Months after the joint US-Israel campaign against Iran began, and amid renewed US-Iranian hostilities in early September, Israelis remain deeply concerned about the threats facing the country. What has changed, however, is the public’s confidence that those threats can be decisively resolved.
At the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), we have repeatedly surveyed the public since October 7, 2023.
Our latest findings reveal growing doubts about what another campaign against Iran could achieve, whether US President Donald Trump can be counted on when Israeli and American interests diverge, and whether Israel’s leaders base national-security decisions primarily on security rather than political considerations.
The unease also extends inward: violent conflict between social groups ranks alongside a nuclear-armed Iran among Israel’s leading threats.
Together, these findings suggest a more sober understanding of insecurity, in which military power, American backing, and domestic cohesion can no longer be considered separately.
The Iran paradox
Israelis remain deeply concerned about Iran, but they have become far less confident that another military campaign could produce decisive results.
In March 2026, more than 80% of the public supported the US-Israeli campaign against Iran. Asked recently whether Israel should initiate another attack, the public was divided: 42% supported doing so, and 46% opposed.
That division becomes easier to understand when we consider what Israelis believe another campaign would actually achieve.
At the beginning of Operations Roaring Lion and Epic Fury, 63% expected major damage to Iran’s nuclear project, 73% expected the same for its missile arsenal, and 69% expected the regime to be significantly weakened or collapse.
After the campaign, only 30%, 42%, and 31%, respectively, believed those outcomes had occurred.
Asked what an additional campaign could achieve, only 29% expected it to fully or mostly dismantle the nuclear project, the same share expected it to dismantle the missile arsenal, and just 20% expected it to bring down the regime. Only 21% expected it to end Iranian support for terrorist organizations, while 16% expected a favorable agreement.
This skepticism has not made Iran appear less dangerous. A nuclear-armed Iran remained tied for first among the scenarios Israelis selected as one of the country’s three leading threats.
The share who considered Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons likely within the next five years rose from 36% in February to 43% in July.
The public therefore sees the threat as more likely, even as confidence that another military campaign could resolve it has fallen.
Trump without illusions
The same realism shapes attitudes toward an ally Israel can neither take for granted nor afford to lose.
In January 2025, as Trump returned to the White House, two-thirds of Israelis expected him to act in Israel’s security interests.
Recently, 58% said he supports Israel only when it serves his own interests, and 23% saw him as too unpredictable to rely on. Only 14% still viewed Trump as deeply committed to Israel’s security, down from 35% in the opening days of Operation Roaring Lion in early March.
But disillusionment is not independence. In June, 52% supported Israeli action against Iran even if it meant confrontation with Trump. By July, that share had fallen to 36%.
This caution about jeopardizing the US alliance extends beyond Iran: 63% said Israel should give great weight to preserving it when making decisions on the Palestinian issue.
Israelis’ caution reflects a broader recognition that the US alliance remains strategically indispensable, even as its durability feels less assured. Of the 14 scenarios examined in INSS’s Israeli Public Threat Perceptions Index, the sharpest rise in perceived likelihood concerned the loss of US support.
The share who considered this scenario likely within the next five years rose from 13% in February to 26% in July. Two-thirds believed such a loss would seriously harm Israel, and 59% said the country is poorly prepared for it.
The findings capture a growing tension – Israelis understand the crucial importance of American support, while becoming increasingly aware that it cannot be taken for granted.
The threat within
Israelis’ sense of vulnerability does not stop at Washington. At home, Israelis distinguish sharply between security institutions and political leaders.
High trust stood at 74% for the Mossad and 73% for the IDF, but only 31% for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and 25% for the government.
This gap is also evident in perceptions of how national-security decisions are made.
Only 39% believed national-security decisions are based mainly on security rather than political considerations, while 56% disagreed.
The partisan divide is stark. Among coalition voters, 64% believed security considerations predominate. Among opposition voters, only 17% did.
The implications extend beyond another familiar measure of polarization. When Israelis cannot agree whether decisions about war and peace are driven by security needs or political interests, polarization becomes part of the country’s security problem.
In July, 87% were worried about tensions within Israeli society, compared with 76% who were worried about external security threats. The difference was even wider among those who were very worried – 45% about internal tensions, compared with 23% about external threats.
Asked to select Israel’s three most threatening scenarios, respondents placed four clearly at the top: a nuclear-armed Iran and violent conflict between social groups within Israel (39% each), a large-scale missile attack on the home front (35%), and damage to Israel’s democratic character (31%). International isolation and sanctions followed at 26%.
Iran still ranked first when respondents were asked to identify a single leading threat, but domestic fracture occupies the same security landscape as missiles and nuclear weapons.
The contrast is even sharper in perceptions of preparedness.
Violent conflict between social groups was expected to cause the greatest harm, with 69% anticipating serious damage. Yet 64% rated Israel’s preparedness for it as low.
Preparedness was also rated low by 55% for damage to Israel’s democratic character, compared with only 32% for a nuclear-armed Iran.
The public thus sees the state as better equipped to confront an external enemy than to contain a breakdown within.
These domestic anxieties predate the Iran campaign. In February, 42% selected violent social conflict as one of Israel’s three leading threats, and 34% selected damage to Israel’s democratic character. Neither figure changed significantly in July.
Two elections, seven days apart
This changing public mood will soon meet an unusually concentrated political calendar. Israelis will elect the 26th Knesset on October 27. Seven days later, Americans will vote in congressional midterm elections that could change control of the House, the Senate, or both.
Both elections could dramatically shape the US-Israel relationship. In Israel, the next government will set policy toward Iran, Washington, and the Palestinians.
The Palestinian issue has received little attention during the campaign, but it is likely to return as regional initiatives involving the United States and Gulf states take shape. Israel’s choices will affect its relations with Washington, Europe, and regional actors.
The American elections come as the political consensus around Israel continues to weaken.
Some critics from both the progressive Left and the “America First” Right have portrayed Netanyahu as helping draw Trump into the Iran war, although they reach that conclusion from different directions.
For progressives, that charge forms part of a broader critique of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and the conduct of the war in Gaza.
For the “America First” Right, that charge reinforces opposition to foreign wars and commitments.
The balance that emerges in Congress could therefore shape not only funding and arms sales, but the broader future of American support for Israel.
The two elections will shape both sides of an alliance that Israelis see as essential but no longer take for granted.
Israelis will enter this political moment with fewer illusions about the choices facing their country. Taken together, repeated INSS surveys show little confidence that further military action will resolve Iran’s core threats. American support is viewed as crucial but uncertain, while internal division and distrust of political leadership are seen as security dangers in their own right.
The elections will therefore test whether political leaders can translate this realism into policy by setting achievable goals, acknowledging constraints, and explaining difficult trade-offs honestly.
If leaders continue to promise outcomes they cannot deliver, realism could instead give way to fatalism.
Israelis have adjusted their expectations. The test now is whether leaders in Jerusalem and Washington will do the same.■
Abir Gitlin is a Neubauer research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies and a PhD candidate in international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.