A dialogue between a serving Mossad director and a Syrian foreign minister is no ordinary occurrence. Several days after speaking by telephone, the two met in an effort to defuse tensions following an Israeli strike on an airbase in northwestern Syria.
According to Israel, Turkey intended to deploy radar systems and unmanned aerial vehicles at the base, followed by air-defense systems and military personnel. Damascus and Ankara denied that there were plans to establish a permanent Turkish presence there.
The incident reflects Israel’s growing concern over Turkey’s expanding involvement in Syria. Indeed, Ankara has become one of the new Syrian government’s most important partners. It is helping to rebuild the Syrian army, training officers and soldiers, and investing in infrastructure.
In doing so, Turkey seeks to translate its long-standing involvement in Syria into broader regional influence. From Israel’s perspective, the deployment of Turkish-made radar and advanced air-defense systems could restrict the Israel Air Force’s freedom of action in Syria and Lebanon and hamper operations intended to prevent Iran from reestablishing its presence or transferring weapons to Hezbollah.
These concerns should not, of course, be dismissed. Turkey’s military involvement in Syria is real, and it is unfolding amid a severe deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations. Israel cannot remain indifferent to the possibility that a regional power pursuing a hostile policy toward it might deploy advanced military capabilities in Syria.
Yet even justified concerns can lead to miscalculation and an excessive response, producing an unwanted escalation. A widespread assumption in Israel holds that the new Syrian government has subordinated itself to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s interests and ambitions. This, however, is far from reflecting the reality.
Turkey’s influence in Damascus is considerable, but it is not unlimited. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has been careful to cultivate relations with the United States, the Gulf states, and other regional and international actors, partly to avoid excessive dependence on Ankara. Syria certainly needs Turkish assistance, but this does not mean that it wishes to become a Turkish client state.
Syria willing ot have relations with Israel
Indeed, Damascus’s willingness to engage with Israel indicates its desire to diversify its relationships and preserve an independent sphere of action. Moreover, the fact that Syria has not denied the contacts between the two countries suggests that it does not regard relations with Israel as something improper or illegitimate that must be concealed.
Israel should therefore avoid interpreting every instance of military cooperation between Turkey and Syria as evidence that the latter is becoming an Erdogan forward base. Such an approach, which treats relations among the three states as a zero-sum game, could itself generate escalation.
It is possible that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has an underlying political objective: manufacturing a security crisis for electoral purposes. If so, both Syria and Turkey appear to have chosen to lower the temperature. It is essential to distinguish between the existence of a genuine threat and political manipulation. The problem is that most members of the public lack access to intelligence information and are therefore unable to distinguish between the two.
Beyond the political dimension, the strike in Syria reveals a contradiction in Israeli policy. The current government is not necessarily interested in strengthening Syria’s central government, based on the assumption that a weak and fragmented Syria gives Israel greater freedom of action and prevents the reemergence of a threat from the north. In the short term, limited Syrian weakness offers Israel tactical advantages and has also enabled it to seize additional territory under the mantle of security.
Israel’s long-term interest, however, lies in the existence of a stable Syrian state governed by a regime that constitutes a clear address, exercises control over its territory, restrains armed organizations, combats smuggling networks, and prevents Iran and Hezbollah from rebuilding their presence.
These goals can be achieved only if the Syrian government stabilizes and its army becomes strong enough to confront threats from within and without. Israel will not benefit from prolonged disorder or from a Syrian government that depends entirely on Turkey for its survival.
The crisis surrounding the strike on the airbase also illustrates the dangers of acting without agreed mechanisms for verifying information and communicating intentions. Even defensive measures or preventive actions may be interpreted by the other side as preparations for aggression.
Since Sharaa came to power, Israel and Syria have exchanged numerous messages, both directly and through the United States. Meetings have also taken place to advance a security agreement, although these talks were suspended by Israel – or so the Syrians claim.
A trilateral or quadrilateral Israeli-Syrian-Turkish-American mechanism could therefore be established to prevent military friction, provide advance notification of significant deployments and exercises, clarify red lines, and manage crises more generally. Washington could also help verify disputed information and provide assurances to all three regional parties. The existing channels of communication between Israel and Turkey, together with the developing dialogue between Israel and Syria, suggest that the foundations for such a mechanism are already in place.
This framework should complement, rather than replace, Israeli–Syrian negotiations over security arrangements, the stabilization of southern Syria, and the establishment of mutually accepted rules of conduct. Peace or normalization between Israel and Syria does not appear to be on the horizon, but a non-belligerency agreement is certainly within reach.
Syria need not become an arena in which Israel and Turkey conduct their broader rivalry. The decision to resume dialogue following the strike demonstrated that escalation is not inevitable. The challenge now is to transform improvised crisis diplomacy into a stable and enduring coordination mechanism.
Moreover, given the new alliances taking shape in the region – such as the “Mecca Pact” among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey - an Israeli initiative in Syria, whether through the establishment of a coordination framework or the signing of a non-aggression agreement, could demonstrate flexibility and creativity in adapting to the regional alignments emerging in the post–October 7 era.
Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a member of the Executive Board of Mitvim. Eitan Yishai is a doctoral candidate at the Hebrew University specializing in Lebanon and serves as Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Mitvim.