Israel needs a smarter strategy for Lebanon - opinion

They deserve an honest assessment of what Israel is trying to accomplish in Lebanon and whether the methods it has relied upon for nearly half a century have any realistic chance of producing a lasting result.

For about 45 years, Israel’s approach has rested on a simple premise: Hezbollah threatens Israel, Lebanon cannot control Hezbollah, and therefore Israel must deal with Hezbollah itself.

The premise has survived governments of the Left, Center, and Right. It has survived invasions and withdrawals and repeated wars. Yet after four and a half decades, the outcomes are difficult to dispute.

If strategy is judged by results rather than intentions, this one has plainly failed.

The problem is not a lack of military capability. The problem is that the military objective and the political objective have never aligned. A buffer zone in southern Lebanon cannot eliminate Hezbollah.

The terror organization’s infrastructure, leadership, financial networks, and political influence extend far beyond the border region. Rocket fire does not depend on control of a few villages near the frontier.

A military presence may prevent infiltrations but does not solve the strategic challenge. Indeed, anyone serious about destroying Hezbollah militarily must acknowledge what such an undertaking would actually require.

It would not stop at a narrow strip of territory along the border. It would require a major campaign extending deep into Lebanon, all the way to the Bekaa Valley, where much of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and support apparatus is concentrated.

Such an effort would entail a prolonged occupation of large portions of the country, enormous financial costs, substantial Israeli casualties, and inevitably significant civilian suffering.

Hezbollah would not obligingly stand and fight as a conventional army. It would disperse, blend into civilian areas, and wage a prolonged insurgency. International pressure would grow steadily.

Images of destruction would dominate global coverage – as occurred with the fight against Hamas in Gaza. Eventually, outside powers would demand an end to the operation long before any ambitious vision of a Hezbollah-free Lebanon could be achieved.

There is a deeper problem as well. Israel’s current approach is squandering one of the most favorable political environments it has ever faced in Lebanon.

For years, Hezbollah justified its position by portraying itself as Lebanon’s defender against Israel. Today, many Lebanese see matters very differently.

After years of economic collapse, political dysfunction, regional adventures, and devastating conflict, Hezbollah is widely viewed as the principal obstacle to Lebanon’s recovery.

The Lebanese government is finally seeking a monopoly on force. Large segments of Lebanese society want a normal state – so that for the first time in decades, the interests of Israel and many Lebanese substantially overlap.

That overlap should be treated as a strategic asset. Instead, Israel risks destroying it. Every military operation that causes extensive damage inside Lebanon – as occurred again over the weekend – shifts attention away from Hezbollah’s role in the country’s predicament and redirects it toward Israel.

Every civilian casualty makes it easier for Hezbollah to wrap itself once again in the language of resistance and national defense. Every additional month of military activity narrows the distinction between Lebanon and Hezbollah precisely when Israel should be widening it.

The application of that lesson to Lebanon is misguided. Buffer zones reinforce Hezbollah’s longstanding claim that Israel harbors territorial ambitions in Lebanon – and hands Iran a role as “protector” of the country.

They weaken Israel’s legitimacy while offering only limited security benefits against threats that can emerge from far beyond the occupied area. Most importantly, they transform Israel from a country seeking security into a country that appears to covet territory beyond its recognized border.

Israel’s strongest position has always been that it seeks no Lebanese land whatsoever. That position should not merely be maintained but elevated into the centerpiece of a new strategy.

Israel should make clear that it is prepared to return fully to the international border and that its sole objective is security, not territory. Such a declaration would immediately alter the diplomatic conversation.

The focus would shift from Israel’s military presence to the far more important question of why an armed organization continues to operate outside the authority of the Lebanese state.

That is the conversation Israel should be encouraging because Hezbollah should not be treated primarily as Israel’s problem. It should be treated as Lebanon’s problem, the Arab world’s problem, and the international community’s problem.

For decades, Israel has effectively told the world that it will handle Hezbollah on its own. The predictable consequence is that the world views Hezbollah through the prism of Israeli military operations rather than through the prism of Lebanese sovereignty.

Israel assumes responsibility for solving the problem and then finds itself condemned for the methods available to it.

A smarter strategy would reverse that equation.

It should work closely with the Lebanese government rather than dismissing Lebanon because it is weak and incongruously threatening the country to take sterner action.

It should support international efforts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, improve border security, reduce Hezbollah’s patronage networks, and help Lebanese institutions establish effective authority throughout the country.

It should be open to the idea of a multinational force arriving to help the Lebanese.

None of this requires naivety about Lebanon’s limitations, and any strategy proposed will immediately draw a chorus of skeptical critics. But here, as elsewhere, maturity requires seeking the least-bad option, not a good one.

Is the least-bad option Israeli soldiers being killed every day in aid of a strategy that does not even eliminate Hezbollah? Is it more of the same – which has yielded a litany of failure? I do not think so.

If Israel abides by the ceasefire, so too, probably, will Hezbollah.

This is also what Iran wants because it has just secured an astounding capitulation deal from Trump. The ceasefire creates space for diplomacy, coalition-building, and experimentation. Israel should use that space.