Can the Oslo Accords model still deliver peace after October 7? - opinion

The question facing policy-makers today is whether the type of agreement achieved through the 1993-1995 Oslo Accords could realistically be negotiated in the current regional and international environment.

The answer depends not only on the willingness of the parties but also on whether the foundational assumptions that enabled the Oslo process still exist.

This commitment was first articulated in the September 1993 exchange of letters between PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which the PLO formally committed itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict through negotiations.

The same principle was incorporated into both the 1993 Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) and the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II).

The parties agreed to end decades of confrontation, recognize one another’s legitimate political rights, and pursue a just and lasting peace through an agreed political process.

These principles reflected broader international norms embodied in the UN Charter, which emphasizes the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation and other mutually accepted mechanisms.

Accordingly, the Oslo framework established a transitional process leading to permanent-status negotiations.

The parties further agreed not to take unilateral measures that would alter the status of the territories pending the outcome of those negotiations.

Direct negotiation was therefore not merely one option among many; it was the foundation of the entire peace process.

Significantly, the Oslo Accords made no provision for international conferences, judicial intervention, imposed solutions, or unilateral recognition campaigns. Nor did they authorize third parties to determine the outcome of negotiations. The underlying assumption was that only direct engagement between the parties could create the trust necessary for lasting peace and coexistence.

Three decades later, however, a series of international, regional, and local developments has made a return to that framework increasingly difficult.

At the regional level, the rise of Iranian-backed extremism and jihadist movements has contributed to growing instability. Moderate Arab voices that once demonstrated a willingness to engage with Israel have come under increasing pressure from radical actors.

At the international level, political polarization has increasingly affected multilateral institutions. Radical and authoritarian regimes exercise growing influence within international organizations, often promoting agendas that undermine the original purposes of those institutions.

At the same time, international legal bodies have become increasingly politicized, with disputed legal questions frequently approached through predetermined political conclusions rather than impartial legal analysis.

The proceedings initiated against Israel before the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are viewed by many as examples of this trend.

Western politics has also been affected by ideological currents that increasingly shape public discourse and policy-making. Progressive activist movements, together with extensive foreign funding directed toward educational and cultural institutions, have contributed to narratives that often distort the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

At the same time, increasing international pressure for immediate Palestinian statehood bypasses the very negotiating framework established by Oslo. The accords envisaged that permanent-status issues would be resolved through direct agreement between the parties. Efforts by foreign governments and international organizations to recognize Palestinian statehood in advance of negotiations effectively prejudge issues that were expressly reserved for negotiation. Such initiatives undermine the contractual foundations of the peace process and further erode confidence in international guarantees.

This dynamic is closely related to the widespread international promotion of the “two-state solution.” While the concept has become a diplomatic slogan, it was never included in the Oslo Accords. The accords intentionally left all final-status arrangements open for negotiation. Whether the eventual outcome would involve two states, a federation, a confederation, or another arrangement was to be determined exclusively by the parties themselves. The transformation of the two-state formula from a possible negotiated outcome into a predetermined international prescription departs from the original logic of the peace process.

Further complicating matters is the absence of a unified and authoritative Palestinian leadership capable of serving as a reliable negotiating partner. At the same time, Israel faces its own internal political and governance challenges, which affect national cohesion and international perceptions of stability.

Against this backdrop, the Abraham Accords offer an alternative and more encouraging model. Announced in 2020, these agreements demonstrated that Arab states and Israel can establish peaceful, productive, and mutually beneficial relations based on shared interests and direct engagement. The accords emphasize coexistence, mutual understanding, cultural exchange, and regional cooperation. Their success suggests that meaningful progress is achievable when parties choose pragmatic cooperation over confrontation.

The central lesson remains unchanged. International forums, judicial bodies, and unilateral recognition initiatives were never intended to replace direct negotiation. Efforts to impose solutions from outside may satisfy short-term political interests, but they cannot create the trust, legitimacy, and mutual acceptance necessary for durable peace.

As long as international actors continue to bypass rather than encourage negotiation, instability is likely to persist. A viable and lasting peace can emerge only from direct engagement between the parties themselves.