Washington held an unprecedented upper hand over Iran - then cashed it in - analysis

While the sequencing, economic incentive mechanisms, and specific steps required by Tehran remain unclear, the deal risks surrendering US leverage without paving the way for a framework to dismantle the regime’s nuclear program, limit its missile capabilities, curb its support for terrorism, or address its repression of the Iranian people.

Under Article 4, the United States removes the naval blockade within 30 days and withdraws its forces from Iran’s vicinity. In return, the Islamic Republic is merely expected to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage” of ships per Article 5, something it is already obligated to do under international law.

It also notes the regime will not charge for passage for 60 days, and mentions how Iran will coordinate with “Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait.”

Discussion surrounding tolling passing vessels, or placing Iran and Oman in charge of maritime traffic through the choke point, only emerged after the conflict and was part of Tehran’s maximalist demands. Simply including these ideas in the MoU lends legitimacy to claims of Iranian authority over the choke point rather than treating the passage as international waters.

The other theme is Washington surrendering its greatest source of leverage, the sanctions architecture created under Trump’s first term and further expanded under Trump’s second, through the maximum pressure campaign.

Under Article 9, Washington “will not impose new sanctions on Iran,” while Article 7 discusses terminating “all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic,” including UN Security Council sanctions, IAEA resolutions, and US primary and secondary sanctions.

The document does not contain a clear mechanism for the automatic reimposition of sanctions should the agreement collapse due to the regime failing to meet its obligations, a process referred to as “snapback.”

More importantly, in exchange for sanctions relief, Tehran merely “reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons” and broadly agrees to discuss a mechanism for disposing of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

Yet, instead of requiring the regime to dismantle its enrichment capabilities and allow inspections, the draft only expects Tehran to “discuss the issue of enrichment,” meaning Iran could once again be allowed to maintain the centrifuges needed to rapidly move toward weapons-grade enrichment if it chooses.

Article 10 states that the “Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives,” while the next section says Iran’s frozen funds, “whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment.”

In addition to allowing the regime to sell oil again, the agreement also grants Tehran access to tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets, primarily from oil, gas, and electricity payments blocked in banks in Qatar, Iraq, India, Japan, China, and elsewhere.

Going beyond granting waivers, it resembles extortion money paid by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to buy security from the local mafia, in this case, the Islamist regime.

The text also places no restrictions on how the regime may spend the money. There is no requirement that it be directed toward humanitarian goods, despite the regime’s long record of sanctions evasion and money laundering, so extensive that it has shared some of its methods with Russia.

Article 13 further conditions the start of final-status negotiations on the implementation of these measures, meaning Iran would begin receiving economic benefits before resolving the most contentious issues surrounding its nuclear program.

Article 1 of the MoU says that the US, the Islamic Republic “and their allies in the current war” agree to the “termination of military operations” in Lebanon and respect its “territorial integrity.”

This implicitly draws parallels between the alliance between the United States and Israel, two nation-states that are part of the democratic world order, and Tehran’s support for non-state terror networks.

Regime officials have already reassured Hezbollah that it would receive additional funding once frozen Iranian assets are released, and many have been vocal about how this deal is an opportunity to reestablish the regime’s so-called Axis of Resistance.

Not only is the regime’s repression of the Iranian people absent from the agenda, but the text also sidelines them under Article 2, which expects the two sides to “refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.”

The United States commits itself to ceasing support for the majority of Iranians, millions of whom took to the streets in January when Trump called on them to “take over your institutions” and promised that “help is on its way.” Some 40,000 unarmed protesters were massacred, hoping that real change was finally within reach.

The frozen Iranian assets generated from the sale of Iran’s natural resources belong to the Iranian people. Yet Washington is not only halting its support, but also handing those funds to their oppressors through waivers and sanctions relief. That money will help pay the repression personnel who open fire on the masses, hang dissidents, and seek to replace Iran’s national identity with Islamism.