As Israel heads toward the October 27 election, public opinion polls consistently provide the current opposition with better prospects of winning. Whether it ultimately prevails remains uncertain.
However, given current daunting national challenges – domestic, regional, and international – it is worth examining the positions and likely policies of those who could soon form the next government.
To be sure, no incoming government is likely to resolve every fundamental challenge confronting Israel. Specifically, those who judge a government solely by whether it can achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement within a year or two will almost certainly be disappointed.
However wise, courageous, and resourceful leadership might be, conditions for a two-state solution hardened in the wake of the October 7 atrocities and the ensuing multi-front war. They had not been easy before the prolonged national trauma either.
Nonetheless, the discernible broad consensus among the five opposition party leaders on several major domestic, security, and foreign policy issues suggests the potential for changes with far-reaching implications.
Clearly, there are differences among the five, and those differences matter and are noteworthy. Still, they do not obscure the broader picture whereby some fundamental course corrections can be expected.
The first disagreement to be manifest even before being sworn in has to do with coalition formation. Should the Zionist opposition parties fall short of the 61-seat majority needed to govern: Do they rely on an Arab party? Some opposition leaders argue that any party accepting the coalition’s governing principles is a legitimate partner.
Others contend that, after Oct. 7, public sentiment makes such a coalition politically untenable. Experience suggests, however, that the expiration date of many political “nevers" arrives with election results: when leaders must choose between yesterday’s articulated “no” and tomorrow’s opportunity to govern.
Beyond that question, the areas of agreement can be grouped under two banners: democracy at home; diplomacy abroad.
Domestically, the opposition is determined to reinvigorate institutional pillars of Israeli democracy weakened in recent years. That includes forming the long-delayed though legally prescribed National Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events that led up to Oct. 7, the security collapse on that day, and the events that followed.
It also includes restoring the independence and authority of the judiciary – first and foremost of the Supreme Court, and protecting the attorney general and other gatekeepers who have braved vicious assaults by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and members of his coalition.
That agenda also features restoring a police culture focused on serving all citizens equally, Israel’s Arab minority and anti-government protesters included. It involves ending the skewing of the national budget in the service of the sectoral interests of coalition partners – lavish funding of the settlement enterprise included.
High on their agenda is promoting national service – military or civil – for all, and making mandatory universal school core-curriculum that prepares the next generation for life in our startup nation.
Changing course
On foreign and security policy, the most significant shift would be restoring diplomacy as an indispensable complement to military power.
Rather than treating diplomacy as a nuisance, forced upon Israel by Washington – in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, even being excluded from the Iran negotiations – the emerging consensus sees Israel’s military achievements as assets to be leveraged via diplomacy into a more stable environment.
To the five, this calls for Israel to take the diplomatic initiative and closely coordinate with the United States, regional partners and other stakeholders.
In Gaza, that means working with, rather than against, US President Donald Trump’s 20-Point Plan, including the removal of the veto over the PA role, which is essential for process legitimacy, third-party participation, and disarming Hamas.
Here too, differences exist. Some believe the plan can only become viable after Hamas suffers another major military defeat. Others regard renewed large-scale fighting as strategically futile.
While Washington might have something to say about the Gaza next step, it is likely to find all five sharing the objective of replacing an open-ended military campaign and occupation with a viable political strategy seeking to secure no future threat emanating from the Strip.
In Lebanon, it envisions strengthening, rather than undermining, the courageous government and its armed forces to the point when they can stand up to Hezbollah, all in pursuit of an end to the war, and a gradual process toward peace between the two countries.
In both Lebanon and Syria, it suggests phased withdrawal from occupied security zones in exchange for credible security arrangements.
When it comes to the Palestinian issue, disagreement over the ultimate endgame often obscures the considerable consensus regarding governing logic and early steps.
The opposition leaders differ profoundly over whether a Palestinian state should eventually emerge. For some, it remains essential to preserving Israel as both Jewish and democratic. For at least one of them, it remains unacceptable.
Yet all appear to agree that the decade-long strategy of “Hamas is an asset” and its practical manifestation in weakening moderates while nourishing extremists must be reversed. Consequently, they view the PA not as an enemy to be dismantled – as pursued by members of the Netanyahu cabinet, but as a partner.
A flawed one, but a partner nonetheless. Some expect it to evolve into the nucleus of a future state. Others consider it an alternative to Israel running (and funding) the lives of millions of Palestinians. The short-term practical implications are remarkably similar.
They include releasing Palestinian tax revenues, renewing cooperation with PA ministries, enhancing coordination with its security agencies, and providing the PA with the space and opportunity to improve governance and undergo reforms.
No less significant is the common resolve to enforce the law uncompromisingly on Jewish terrorists, prevent settlement incursions into Areas A and B, and reverse some of the more provocative and violent outposts and so-called “farms.”
Whether at some point such a government could agree on language concerning a path toward a future two-state solution that is sufficiently constructive to revive Saudi normalization and regional integration while preserving internal unity remains, at best, uncertain.
What is far less uncertain is that it would represent a profound departure from the current government trajectory. Externally, it would change course from force alone on all fronts to strength-based diplomacy; change dynamics on the West Bank; uncork the Gaza plan; and facilitate a new chapter with Lebanon and possibly Syria.
Internally, it would restore commitments to democratic values and institutions. In so doing, such a government would promote cohesion at home and strive to turn the tide against Israel in the region and the world.
That is not a revolution, but not bad for a reset.
The writer served as policy adviser and special envoy to the late prime minister Shimon Peres. He is a fellow with the Israel Policy Forum and the Economic Cooperation Foundation and a member of the leadership of Commanders for Israel’s Security.