The war exposed a second front: Israel's own decision-making - analysis
Israel’s next government must do more than confront external threats. It must restore sound decision-making, public trust, and democratic accountability as pillars of national security
Follow us on GoogleIsrael’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (C) and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir (R) visit the scene of a shooting at the Ramot road junction in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem on September 8, 2025. (photo credit: RONEN ZVULUN/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)ByAMICHAI COHEN
On October 27, Israelis will cast their ballots for the first time since the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks and the judicial overhaul controversy. They will do so after a period marked by profound internal divisions, far-reaching and controversial proposals to change Israel’s system of government, the October 7 massacre, and the longest war in Israel’s history – a war fought across multiple fronts, some of which presented challenges Israel had never faced on this scale. The government that emerges will face the formidable task of showing that Israel can defend itself without weakening the democratic foundations on which its security rests.
National security and democracy are often discussed separately. The past several years have shown that they are inseparable. The extraordinary burden on reservists, together with the unresolved question of haredi conscription, has intensified a debate that threatens the IDF’s character as a people’s army. Years of combat have also confronted soldiers and commanders with difficult ethical questions, while disputes over military conduct and investigations became a political flashpoint surrounding the Military Advocate General.
The failures of October 7 led IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi to accept responsibility and resign. The government’s attempt to dismiss Shin Bet director Ronen Bar, followed by Bar’s resignation, produced an unprecedented institutional confrontation. The appointments of David Zini to head the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and Roman Gofman to lead the Mossad were also challenged before the High Court of Justice.
These events reveal one of the central challenges awaiting the next government. The question is not only how Israel uses its security power, but who makes the decisions, through what process, and with what degree of accountability.
Restoring the system
The next government must first restore order to Israel’s national-security decision-making system.
In Israel, the full cabinet serves as the IDF’s “commander-in-chief,” which can designate a smaller security cabinet to make many national security decisions. Even before the war, it was clear that the security cabinet, the National Security Council – which is tasked with coordinating between the cabinet and the various security agencies – and their relationship with the IDF were not functioning as intended. The Submarine Affair showed how major decisions could be made without sufficient planning or the full involvement of relevant institutions.
During the war, authority shifted among the security cabinet, the war cabinet, and smaller informal forums. If recent reports about planning a campaign aimed at bringing about regime change in Iran are accurate, then here too, not all relevant institutions were fully involved.
National security leadership sometimes demands speed and secrecy, no doubt. But neither can justify bypassing institutions designed to test assumptions, examine alternatives, and clarify responsibility. A country facing complex threats on several fronts cannot afford to normalize improvised decision-making. These processes are a national security asset.
The people’s army
The second task is to repair the relationship between the IDF and the society it serves.
Some reservists have served hundreds of days over the past three years, with their families bearing the burden alongside them. When a democratic government demands sacrifices of this magnitude, it must show that they are necessary, that decisions are responsible, and that the burden is shared as fairly as possible.
The government cannot continue asking the same citizens to return repeatedly to reserve duty while leaving haredi conscription unresolved. It must make every possible effort to resolve this issue rather than manage it as a recurring political crisis.
The prolonged war has placed an unprecedented burden on Israel’s reservists. Two soldiers attend the funeral of 29-year-old soldier M.-Sgt. Alexander Filin, at the Haifa Military Cemetery, on June 21. (credit: Ilia Yefimovich/AFP via Getty Images)
Ethics of war
The next government and the IDF’s commanders must ensure that years of intensive combat have not eroded the military’s ethical foundations. The IDF’s ethical code guides soldiers and commanders in routine operations and wartime, setting out commitments including purity of arms, professionalism, responsibility, and duties toward the state and one another.
War places these values under immense pressure. It does not suspend them.
The controversy surrounding the Military Advocate General – which began with the investigation of reservists accused of abusing a Palestinian detainee and later expanded into a broader dispute over the conduct of the military prosecution – showed how quickly soldiers’ conduct and military investigations can become entangled in political conflict. An army that cannot examine alleged misconduct will struggle to remain faithful to its standards. But an investigative system perceived as politicized will also struggle to retain the confidence of soldiers and the public.
The government has a duty to ensure that the IDF remains committed to its ethical code and that its accountability mechanisms operate professionally and independently.
Above politics
Finally, the government and the heads of Israel’s security organizations must protect the professional and nonpartisan character of those institutions.
The Shin Bet, the Mossad, and other security bodies possess extraordinary powers over Israelis and foreign nationals alike. Those powers are legitimate only when exercised professionally and in service of the state, not to advance political or personal interests.
The controversies surrounding Bar, Zini, and Gofman therefore raised a broader question about the relationship between elected leaders and the security institutions under their authority.
A democratic government has the authority to determine policy and appoint senior officials, and security chiefs are accountable to it. But they serve the state and the law, not the personal or political interests of those temporarily holding office. Preserving that distinction is essential to democracy and effective national security.
Public trust is one of the security agencies’ most important assets. If citizens view them as partisan instruments, both their legitimacy and their ability to perform their missions will suffer.
On October 27, Israelis will decide who should lead the country. Whichever government emerges will inherit the same obligations: to repair national security decision-making, renew shared responsibility for military service, safeguard the IDF’s ethical character, and keep Israel’s security agencies professional and nonpartisan.
Security and democracy are not competing priorities. For Israel, they are mutually dependent. Military strength becomes harder to sustain when public trust, institutional discipline, sound decision-making processes and social solidarity erode.
Israel’s enemies will continue to test its strength. The next government will be judged by whether it can meet that test while protecting the democratic foundations that make Israel’s strength sustainable.■
Prof. Amichai Cohen is the vice president of research at the Israel Democracy Institute and a member of the Faculty of Law at Ono Academic College.
