Trump’s Iran deal may be worse than Obama’s, former Netanyahu security adviser says - opinion

For President Trump, the question is whether he wants to be remembered as the leader who corrected former US president Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, or as the one who signed an even worse agreement when Tehran was at its weakest.

The successful Israeli-American campaign against Iran destroyed significant portions of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile capabilities, and drone programs, but not all of it. It may have initiated a process that could eventually lead to regime change, but it could also trigger greater radicalization. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which effectively controls Iran and Supreme Leader Khamenei, now understands that only the acquisition of nuclear weapons can provide it with a true “insurance policy,” and it will do everything possible to achieve that objective.

By contrast, the emerging understanding between Iran and the United States, as I understand it, is hollow, devoid of substantive substance, and completely detached from the core issues. It addresses only what currently matters to the Trump administration and the Iranian regime: partially reopening the Strait of Hormuz to ease pressure on the global economy, particularly on the Gulf states, and enabling the flow of funds into Iran, including the removal of some sanctions.

All other provisions merely describe what the parties will discuss in future negotiations. Each side will interpret these provisions as it sees fit and claim victory. We are already witnessing this through Iranian statements regarding the agreement’s 14 principles and American responses dismissing those claims as fake news. In any case, it is difficult to believe that a good agreement will emerge from future negotiations.

Following the military campaign’s success and Iran’s unprecedented weakness, the United States should have continued its maximum-pressure campaign in Hormuz, expanded the naval blockade with an aerial component, and conducted extensive strikes against the regime's main interests while simultaneously holding discussions regarding a future settlement.

To pursue such a strategy, President Trump needed the full support of his closest advisers, particularly Vice President Vance, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner. Instead, he received the opposite. Domestic political pressures ahead of the midterm elections, concerns about fuel prices, pressure from Gulf allies, and military assessments suggesting that further pressure would take time to yield results all pushed him in the wrong direction.

Once the President mistakenly chose to pursue a hollow memorandum of understanding despite Iran’s consistent contempt and arrogance, he should at least have instructed his negotiating team to present one clear demand, one that Iran would almost certainly reject initially, but eventually accept when it had no alternative as pressure intensified: the complete dismantlement of everything that remains of Iran’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and drone programs, alongside an end to its support for terrorism and domestic repression, and the unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

These measures should have been implemented in practice, not merely discussed in negotiations scheduled to begin after signing the memorandum and the start of the release of funds to Iran. Iran would naturally oppose such demands, and in prolonged negotiations it has historically excelled at delaying and outmaneuvering its counterparts.

On the nuclear issue, it is not enough merely to suspend enrichment—even for decades—or to remove the enriched material (all levels) from Iran. Certainly, it is not enough to dilute it within Iran. What is required is the complete dismantlement of all enrichment facilities and capabilities, the destruction of all enriched material, the demolition of all existing and future underground enrichment facilities, and the closure of all weapons groups and supporting laboratories.

The emerging understanding appears to allow Iran to do exactly what it does best: engage in diplomatic maneuvering and delay tactics while projecting an illusion of victory that exists only in rhetoric and propaganda.

It is critical to acknowledge that Iran’s highest priority is the removal of crushing sanctions and the inflow of billions of dollars into its collapsing economy. Even a relatively modest influx of funds, combined with continued oil and gas exports, would enable the Revolutionary Guards, the de facto rulers of Iran, to suppress domestic dissent while using those resources to rebuild terrorist networks and proxy organizations, restore military capabilities and missile programs, including those capable of threatening the United States, and continue preparations for a future nuclear breakout after 2028.

A memorandum of understanding that consists only of meaningless Iranian declarations renouncing nuclear weapons while providing sanctions relief, financial resources, a partial solution to the Hormuz issue, and postponing all other critical matters to future negotiations would be a catastrophic mistake, and a deal it would have been better not to reach at all.

Such an agreement would also send a message to the Iranian people that the American president has once again abandoned the millions who took to the streets expecting the support President Trump had promised them. It would reduce the likelihood of regime change.

Linking this memorandum to the developments in Lebanon, if such a connection exists, and I sincerely hope it does not, would be highly problematic, particularly if it were binding. I am convinced that Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear to President Trump that Israel will not accept any such commitment.

The Iranian regime will continue to play the "dirty game," at which it excels. Only sustained and credible military pressure, combined with an intensified blockade, may persuade the Iranian leadership to alter its behavior. Continued pressure may also convince the Iranian people, who remain burdened by economic collapse and the destruction now visible before them, to renew their protests, as they did months after Operation Rising Lion. Ultimately, only the Iranian people themselves can replace the regime.