In the heart of Jerusalem's city center, at 14 King George Street, there is a shop called Rachel Imenu's Corner. Within it, a profound human drama about the art of negotiation unfolds daily. This is the home turf of Mr. Yosef Yakovian, the protagonist of the documentary film I am currently working on a film titled For Shoes.
Yosef is a retailer of footwear and clothing, but for him, commerce is much more than a profession; bargaining, purchasing, and selling, reading environmental data, analyzing it, and taking action, have flowed in his veins since childhood, as is natural for a son of the culture of the Persian nation. Through his character, my camera seeks to capture an entire way of life that does not stop at the shop's doorstep but constitutes his gait, language, and second nature an ancient and intimate art that, amid the digital technological era and an accelerated Western culture, sometimes seems to be nearing its end.
"For shoes," as the Midrash reminds us, the brothers of Joseph the Righteous sold him to the Ishmaelites. Most readers tend to interpret this sale price as an expression of the cheapness of a brother's life, sold for a paltry and humiliating sum. But perhaps, from an alternative historical and psychological perspective, the "achievement" of the low price can be attributed precisely to the Ishmaelites the desert masters of negotiation, who even then knew how to identify the pressure and cracks on the opposing side, eroding the deal's price in their favor.
This seam, between the traditional art of commerce and the ability to turn human dynamics into a lever of power, is precisely the key to understanding what is happening today in the global arena. When one looks at the new Memorandum of Understanding signed between Iran and the United States, it becomes clear that this is not a random diplomatic maneuver; it is an instructive lesson in that Persian-Shi'ite negotiation architecture; a masterpiece that blends the political realism of "Mirrors for Kings," the bazaar mentality, and deep theological and legal principles of Ijtihad, Taqiyya, and Ghaibah.
The bazaar mentality and "Ta'arof" — the psychological lever
While Western leaders conduct diplomacy under a political stopwatch and media pressure, in Tehran they operate in entirely different units of time. The Persian bazaar is not merely a marketplace, but an institution where the opening price is never the final price, and time management is a flexible resource. This principle converges with the refined social code Ta'arof. Ta'arof sanctifies extreme politeness, displays of humility, and exaggerated gestures of respect, but in a political context, it serves as a sophisticated psychological cover designed to obscure intentions, exhaust the opponent, and make them feel morally inferior.
In modern negotiations, this mentality translates into the strategy of brinkmanship. The formula is constant: create a controlled crisis choking shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, uranium enrichment, or activating proxies and then demand that the West "pay" just to restore the situation to its previous state. This is precisely the mechanism underlying the current Memorandum of Understanding. Iran did not surrender a sovereign asset; it merely agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days. In return for this "gesture," it receives an immediate exemption from oil export sanctions and
access to frozen assets. The West breathes a sigh of relief, but in practice, it paid full price for goods that Iran had taken hostage just a few months ago.
While the Americans seek "quick fix" solutions to serve their political timelines, the Iranians act like carpet weavers: knot after knot, with endless patience. The current 60-day interim agreement provides Tehran with immediate economic oxygen, while all the difficult core issues the fate of 60% enriched uranium and the ballistic missile program have been pushed to further talks in Switzerland.
The literature of "Adab" and "Mirrors for Kings" — Persian political realism
To understand the roots of this cynical political realism, one must turn to the philosophy of the Near East. Those who most directly and practically shaped and wrote about the art of negotiation, diplomacy, and statecraft in our region
are not metaphysical philosophers, but Persian political thinkers and statesmen. In this cultural tradition, an entire literary genre developed known as "Mirrors for Kings" (Adab literature), which served as a practical guide for rulers, ministers, and ambassadors, distilling management and negotiation tactics centuries before Niccolò Machiavelli.
Three prominent Persian thinkers illustrate how these principles are deeply embedded in Tehran's political DNA:
- Ibn al-Muqaffa (8th century): In his philosophical-practical work, Al Adab al-Kabir (The Great Book of Life's Manners), he formulated strict rules for managing political relationships and the art of persuasion for the political echelon. He emphasized the supreme importance of concealing
intentions, demonstrating restraint and absolute emotional control, alongside the use of calculated compromises as a tool to achieve long term strategic goals. - Nizam al-Mulk (11th century): The grand vizier of the Seljuk Empire, who in his seminal work Siyasat-nama (The Book of Government), dedicated specific chapters to diplomacy and foreign relations. Mulk warned that envoys and ambassadors do not come merely to negotiate but to gather intelligence, identify internal weaknesses, and report on them. Accordingly, he developed tactics of delay and deterrence, teaching how to demonstrate manipulative power against the other side during discussions to manage the discourse from a position of strength and without resorting to war.
- Kai Ka'us (11th century): In his renowned work Qabus-nama, dedicated to the conduct of ambassadors, he outlines a model of applied psychology in negotiation. He emphasizes the dynamic need to adapt the message to the target audience: the negotiator must understand the psyche of the person opposite him, speak their language, and know exactly when to use soft and flattering language (similar to Ta'arof) and when to switch to aggressive, unequivocal, and threatening language.
