Who are Hamas’s adversaries in Gaza? - opinion

Hamas’s internal security and counter-intelligence apparatus in Gaza includes a specialized unit known as the Radaa Force. It is focused on monitoring threats to Hamas from rival factions and on identifying dissidents, suspected informants, and “collaborators” working with Israel.

The size, command structure, and exact responsibilities of the Radaa Force are uncertain; Hamas has revealed few details about it. Its name derives from an Arabic root meaning “deterrence” or “prevention.”

“We say to all members of the collaborator gangs,” ran the Radaa Force statement, “that assassinating senior collaborators in these groups will be your salvation – before us, and before your people.”

The most internationally visible, and arguably most consequential, of the anti-Hamas armed networks in Gaza is known as the “Popular Forces.” Originally led by Yasser Abu Shabab until his death in December 2025, it is now under the leadership of Ghassan Duhine, his deputy. It is the only anti-Hamas force that appears to have reached battalion-scale strength. Estimates range up to 700 fighters.

Subsequent reporting by the Associated Press and other outlets identified Abu Shabab’s Popular Forces as one of the groups receiving such support.

Reported assistance included weapons, intelligence, logistical support, access to Israeli-controlled areas, and protection from Hamas. The reported activities of the Popular Forces include an attack on a Hamas facility near Khan Yunis that the group alleged was being used to store aid confiscated by Hamas.

Unlike Fatah, the Popular Forces do not prioritize Palestinian nationalism or a state-building ideology. Abu Shabab publicly condemned the brutal onslaught on October 7, 2023, and argued Hamas had brought catastrophe on Gaza.

Politically, this group is the least clearly ideological of the major formations. Its motivations seem to combine anti-Hamas hostility, tribal autonomy, economic interests, personal power, and dependence upon Israeli patronage. Its principal political proposition is effectively that Hamas must be removed and that local Palestinian actors should assume control.

The Popular Forces’ politics are moved partly by clan interests. The Abu Shabab clan is a large family network in the Rafah area of southern Gaza, connected to the larger transborder Tarabin tribal network, which extends into Sinai. Its priorities are protecting its local influence, its territory, economic resources, and clan autonomy.

Hamas has traditionally sought to subordinate armed groups and local power brokers to its own authority. During periods when Hamas’s control has weakened because of war, some clans – the Popular Forces among them – have sought to expand their own security and political roles.

The second particularly important anti-Hamas organization in Gaza is the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force (CTSF), centered on Khan Yunis and commanded by Hussam al-Astal. Al-Astal has a security service background within the Palestinian Authority, and his opposition to Hamas is more political and institutional than purely tribal.

The declared objective of the CTSF (sometimes known simply as the Anti-Terror Force) is the removal of Hamas and the establishment of an alternative security authority. Al-Astal portrays his organization as an independent Palestinian anti-Hamas force, though there is significant evidence of operational cooperation with Israel.

The group crossed an important threshold on January 12, 2026, when gunmen killed Mahmoud al-Astal, a senior Hamas police officer. Hussam al-Astal’s organization publicly claimed responsibility. Hamas described the perpetrators as Israeli collaborators.

The common surname is almost certainly not accidental. Mahmoud al-Astal and Hussam al-Astal appear to have belonged to the same extended al-Astal clan, but they were aligned with opposing political-military camps. Publicly available sources do not identify their precise familial relationship.

The Hellis clan represents a third category of anti-Hamas groupings.

The al-Majayda clan is based in Khan Yunis, and it, too, has become involved in the struggle over postwar authority. Members have clashed with Hamas during attempts by Hamas security forces to arrest suspects.

Although the clan has criticized Hamas’s use of extrajudicial violence, its political position is notably ambiguous. At least one senior al-Majayda figure subsequently expressed support for Hamas’s efforts to restore order.

The al-Majayda clan has been linked to the CTSF through local alliances and cooperation, although the clan and the militia are distinct entities.

The Doghmosh clan is somewhat different from the others. It is not primarily an Israeli-backed militia. It is one of Gaza’s long-standing armed families and has historically shifted between relationships with Hamas, Fatah, Salafist groups, and independent activity.

As for the 20-point Trump peace plan for Gaza, there is no evidence that any major anti-Hamas militia has formally adopted the plan as its platform.

Some – especially the Popular Forces – have objectives that overlap with key parts of the plan, particularly supporting a post-Hamas administration after ending Hamas rule. Others – anti-Hamas though they are – seem more intent on pursuing their own narrower interests.