Israel beats enemies on multiple fronts but risks diplomatic setbacks - analysis

Everything has changed for Israel, with Iran, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah, and Syria.

Now, Israel has security zones everywhere, is unafraid to bludgeon its enemies if they look at it in the wrong way, including Iran, but is not using any diplomacy or any compromises to achieve its strategic goals, leading to continually dropping lows in its diplomatic strength. Given that diplomatic strength eventually impacts military strength, especially when it comes to the US, this is not a secondary issue.

Let's start with Iran.

Most observers forget that Israel and Iran have not fought twice in the last few years, but now rather five times.

It started in April 2024, got worse in October 2024, and then expanded much more in June 2025 and February 2026, with a smaller but not insignificant round (around 25 Iranian ballistic missiles and dozens of IDF fighter jet airstrikes) this week.

In this new Middle East, the constant rounds of big fighting is not between Israel and Hamas, but Jerusalem and Tehran.

In some ways, this new arrangement is worse for Israel, but in some ways it is much better.

It is worse because Iranian ballistic missiles are far more dangerous and scary than Hamas's low-class rockets.

But it is much better because now when Israel fights, it can directly damage, and in that way, speak to the head of the snake.

When Israel was getting bloodied by Hamas from Gaza, round after round, year after year, Iran did not care that Hamas was losing more fighters than Israel, because the Islamic Republic was sitting pretty drinking Kool-Aid on the sidelines 1,500 kilometers away.

Now Israel has shown it is ready, willing, and able to hold Iran accountable, and that when it does, the Jewish state will come out ahead, and the Islamic regime will lose something, or many things which are valuable.

Until now, Iran has also been under the misconception that Israel might be afraid to strike its nuclear program or ballistic missile program. Now it knows that no matter what paper it signs with the Trump administration, if it crosses certain redlines, the question about Israel striking would not be if, but when.

This may be more terrifying for Israel's citizens for short bursts of time, but Israel is militarily safer than Iran now that it has rewritten the rules.

Israel's legitimacy is the lowest it has been since the 1970s and possibly the lowest ever.

Every month that goes by without rebuilding in Gaza does not just hurt Hamas - it also hurts Israel.

Jerusalem needs to get some amount of disarmament from Hamas to move rebuilding past a certain point and to start partial reductions of its Gaza security zone (say from 50-70% to 30%, while Israel probably only needs 15%), but holding out for complete disarmament before rebuilding starts even in areas under Israeli control is harming long-term Israeli interests in the US, in Europe, and with Israel's Arab allies. That is only among Israel's allies. Obviously, with Israel's enemies, it is providing them with additional public relations ammunition for aggressive disinformation campaigns.

If after October 7, 2023, Israel needed to topple Hamas's military threat and ensure the terror group could not just rearm in the near future, it has by now done that and then some, but allowed its legitimacy to drop off a cliff - and much farther than was necessary.

While some Israeli officials may want to keep the focus only on Iran, and it was critical to set back the Islamic regime's nuclear and ballistic missile threats, ignoring Gaza is costing Israel far more than many are admitting.

The group went from being able to threaten the whole country with apocalyptic destruction by the sheer immensity of 150,000 rockets and missiles, to basically being a Hamas in the north, which can threaten the nearby northern areas, but not much more than that.

Moreover, anytime Hezbollah might provoke Israel, the air force can now exact harsh revenge without worrying about setting off judgment day, because Hezbollah no longer wields a judgment day-level threat.

Whether Israel can get Hezbollah to at least partially disarm - say, moving its rockets much farther away from Israel and keeping long-range precision rockets down under a certain number - in exchange for a withdrawal or partial withdrawal from southern Lebanon remains an open question.

But as with Gaza, the IDF is likely to hold some kind of security zone in Lebanon for the foreseeable future, since it cannot actually fully disarm Hezbollah.

Israel has had quiet from Syria now for over 18 months.

Syrian ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa has an al-Qaeda background and resume and may be a ‘wolf in sheep's’ clothing, but it is unclear what Israel would lose by a partial reduction of its huge Syrian buffer zone in exchange for Syria also demilitarizing in areas near Israel.

As long as Israel keeps a partial zone, jihadists should not be able to overrun any Israeli villages as they did from Gaza on October 7. And if al-Sharaa has decided not to fight Israel because he has too many internal problems, then a deal leading to a partial withdrawal for partial Syrian demilitarization

Israel has beaten its enemies, at least in relative terms, on every front. But it has failed to nail down any long-term diplomatic achievements, which would allow it to switch from fighting all the time to some of the time.

No one in Israel is talking about going back to the timid pre-October 7 positions, and Israeli military achievements have made Israel safer in the short and medium term. But if Israel does not remember how to do diplomacy before it is too late, eventually, its ignoring that critical arena will lead to the world, via Trump or others, imposing less desirable conditions on the Jewish state, including on its military abilities.