The open gates of Ijtihad: Legal dynamism as a tactical weapon
Upon this historical-secular foundation, the religious layer is superimposed, fundamentally distinguishing the Sunni Muslim world from the Shi'ite-Iranian one, and projecting directly onto the negotiation table: the institution of Ijtihad interpretive innovation and independent legal reasoning.
According to accepted Sunni Muslim tradition, the "gates of Ijtihad were closed" as early as the tenth century. Although modern research on Islamic law has shown that in practice, independent legal reasoning never completely ceased and its gates were not hermetically sealed, in the institutional Sunni consciousness, the aspiration remained to adhere to past traditions and existing rulings (Taqlid). In contrast, in the Shi'ite world, and in Iran in particular, the gates of Ijtihad were never closed neither in theory nor in practice.
In Shi'ism, the Mujtahid (the senior religious scholar, usually holding the rank of ayatollah) possesses the authority, and indeed the obligation, to reinterpret divine laws anew according to the spirit of the times and changing circumstances. The sanctification of Ijtihad grants the Iranian leadership phenomenal legal and political plasticity and flexibility. While Sunni or Western leaders are often bound by rigid doctrines or written laws, the supreme leader in Iran can, in the name of the dynamism of Ijtihad and within the framework of protecting the interests of the Islamic state (Maslahat), alter religious rulings from one extreme to the other with a stroke of a pen. Suddenly, a compromise considered "treason" yesterday can be declared "heroic flexibility" today. The implication for negotiations is immense: Iran holds an inherent religious-legal license to display political acrobatics, change the rules of the game mid-course, and legitimize any tactical compromise without losing its religious legitimacy.
Between "Velayat-e Faqih" and "Ghaibah" — The asymmetry of concealment
This legal and historical flexibility converges perfectly with Iran's governmental-religious architecture: the absolute concealment of the supreme leader, the Rahbar. According to the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, the rule of the
jurisprudent shaped by Khomeini—the supreme leader is the official highest Mujtahid, holding absolute authority. However, this rule derives its legitimacy from the concept of Ghaibah, the occultation (disappearance) of the 12th Imam, the Mahdi, who vanished from mortal eyes and will return at the end of days. The supreme leader is perceived as filling his place and leading by his authority. Consequently, he is elevated above the common people and is not supposed to "dirty his hands" with daily political compromises or direct meetings with Western leaders. This cultural and religious distance plays a crucial political and operational role in negotiations, creating an absolute asymmetry within the negotiation room:
- Absolute immunity from direct responsibility: Since the supreme leader is not physically present in Geneva and does not sign any document, he holds an absolute and immune right of veto. He can, at any given moment, invalidate understandings reached by his envoys (such as Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf or Foreign Minister Araghchi), claiming they exceeded their authority or succumbed to pressure.
- Preservation of myth and deterrence: Preventing the leader's exposure to investigative journalism, difficult questions, or public confrontations maintains his aura of power, determination, and sanctity among his supporters in Iran and the network of proxies across the Middle East.
- Built-in division of roles: The leader remains ideologically rigid and pure, while allowing his articulate technocrats and diplomats to present a moderate and pragmatic facade to the West. This double game allows Iran to demonstrate "cultural offense" in response to harsh Western statements,
and to extract further concessions under the threat that "the conservatives at home will blow everything up.“
Legitimacy for concealment: The principle of "Taqiyya"
It is impossible to understand the Iranian willingness to sign agreements, such as the current agreement to return inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without understanding the concept of Taqiyya. Taqiyya is a religious injunction rooted in Shi'ism, which permits concealing one's true beliefs, lying, or presenting a false front in times of distress, danger, or a threat to the community.
In a political context, the leadership of the revolution perceives Iran as being in a constant struggle for survival against "global arrogance" (Western imperialism). Under this worldview, the use of ambiguity, signing vague formulations, and presenting false pretenses regarding the true intentions of the nuclear program are not seen as a lack of diplomatic integrity, but as a supreme religious and strategic duty to protect Islam and the revolution. Iran allows the return of inspectors (a tactical step) to remove the economic blockade, but reserves the right to interpret the extent of the inspection's "intrusiveness" at its most sensitive sites.
Conclusion and future outlook
The current Memorandum of Understanding does not mark the end of the diplomatic game, but rather the relocation of its pieces to a much more advanced and dangerous stage. While the West tends to celebrate short-term
tactical achievements of temporary calm or the opening of trade routes, Tehran conducts a broad strategic campaign in which time, patience, and cultural depth are the primary resources.
Just as the Ishmaelites in the desert knew how to buy Joseph "for shoes“ through a brilliant identification of the vulnerabilities and psychological pressure of the opposing side so too does the Iranian leadership continue to guide Western powers through the pathways of global negotiation. As long as Western perception insists on analyzing Tehran's moves through linear and technocratic lenses, while ignoring the historical and religious baggage that shapes its actions from the realist state theory of the Siyasat-nama, through the flexible legal space of Ijtihad, and up to the veil of ambiguity of Taqiyya it will find itself repeatedly led step by step, thread by thread, into the intricate Persian carpet woven for it by the diplomatic masters of the Islamic Republic.
The writer, a PhD, is a theater director, an expert on Iranian culture and religion, and is a member of the Bama Tova organization.