Israeli anger at Europe is not new, and it is not baseless.
The first reason is almost trivial, though it matters in daily life. For years, Europe served as Israel's affordable escape valve. In a country where the cost of living, hospitality, and dining is exceptionally high, budget flights made it possible to spend a few days in Budapest, Rome, Prague, or Athens at a relatively modest cost. The war, repeated flight cancellations, and the tendency of European airlines to withdraw from Ben-Gurion Airport whenever the security situation deteriorates have taken a real bite out of that convenience.
The second reason is far more serious. Since October 7, antisemitism in Europe has not simply risen – it has surged. Jews and Israelis feel it in the street, not only in survey data. In several major Western European cities, Muslim voters have also become an increasingly important electoral constituency, with Gaza emerging as a significant political issue. This should not be turned into a single, all-explaining cause – that would be neither historically nor sociologically accurate. But pretending the factor does not exist would be its own kind of distortion.
The third reason is squarely political. Many Israelis feel that European institutions apply a double standard to Israel. Whatever one thinks of that charge, data confirms a marked deterioration in the tone of European Union statements toward Israel. A study by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) found that before October 7, roughly 29% of EU statements on Israel were negative. Today that figure stands near 46%. Positive statements, once around 20%, have fallen to about 8%.
This is the Europe many Israelis see: less accessible, more hostile on the street, and more hostile institutionally and diplomatically.
And yet there is reason for cautious optimism that this picture may be shifting.
Reasons for optimisim
European public opinion itself has not flipped in Israel's favor. It remains critical, and Gaza will continue to weigh on Israel's image for years to come. But as the war recedes somewhat from the center of European political life, two parallel developments are worth noting.
First, the intensity of the fighting in Gaza has dropped sharply compared with the deadliest stretches of 2024–2025, even as the ceasefire remains fragile and the underlying crisis unresolved. Second, a backlash is emerging against some of the more extreme elements that attached themselves to pro-Palestinian demonstrations: intimidation of Jews, glorification of Hamas, and open sympathy for the Iranian regime are increasingly being distinguished from straightforward solidarity with Palestinian suffering. In Britain, for example, the government took the exceptional step of prohibiting the 2026 Al-Quds Day procession in London while permitting a stationary protest under strict conditions.
Beyond these specifics, a broader realignment is underway: Europe's political center of gravity is shifting rightward.
This shift shows up clearly in the numbers. In Germany, the CDU/CSU (center-right) won 28.6% of the vote and the AfD (nationalist Right) 20.8%, against just 16.4% for the center-left SPD. In Spain, the PP and Vox together poll near 50%, compared with 26.5% for Pedro Sánchez's Socialists. In Portugal, the center-right and nationalist Right combined won more than 53% in the 2025 elections, while the Socialists fell to 22.8%. In France, Marine Le Pen, representing the nationalist Right, currently leads first-round polling for the 2027 presidential election with 34–36% – a comfortable margin. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy remains the country's largest party.
Why does this matter for Israel?
Because according to the Pew Research Center, in every one of these countries, right-wing voters view Israel far more favorably than left-wing voters do – and the gap is not marginal. In Spain, 30% of right-wing voters hold a favorable view of Israel, compared with just 4% on the left. In France, the figures are 33% versus 11%; in Italy, 33% versus 9%; in Germany, 31% versus 14%; and in Britain, 38% versus 13%.
None of this means Europe's Right has become uniformly "pro-Israel." It has not, and each nationalist movement carries its own history – in some cases, a troubling one. In Portugal, for instance, the far Right actually leans anti-Israel, running counter to the broader continental trend. But in most countries, the pattern is the reverse: in France, as Israel's ambassador in Paris, Joshua Zarka, has noted, the far Right has been the political force showing the most consistent and unequivocal support for Israel since the war began. Exceptions notwithstanding, the overall trend is hard to ignore: electoral momentum is shifting toward constituencies that are currently less hostile to Israel than the European Left.
Europe is not becoming pro-Israel, and that distinction matters. But the combination of a weakened center-left in several countries, a strengthening Right, growing pushback against extremism at protests, and the return of security concerns to the political mainstream may produce something more modest than affection – yet still significant for Israel: a continent less hostile than the one we have known over the past two years.
For those who have grown used to seeing "Europe" as one uniform, hostile bloc, this is a trend worth watching closely.
Dr. Dov Maimon is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), where he heads the institute's European activities.