Why diplomatic deals cannot fix revolutionary ambitions - opinion

There is endless debate about what would constitute a "good deal" between the United States and Iran. But I ask: What would have been a good deal for the tribe of Quraysh in 628 CE?

The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah is one of the most consequential agreements in history. Six years after leaving Mecca and establishing a community in Medina, Muhammad approached the city with a large group of followers. The Quraysh, who opposed him and viewed his movement as a threat, chose negotiation over confrontation. The result, on paper, was a ten-year truce.

Then, the agreement may have seemed reasonable because it reduced immediate tensions and created a period of stability. Yet in hindsight, we know how the story ended. Within a couple of years, Mecca came under Muslim control, the Quraysh eventually embraced Islam, and the Arabian Peninsula was transformed. The former culture and religion of the region was gone.

This raises an uncomfortable question. Was there any agreement the Quraysh could have signed that would have changed the story’s ending? Probably not.

Before continuing, it is important to clarify what this argument is—and is not. It is not a judgment on whether the rise of Islam was good or bad. For billions of Muslims and from the perspective of world history, the spread of Islam was one of the most influential developments in human civilization.

It is rather a factual question: if you were advising the leaders of Quraysh, and your objective was preserving their political, religious, and social order, was there any agreement they could realistically have signed that would have achieved that goal? In hindsight again, the answer appears to be no.

The reason has little to do with military power and everything to do with mission. Muhammad did not view himself as a political leader seeking a compromise with a neighboring tribe; he believed himself to be God's messenger. Mecca contained the Ka'ba, the most sacred site in Islam. For his movement to fulfill its purpose, Mecca could never remain outside its reach.

For the Quraysh, this was a fundamental problem. They may have wanted to be left alone to focus on their affairs and continue to flourish without unwanted conflict. But they were negotiating with an actor whose ambitions extended beyond coexistence. Any agreement could delay conflict, reshape the battlefield, or change the timing of events, but it could not eliminate the underlying strategic reality.

This piece of history offers a useful lens through which to view Iran.

Like the Quraysh, the United States would prefer Iran to focus on its own affairs and stop threatening its neighbors, sponsoring armed proxies, attacking American interests, and seeking regional dominance. Because Washington's objective is not to conquer Iran or transform Persian civilization. It wants a manageable relationship.

But the Islamic Republic does not define itself just as a nation-state pursuing ordinary national interests. Since 1979, it has presented itself as the vanguard of a revolutionary mission. Its constitution, institutions, and foreign policy are built around exporting that revolution, resisting the Western-led order, and confronting the perceived enemies of Islam.

This creates the same strategic dilemma the Quraysh faced. Can agreements with Iran reduce tensions? Certainly. Can they buy time, prevent escalation, improve military preparedness, or create diplomatic opportunities? Of course. But can they permanently resolve the conflict and secure the interests of the United States and its allies for the long run? I believe it cannot.

The lesson of Hudaybiyyah is not that negotiations are pointless. Agreements can create breathing room, reduce immediate dangers, buy time, and improve one's strategic position. Sometimes, they may be the best option available.

But they can only serve those purposes if they are understood for what they are: temporary arrangements, not permanent solutions. The danger arises when one side sees the truce as the end of the conflict and shifts its attention elsewhere, while the other side sees it as an intermission.

A pause in conflict does not necessarily mean both parties are resting. One side may be using the time to strengthen its position, expand its capabilities, consolidate support, and prepare for the next round. And if the agreement serves its interests, that is what one should expect it to do.

Therefore, a deal is only as durable as the objectives of the signatories. When one side's long-term identity and legitimacy depend upon continuing a struggle, any agreement is likely to be a pause rather than an endpoint. The Quraysh discovered this too late, but the United States must not.