The Gulf tried to prosper without choosing sides. Iran is making that impossible - opinion

“Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war.”

That is the question now confronting the Gulf States.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf States have pursued an ambitious strategy: rely on the American security umbrella, maintain dialogue with Iran, deepen trade with China, and develop ties with Israel where interests converge.

The goal was to avoid fully aligning with any one camp while turning the Gulf into an island of stability and prosperity in a volatile region.

This rational hedging became part of the economic model on which the Gulf’s future was built.

Saudi Vision 2030, Dubai and Abu Dhabi’s financial hubs, Qatar’s LNG industry, and the region’s airlines, ports, tourism, technology, and foreign investment all rest on the assumption that the Gulf can insulate its prosperity from regional turmoil while maintaining security ties with Washington, trade with Beijing, and dialogue with Tehran.

The current war threatens that assumption.

The Gulf States were not wrong about the cost of war. Regional conflict threatens infrastructure, shipping, foreign investment, and projects worth hundreds of billions of dollars. The question is whether staying out could ever shield them from its consequences.

To the east lies the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran can threaten a vital global energy artery. To the west lies the Bab al-Mandab Strait, where the Houthis can threaten Red Sea shipping. The war Gulf States spent years trying to keep at arm’s length has reached them from both directions.

For years, Israel asked how other countries would respond if missiles were routinely fired at their civilians. The Gulf States are now confronting that question themselves. Israel spent decades building air defenses, civil resilience, and the capacity to function under sustained attack. The Gulf must now ask whether it has built the same resilience.

Saudi Arabia’s renewed use of force against the Houthis does not mean Riyadh wants a regional war. It underscores a crucial distinction: avoiding war cannot come at the expense of convincing an adversary that escalation carries a price.

Israel’s advantage lies not simply in military power, but in the credibility of its threat. Tehran knows Israel has demonstrated a willingness to use force even at high military, economic, and diplomatic cost. Deterrence depends not only on capability, but on what an adversary believes a country is willing to do.

Netanyahu has consistently viewed a strong, innovative economy as a pillar of national security, giving Israel the financial endurance to absorb the costs of extended conflict while continuing to fight and function.

By contrast, the Gulf States possess vast wealth, but their dependence on energy infrastructure, global trade, aviation, tourism, and international investment makes them far more vulnerable to prolonged regional warfare.

Israel has also recognized the strategic vacuum created by Gulf hedging and Washington’s reluctance to be drawn into another regional war. For years, Netanyahu has sought to turn Israel’s military power into a regional asset, positioning it as the one regional actor both capable and willing to confront Iran directly.

Tehran must factor in the risk: escalation with Israel could push the Gulf States closer to Israel and strengthen its role as a security anchor against the Iranian threat.

The Gulf States pursued security differently – through diversified partnerships, de-escalation, trade, and reduced friction. But if military pressure can shape a neighbor’s behavior, hedging can turn from an insurance policy into a vulnerability.

This is not “the language of the Middle East.” It is the language of international politics. Pressure that succeeds invites more pressure. Diplomacy backed by credible deterrence can produce an agreement. Diplomacy, interpreted as an unwillingness to confront, may simply buy time until the next crisis.

Will it act when American forces are attacked? When navigation through Hormuz is threatened? When Gulf partners come under attack? Or will it conclude that Iran’s recurring ability to threaten the regional order is itself the problem?

America in 1939 had not concluded that the war in Europe was America’s war. Pearl Harbor changed that calculation overnight. History need not repeat itself for threat perceptions to change rapidly when a distant conflict becomes a direct challenge to national interests.

A dramatically weakened Iran or regime collapse could create a vacuum, allowing Turkey to expand its influence while China and Russia seek opportunities. Iraq after 2003 reminds us that defeating an enemy is no substitute for a strategy for what comes next.

But fear of the day after cannot make preserving today’s threat a strategy. Deterrence and preparation for the next regional order must proceed simultaneously.

The current war may be bringing that luxury to an end.

Iran is confronting them with a harder question than whether to choose peace or war: Can they continue to prosper without choosing who will defend the regional order that makes that prosperity possible?

The Gulf built its future on the assumption that it would never have to choose a side.

Iran may be choosing for it.