Israel’s longest border runs along the Jordan River Valley, extending south from the Dead Sea to Eilat and Aqaba. I have spent time on multiple occasions with Israeli military intelligence in the field discussing weapons and drug smuggling, as well as the proposed billion-shekel project to construct a new security barrier.
The current barrier is dilapidated and must be replaced; even recognizing the limitations of physical barriers in the post-October 7 world, there is no substitute for boots on the ground working in conjunction with advanced technologies, which are equally indispensable.
Jordan is becoming increasingly fragile. Its monarchy was artificially transplanted from Arabia as compensation for the European colonial decision to back the House of Saud rather than the Hashemites.
The population is overwhelmingly Palestinian, heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, and broadly supportive of Hamas. Palestinians have not, in significant numbers or in any meaningful way, been integrated into the government or the highest levels of the security and defense establishment.
A fragile kingdom
Fifteen years ago, I asked Israeli security and defense officials what Israel would do if Jordan were on the verge of collapse. The majority told me Jordan was so vital to Israel’s security interests that the government would almost certainly intervene, even with boots on the ground to prop up the king.
I have asked that same question every few years, and today I hear almost unanimous agreement that Israel would not put its soldiers in harm’s way for Jordan. That does not preclude working behind the scenes or employing special forces if such actions could prove decisive.
Iran has had its eyes on Jordan for a long time. Even with the degradation of its proxy network, Tehran still views Jordan as fertile ground for destabilization, sowing anarchy, and supporting aligned terrorist groups to threaten Israel, its principal target for destruction.
The active phase of the war with Iran will end sooner or later, and if the Shiite jihadist regime survives, it will regard that alone as a victory. Jordan, Kuwait, the UAE, and other neighboring states will once again have to accommodate an emboldened and hostile theocracy. Tehran will regroup, rebuild, and continue pursuing its Shi’ite Twelver jihadist mission of regional expansion and domination.
Iran’s eastern opening
Just as Hamas, an Arab Sunni terrorist organization, aligned itself with Persian Shi’ites for a common strategic purpose, radical Sunnis in Jordan would likely accept Iranian Shi’ite financial support. Iran does not need to control Jordan to achieve its objectives. It needs only to create enough chaos to weaken the kingdom and threaten Israel.
Jordan is indispensable to Israel’s national security because it serves as the country’s strategic eastern buffer. For more than three decades, the peace treaty with Jordan has allowed Israel to concentrate its military resources on more immediate threats from Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Iran.
Should Jordan become unstable or fall under the influence of Iran or Islamist forces, Israel would suddenly face an active eastern front stretching hundreds of kilometers. Weapons, terrorists, and Iranian-backed militias could flow through Iraq into Jordan and ultimately toward the Jordan Valley and the West Bank, fundamentally altering Israel’s security environment.
Preserving Jordan’s stability is therefore not simply about protecting a peace treaty; it is about preventing Israel’s longest border from becoming its next major front.
Jordan’s future may be influenced most by its eastern neighbor, Iraq. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has inherited another fragile state that has long been under Iranian influence through Tehran-backed militias embedded within the Iraqi security forces and pro-Iranian politicians in Parliament. The majority of Iraqis, like Iranians, are Shi’ite. Yet Iraqis are Arab, while most Iranian Shi’ites are Persian, a significant divide that could potentially be exploited.
Prime Minister al-Zaidi is Washington’s hand-picked partner in the effort to reduce Iran’s grip on Iraq. Like many countries in the region, Iraq is plagued by corruption. His daunting challenge, assuming he is committed to it, is to bring the Iranian-backed militias under the authority of the Iraqi state or, preferably, remove them from the security forces altogether and restore Iraqi sovereignty.
The degree to which he succeeds may determine how stable Jordan remains. If Iraq can loosen Iran’s stranglehold, Jordan will have a greater opportunity to stabilize and resist Tehran’s ambitions.
For Jordan to prosper, it should look west toward Israel. Yet decades of anti-Semitic educational indoctrination, resulting in deep hostility toward Jews among much of the Jordanian public, make that difficult. I remember visiting Amman and finding copies of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion readily available for purchase.
The cold peace
Nevertheless, Israeli and Jordanian intelligence services cooperate because it is in both countries’ interests to prevent a Palestinian uprising, avoid a descent into anarchy, and counter Iranian subversion.
Israel needs a cold peace with Jordan for its long-term security. A genuine people-to-people peace remains an aspiration, but for now it is unrealistic, particularly while the Palestinian issue remains such a raw and emotional fault line. Expecting much more is wishful thinking.
The United States also has a strong interest in Jordan’s stability. Its principal leverage is the substantial financial assistance it provides to a country with limited natural resources and a non-indigenous monarchy ruling a population that is overwhelmingly Palestinian. The quid pro quo is straightforward: continued American economic support in exchange for stable relations with Israel and ongoing intelligence cooperation.
In the Middle East, that is often the best outcome one can realistically hope for.■
Dr. Eric R. Mandel is the Director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and the Senior Security Editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy advisors, the State Department, and think tanks.