dismantled. The deal is a strategic setback, perhaps even a catastrophe, for Israel, because Washington has effectively legitimized the very regime Israel sought to weaken or topple.
That is a betrayal in the ordinary political sense. Israel accepted the risks of a regional campaign on the assumption that Trump would remain aligned with Israel’s war aims.
Once the costs rose, especially around the closure of Hormuz, oil prices, Lebanon, and wider escalation, Trump did what he always does – he sought an exit that could be sold as a triumph.
Exit pattern
The pattern was evident long before Iran. In 2020, Trump signed the Doha agreement with the Taliban, paving the way for the withdrawal of American and coalition forces from Afghanistan. It was a foolish gamble that granted the Taliban legitimacy and control of the country while cutting the legs from under the Afghan National Army.
Ukraine learned the same lesson. Trump approached Russia’s invasion less as a struggle over European security than as a deal to be closed quickly, pressuring Kyiv into a minerals agreement central to retaining Washington’s support. The draft lacked concrete American security guarantees, exactly the point that mattered most to Ukraine. The Trump administration then worked tirelessly to broker a deal tantamount to Ukrainian surrender, until Trump lost interest and walked away.
Gaza is the one case where fairness requires balance. Trump deserves real credit for helping secure the return of the last surviving Israeli hostages. However, even with Gaza, warning signs were present. Trump celebrated a deal, a summit, and a declaration of peace, while the hard questions of Gaza’s governance, Hamas’s disarmament, and Israel’s long-term security remained unresolved. He delivered a genuine humanitarian achievement, then moved on to the next scene.
Transactional instincts
Iran was never going to be different. Trump wanted the prestige of breaking Tehran without paying the full price of a regional war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have believed that a president flattered by audacity would remain committed even when the campaign encountered the predictable frictions of geography, energy markets, Turkey, Hezbollah, the Gulf states, and American domestic politics. That was an extraordinary assumption.
The deeper failure lies in Jerusalem. No Israeli prime minister can ignore Washington. American munitions, air defense replenishment, spare parts, diplomatic cover, intelligence, and financing are central to Israel’s security architecture. Coordination with the United States is one thing. Making Washington the load-bearing wall of an Israeli theory of victory is another.
Netanyahu subordinated Israeli strategy to a man whose instincts were always transactional. He treated access to Trump as if it were control over him. He mistook alignment on rhetoric for alignment on the end state. He assumed that because Trump disliked Iran, he would share Israel’s patience, threat perception, and willingness to absorb escalation. Those are different propositions.
Israel’s enemies will study this carefully. Tehran has survived, gained time, and returned to negotiations with sanctions relief on the table. Hezbollah continues to fight against Israel from inside Lebanon. Gulf states have been reminded that open alignment with Israel carries costs, while Washington can still cut its own side deal. Turkey has seen that American policy can shift when pressure is applied at the right moment.
The Israeli lesson should be severe. Before embarking on any future regional campaign, Jerusalem must ask whether it can sustain the strategy if the American president loses interest, oil markets panic, Gulf capitals hedge, Turkey intervenes, or Washington decides that a deal with the enemy is more useful than loyalty to an ally. If the answer is no, the strategy is not ready.
Trump did not become Trump last week. He has always preferred the headline to the alliance, the signature ceremony to the aftermath, and the appearance of dominance to the discipline of statecraft.
Netanyahu’s error was to believe Israel would be the exception. Iran has shown that it was always going to be the rule.
Andrew Fox is a former British Army officer, senior fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, and co-host of The Brink podcast.