One may indeed ask how far the British government, with its new Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Foreign Secretary Edward Miliband, intends to go in damaging Britain’s traditional interests and its relationship with Israel.
Is Britain prepared to sacrifice its own national interests to placate an increasingly vocal coalition of extreme left-wing, anti-Israel politicians and an increasingly influential Islamist lobby seeking to exert pressure on government policy?
Following Israel’s publication of a tender for 1,200 housing units in E1, a 12-square-kilometer tract of land between Jerusalem and Ma’aleh Adumim, Miliband described it as an “unacceptable and destructive act” and suggested that Britain might impose sanctions on those involved in settlement expansion.
He announced a forthcoming “comprehensive reset” of British policy towards Israel, including examination of Britain’s wider economic relationship with the territories and possible measures to prevent British companies from financing, constructing, or advertising new settlements.
He also condemned what he called “appalling settler terrorism in the occupied West Bank,” and he indicated that Britain might take further action against trade in goods from Israeli settlements, arguing that those who support a two-state solution must act when they believe it is being undermined by “facts on the ground.”
One might reasonably expect that, before announcing such a fundamental change in policy towards an historic ally, a British foreign secretary would consult the considerable body of British international-law expertise available to him and ensure that his assertions were legally and factually accurate.
Unfortunately, Mr. Miliband’s statements suggest otherwise.
His repeated invocation of the “two-state solution” demonstrates a remarkable misunderstanding of the legal and political framework governing Israeli-Palestinian relations.
The expression was popularized internationally, including in president George W Bush’s 2002 vision of “two states, living side by side in peace and security.” But it was never incorporated as an agreed outcome in the 1993-1995 Oslo Accords.
Under those agreements, the permanent status of the territories was expressly left to negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
Edward Miliband’s biased approach to E1 and Area C settlements
The eventual outcome could theoretically have been one state, two states, a federation, confederation, condominium, or another mutually agreed arrangement.
There was certainly no agreement that a third party – the United Nations, European Union, British government, or anyone else – could prejudge the result and dictate the political outcome.
Miliband’s fixation on a predetermined “two-state solution” is therefore not merely political rhetoric. It ignores the very agreements he claims to support.
Equally questionable is his description of Israel’s E1 construction tender as an “unacceptable and destructive act.”
E1 lies within the territory designated Area C under the Oslo framework, where Israel retained planning, zoning, and construction authority pending permanent-status negotiations.
The Oslo arrangements did not prohibit construction by the party exercising jurisdiction in its respective area. Palestinians similarly exercise planning and construction authority in Areas A and B under their jurisdiction.
Whatever one’s political view of Israeli construction, therefore, Miliband has no basis for presenting the E1 tender as a violation of an agreed Israeli-Palestinian arrangement.
Nor is there any legal basis for Britain, the EU, or other outside governments to impose their political preferences upon Israel. Britain’s special authority over Mandate Palestine ended with the termination of the British Mandate on May 14, 1948.
Finally, Miliband’s reference to “appalling settler terrorism” deserves scrutiny.
Violence by small groups of extremist Israeli settlers against Arab residents is unacceptable, illegal, and must be more vigorously prevented and punished.
But to transform isolated acts by extremists into a generalized phenomenon of “settler terrorism” is both misleading and politically prejudicial.
One may also reasonably ask why he remains silent regarding the Palestinian policy commonly described as “pay for slay” – the provision of financial benefits to Palestinians imprisoned for terrorist offenses and to families of terrorists killed while committing attacks.
If he considers terrorism “appalling,” why is this official Palestinian policy not accorded comparable attention?
And if such policies do not undermine the prospects for peace and the “two-state solution,” why are Israeli actions continually portrayed as doing so?
Britain may have “Brexited” from the EU to recover greater freedom to pursue its sovereign national interests.
Yet when it comes to Israel, one must ask whether Britain is genuinely pursuing an independent foreign policy – or simply following the prevailing European hostility towards Israel while responding to domestic Islamist and radical political pressure.
A country that prides itself on its independent judgment should first understand the facts and the law before condemning an ally.
Britain’s historic relationship with Israel deserves better than politically fashionable rhetoric masquerading as international law.
The writer, born in the UK, served as the legal adviser to Israel’s Foreign Ministry and as Israel’s ambassador to Canada. He presently directs the International Law Program at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.