Gadi Eisenkot presents himself as one of the most serious and honest figures in Israeli politics. His record of military and public service gives him credibility on the questions that will determine Israel’s future: security, the Palestinians, and the character of the State of Israel.
That is why his opposition to the two-state solution deserves scrutiny. Eisenkot is entitled to oppose Palestinian statehood. But if he does, Israelis should ask one simple question: What is your alternative?
An alternative to the two-state solution
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s years in power have shown that his approach was based on the proposition that the Palestinian conflict did not need to be solved. It could be “managed.” Israel could control the West Bank, contain Hamas in Gaza, periodically use military force, and indefinitely postpone the political future of millions of Palestinians.
October 7 should have destroyed that doctrine.
Yet if Eisenkot rejects two states without offering another political destination, what fundamentally distinguishes his strategy from Netanyahu’s? Better management and more competent security policy matter enormously, but they do not answer the fundamental question.
Israelis have every reason to be skeptical of Palestinian statehood after October 7. The massacre shattered assumptions about Hamas, deterrence, and Israel’s security doctrine. But October 7 did not make the Palestinians disappear, nor did it alter the demographic and political reality between the Mediterranean and the Jordan.
There is still no viable alternative to political separation if Israel intends to remain the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people. Stronger fences, better intelligence, and more soldiers may be necessary, but they are instruments, not a strategy. The deeper lesson of October 7 is that the Palestinian question cannot be contained indefinitely.
It is legitimate for Eisenkot to insist that a Palestinian state must be demilitarized, that Palestinian institutions require profound reform, and that effective security arrangements must ensure that the West Bank never becomes another Gaza. But these are arguments about the conditions under which Palestinian statehood could safely emerge. They do not answer what replaces it.
If not two states, what? Permanent Israeli control? Annexation? Palestinian autonomy without sovereignty? Or Palestinian statehood as a future objective after reform, demilitarization, and enforceable security guarantees? Israelis deserve to know.
There are approximately equal numbers of Jews and Palestinians between the river and the sea. Neither people is going anywhere. Israel’s military superiority can defeat armies and destroy military infrastructure. It cannot make another people disappear or permanently abandon its demand for political rights.
Permanent Israeli control therefore leads toward one of two outcomes: a binational state that ends Israel’s character as the nation-state of the Jewish people, or permanent domination of millions of Palestinians without equal political rights, undermining Israel’s democracy and guaranteeing continued conflict.
That is why “I oppose two states” is not a policy unless it is followed by “and here is what I propose instead.” Perhaps Eisenkot’s position is partly electoral. “Palestinian state” has become politically toxic for many Israelis since October 7, and a politician competing for center and center-right voters may regard support for two states as dangerous.
But this is precisely where leadership matters.
The defining characteristic of leadership is not simply the ability to read public opinion and follow it but the willingness to shape it when reality demands. Leaders identify dangers, explain difficult truths, and build support for what they believe serves their country’s long-term interests.
Eisenkot, of all people, should understand this. As a former IDF chief of staff, he knows that military force must serve a political objective. Winning battles without defining the political reality that should follow them is not strategy. Replacing Netanyahu with a more competent leader while retaining Netanyahu’s fundamental doctrine toward the Palestinians would amount to better management of the same failed strategy.
There is another dimension Eisenkot should consider: Israeli leaders can influence Palestinian politics. Palestinians are approaching their first legislative election since 2006. The message they hear from Israel matters. Palestinian advocates of diplomacy have long confronted the argument that Israel will never permit genuine Palestinian independence regardless of what Palestinians do. Every Israeli leader who declares that there will never be a Palestinian state strengthens that argument and weakens those Palestinians advocating a political path.
Eisenkot could send a very different message. He could tell Palestinians: If you elect a genuinely democratic leadership that seeks peace with Israel, rejects terrorism, accepts one authority, one law, and one legitimate weapon, and recognizes the historic connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, you will find an Israeli partner prepared to work with you toward two states, security, and peace.
Recognizing the Jewish connection to this land does not require Palestinians to surrender their own connection. The historical attachments of two peoples do not have to cancel each other out.
The message must also be clear on security. Israel will always do whatever is necessary to protect its people. Any agreement must include credible and enforceable security arrangements. But if Palestinians elect leaders genuinely prepared for peace, Israel should be prepared to recognize them as partners and respond.
Israel should not tell Palestinians: It makes no difference whom you elect; there will never be a Palestinian state. It should say: Choose peace, and you will find Israelis prepared to choose peace with you.
That message could influence Palestinian politics. If Palestinian voters believe that electing pragmatic leaders can advance their freedom and independence, they have a reason to choose them. If Israel tells them no political choice can ever change their situation, it strengthens those who claim diplomacy is useless.
The Israeli election can influence the Palestinian election, just as the Palestinian election can influence Israel’s future.
A future two-state agreement cannot simply reproduce Oslo or pretend October 7 never happened. Palestinian statehood must include demilitarization, accountable democratic institutions, one legitimate government and armed force, enforceable security arrangements, and regional participation in security and reconstruction. Israel must retain the ability to defend itself against genuine threats.
There is much to debate about implementation. But first Israel must decide where it ultimately wants to go. The principle is simple: Israel will never have security until Palestinians have freedom, and Palestinians will never have freedom until Israel has security. These are not competing objectives. Each depends on the other.
A Palestinian leadership that recognizes the Jewish people’s connection to this land, rejects terrorism, and accepts Israel’s legitimate security needs should encounter Israeli leaders willing to say: We recognize you as a partner. Let us work together so that both peoples can live with freedom, security, dignity, and peace.
That is leadership. It does not wait passively for the perfect partner to appear. It helps create the political conditions in which partnership can succeed.
Eisenkot has every right to reject a particular agreement, Palestinian leadership, or timetable. But a man asking Israelis to entrust him with national leadership cannot merely reflect public fear. He must tell Israelis where he intends to lead them – and be prepared to shape public opinion to get there.
Israel has already tested the proposition that the Palestinian conflict can be managed indefinitely. October 7 was the most devastating evidence imaginable that it cannot.
Eisenkot should tell us what he learned from that failure – and what his alternative is.
The writer is the Middle East director of the International Communities Organization and the co-head of the Alliance for Two States.