Discussions over the future of the Gaza Strip have been eclipsed by the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Yet keen observers believe that Trump’s Gaza Plan is doomed. No international stabilization force is ready to step in, while the planned technocrat interim government has been intimidated out of entering the Strip by Hamas.
Moreover, Nickolay Mladenov, the High Representative for the Board of Peace for Gaza, reported to the UN Security Council that establishing an effective transitional civilian authority in Gaza is not possible without first overcoming Hamas’s resistance to disarming.
The war against Iran may end soon, as neither the US nor Iran appears eager to continue it. Subsequently, attention will move to other arenas. Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, has been weakened but remains well-armed and holds veto power over the Lebanese government’s decisions.
Similarly, Hamas in Gaza has resisted pressure to disarm and remains the de facto ruler of the territory it controls – over 30% of the Strip.
Unsurprisingly, terror armies such as Hezbollah and Hamas cannot be eliminated when their ideology commands broad support among the populations in which they operate and when they continue to receive military aid from abroad. Iran has enabled its proxies to survive.
'Total victory' against Hamas is unrealistic
In Israel, the IDF has presented plans to renew its assault on Hamas in order to achieve disarmament and deliver the “total victory” demanded by politicians.
Yet this goal is entirely unrealistic. Notably, Israel has not succeeded in eliminating or disarming Hamas in the West Bank, a territory that has been under IDF military control since 1967.
Meanwhile, polls consistently show that Hamas remains popular among Palestinians despite the immense suffering brought on by the October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel. Furthermore, Hamas has rebuilt its weapons-smuggling networks to recover from the blows dealt by the IDF, and is actively recruiting and training new fighters in preparation for an Israeli offensive.
While the IDF could take over the entirety of the Gaza Strip – and the prospect of a “decisive” victory is tempting – the wisdom of “finishing the job” is questionable for several reasons.
A conquest of the entire Gaza Strip would make its impoverished population of approximately two million people Israel’s direct responsibility.
Preserving the status quo – a divided Gaza – spares Israel this burden, which has already become a challenge for the international community following the adoption of the Trump Plan for Gaza by the UN Security Council.
Such a conquest would also transform the IDF, which currently operates in the roughly 60% of Gaza it controls – areas largely empty of civilian population – into an occupation army functioning among civilians who have been educated for years by Hamas to hate Israelis.
This kind of population provides fertile ground for Hamas to wage guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces. A “hearts and minds” strategy is not a realistic option for Israel, and any ambitious deradicalization project faces slim prospects of success, requiring a multi-generational timeframe. Israeli energies would be better directed elsewhere.
The multi-front war since October 7, 2023 has been the longest military engagement in Israel’s history. While Israeli society has displayed remarkable resilience and its economy has demonstrated considerable strength, Israel would welcome a respite.
The current deployment in Gaza – defending border communities that were in close proximity to Hamas – requires relatively few troops. Reigniting the Gaza front would necessitate a significant reserve mobilization and would be costly in both lives and resources.
The case for a full takeover of Gaza is not compelling enough at a time when Israelis are longing for some degree of normalcy.
A divided Gaza – one that leaves Hamas in control of a portion of the territory – also preserves the schism within the Palestinian national movement, Israel’s principal long-term adversary, which shows little sign of moderating its deep hostility toward the Jewish state.
This approach reflects Israel’s Gaza strategy following Hamas’s expulsion of the Palestinian Authority from the territory in June 2007.
That separation policy weakened the Palestinian national movement and its push for statehood, which is currently opposed by a large majority of Israelis who are not convinced that the Palestinians can become a reliable neighbor in the foreseeable future.
October 7, 2023, did not represent a failure of the separation policy per se. The failure lay in the IDF intelligence branch’s complacency and, more broadly, in Israel’s policy of restraint and containment.
The separation strategy wrongly embraced a “quiet for quiet” approach, tolerating recurrent missile attacks on its civilian population while allowing Hamas to substantially expand its military capabilities.
Israel failed to act aggressively enough to prevent that buildup. In a protracted and intractable conflict, “mowing the grass” – using military force periodically to degrade enemy capabilities, restore temporary deterrence, and extend the intervals between violent confrontations – is the only viable approach to adversaries, whether hostile states, terrorist organizations, or terrorist armies.
This concept offers no definitive endpoint and no decisive victory. It requires ongoing vigilance and periodic action, while acknowledging that the threat may always reemerge. In Gaza, Israel neglected this imperative.
A Hamas-controlled enclave in Gaza is therefore a bearable outcome – provided Israel remembers to “mow the grass” frequently enough. It also frees the IDF from occupation duties, which carry their own costs and complications.
Finally, restraint in Gaza may spare Israel the reflexive international criticism that so often greets its use of force, criticism that frequently rests on a fundamental misreading of the situation
The writer is the founder of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and currently a Senior Researcher there. He also serves as Chair of the Program for Strategy, Diplomacy and Security at the Shalem Academic Center.