Terror intel. center provides Hamas Oct. 7 secret deception plan documents to 'Post' - exclusive

It also highlighted Hamas operatives "building the military [border] positions at a normal pace and continuing drills in a routine manner until the opening of the pressure campaign, which will provide an appropriate excuse for reducing (open military activities)."

Section 6 said that Hamas would "act to summon the Nukhba Force fighters repeatedly and in different ways, and in a manner which would cause 'the enemy' [Israel] to lose the ability to identify the moment of the attack."

According to Section 7, Hamas should put special efforts into evaluating special moments when its forces would be extra ready for an attack and when Israel and the IDF would have a reduced focus on defending from an attack.

In Section 8, Hamas recommended not only having the pattern of certain forces going to and from the border for drills to increase and be carried out in a way to confuse the IDF, but also that high level commanders be frequently sent to the border and that the broader volume of Hamas terrorists on the border be increased to make it even more difficult for the IDF to notice that anything unusual might happen.

The Amit Center then notes in its own analysis that top Hamas officials had proudly admitted after October 7 that they had utilized a systematic deception plan to fool Israel and the IDF into a sense of complacency and that the Gaza terror group was too deterred to mount any real threat.

According to the Amit Center, this deception plan included Hamas standing down during multiple rounds of conflict between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, even at the cost of looking weak in the Strip in the short term.

Top Hamas officials were totally willing to look weaker in the short term in order to fool Israel so that their larger "Big Project" surprise attack plan on Israel would later fully catch the Jewish state off guard.

In the intelligence center report, top Hamas officials are quoted as saying they "undertook unprecedented intelligence tactics to confuse Israel, including convincing Israelis that Hamas was afraid to go to war and just wanted to improve its economic situation.

According to the report, Hamas continued to send deceptive and pro-negotiation messages to Israel even in the days before October 7.

Next, from a year later, there is a September 25, 2023 document, Document Five, entitled "Situational Update Regarding the Second Stage of Pressure" from Mohammed Odeh [later became Hamas's chief briefly in May 2026 before himself being assassinated] to Yahya Sinwar.

According to the document, "The additional pressure on 'the enemy' caused it to work more intensely with 'middle-man negotiators' [such as the Qataris] to calm the situation. 'The Movement' [Hamas] presented official updated conditions regarding humanitarian aid."

Regarding strategy leading up to the invasion, which ended up taking place only two weeks later, the document emphasized the importance of the continuation of the marches until Hamas's goals would be achieved.

"Experience has shown that the enemy only responds to pressure. Jewish holidays represent opportunities in the short term," and in the medium term, there is a desire to calm matters in order to facilitate normalization with the Saudis and to avoid any connection between the different fronts, said a Hamas analysis of the current situation.

Next, the document said that pressure must be based on "political motivations and goals, including pressure, clear presentation of demands, and giving the enemy a reasonable time to respond."

Further, the document stated, "Our humanitarian goals are limited, and we can achieve them through patience and continuous pressure so that the amount of pressure and effort is attuned to the scope of the achievements."

In addition, the document said that the pressure should continue on September 24, but should be reduced on September 25-27. "This brief amount of time will allow the enemy time to respond, time to speak to the negotiators, and time to move more personnel and resources toward the border, in order to inflame it more," on September 28-29.

Moreover, the document said that, "the Movement should ensure that other armed groups do not overheat conflict on the border, which could be used to undermine Hamas's control of the national narrative [and by extension the future of the Big Project]."

After that, Hamas's internal analysis, the document issues a list of specific recommendations.

These recommendations included that, "It is critical to push into the public sphere the slogans which will ignite the situation, such as al-Aqsa, security prisoners, enemy aggressiveness against West Bank Palestinians, removing the Gaza sea blockade, the right to work, the right to travel, and the right to medical care" without being extorted at the Erez Crossing. "These must be inculcated with determination into the national Palestinian consciousness," added the document.

Next, it recommended that all military forces be kept up to date and ready to act.

Also, the document said there needs to be comprehensive efforts with Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, and Kuwait to keep pressure on Israel to improve the humanitarian and unemployment situation.

Curiously, Hamas recommended that a civilian delegation be sent to visit parliaments around the world to rally support for ending the sea blockade of Gaza and to encourage weekly and monthly protests outside American embassies worldwide for the same goal.

Another strategy from Hamas was to press for tying the Palestinian cause to the cause of restoring territory from Israel to Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Document Six from October 2, 2023, only five days before the invasion, is a "List of Those in Attendance from a Transcript of the Political Bureau of Hamas," – which was the last major meeting of the specific high committee.

Out of 22 members of the committee, the transcript noted that seven members were not present, including Khalil al-Hayya, Bassam Naim, and Kamal Abu Oun, with the reason for their absence labeled as "travel."

Hayya, who was Yahya Sinwar's top aide at the time, would fly to Qatar and serve as the main negotiator for Hamas over hostages and ceasefires over the course of the war.

He remains one of Hamas's top officials, though so many of the terror group's top officials have been killed by the IDF that there is currently some ambiguity about exactly who has which authorities.

Since Odeh was killed, Hamas has not announced a new military leader.

The Amit Center is unique because it is run by former top officials from IDF intelligence, the Mossad, and the Shin Bet, in addition to talented outside researchers, and has had special access to Hamas documents seized by IDF intelligence, on top of its high-level open source research.

Its current head is Col. (res.) Shlomo Mofaz.