Israel can secure a good new military aid agreement with the United States, but doing so will require a clear understanding of what each country gains from the relationship and the limits of Israel’s influence.

More than a month ago, I outlined in this newspaper the recommendations of the Nagel Committee on the Defense Budget regarding a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Trump administration. The task facing the current negotiating team is much harder and entirely different from the one we faced a decade ago, when I had the honor of leading the negotiations for the unprecedented $38 billion agreement signed toward the end of the Obama administration, with excellent cooperation from an outstanding interagency team.

Still, I believe a reasonably good agreement is possible, provided we take the necessary measures with determination, even though some will describe the task as “mission impossible.”

Since then, I have often been asked why the United States should sign a new agreement with Israel at all. What does it offer the superpower? What does it offer Israel beyond the assistance itself? What does the special relationship with Israel offer the United States, and where does it end?

I have also repeatedly been asked why, contrary to irresponsible statements by commentators and even some Israeli policymakers, past and present, continued assistance is not directly tied to Israel’s political independence from the United States. The claim that it is directly tied is simply incorrect. Anyone who argues otherwise does not understand the balance of power or the geopolitical relationship between the two countries.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hold a press conference after meeting at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, US, December 29, 2025.
US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hold a press conference after meeting at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, US, December 29, 2025. (credit: JONATHAN ERNST/REUTERS)

To answer the first question, I will refer to a slide the MOU negotiating teams drafted jointly about a decade ago. It explained why the agreement was so important to the United States. A corresponding slide explained why the agreement benefited Israel, but that is less relevant to this article. I believe the reasons presented in the slide remain largely accurate.

Agreement demonstrates long-term US commitment to Israel

The agreement demonstrates the United States’ long-term commitment to Israel and implements part of the legislation concerning Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). It prevents the need for active US military intervention on Israel’s behalf and presents Israel as a bulwark against radical Islam and an effective security guarantor for Jordan. It also enables the United States to strengthen its security cooperation with Gulf states by providing significant military capabilities and supporting military cooperation and joint development.

It is also important to understand the main direct and indirect contributions that Israel’s government, defense establishment, and civilian and commercial sectors bring to the relationship. While there is legitimate debate over their precise economic value, those contributions are worth far more than the US assistance itself.

In many cases, Israel provides the United States with immediate solutions to urgent operational problems or gaps in the field, largely because Israel is more flexible and quicker to identify threats and develop working solutions. In some cases, after receiving that immediate assistance, the United States invests enormous resources and its best people in its defense industry and security establishment, eventually surpassing Israel in those capabilities.

Areas in which Israel has helped and continues to help the United States include intelligence and cyber capabilities; defense against short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles; unmanned aerial vehicles and drones; space technologies, particularly lightweight satellites; technologies for detecting and neutralizing tunnels; operational concepts, doctrine and experience; and counterterrorism technologies and prototypes. They also include selected partnerships with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the research laboratories of the US Army, Navy and Air Force, and US national laboratories.

Israeli startups, research centers established in Israel by multinational corporations, and Israeli academia also contribute direct and indirect contributions from technologies and breakthroughs. These are, of course, specific and sometimes niche technologies. It would be wrong to claim that Israel is solely responsible for all, or even a large share, of the revenue generated by any of the companies mentioned here.

Examples include Mellanox/Nvidia, Amazon, Meta, Google, Palo Alto Networks and Check Point, as well as developments in life sciences, medicine, quantum technologies and cybersecurity startups working in both defensive and offensive fields. They also include defense technologies transferred through broad partnerships between Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Elbit Systems and smaller Israeli companies, and major US corporations or second-tier suppliers.

Still, despite all of the above, my unequivocal position is that those who argue that the United States could not “survive” without Israel’s technological contribution, and that Israel is therefore indispensable, are overstating the case. I wish I could agree.

There are two considerations here. Israel’s value and contribution to the United States are beyond doubt, including its direct and indirect, though partial and limited, contribution to US capabilities against adversaries such as Russia and China.

Dangerous to claim US cannot 'survive' without Israel

But claiming that the United States cannot do without Israel, and acting on that assumption, is very dangerous. This is particularly true of proposals to base the next MOU primarily on technological cooperation rather than security assistance, which has been its basis until now.

The political changes taking place on both sides of the US political spectrum do not alter this assessment. Such an approach could backfire on Israel and leave the Israel Air Force with no viable path to procuring its main platforms in the future.

Signing a new MOU adapted to changing realities will require a focused, uncompromising effort by all relevant parties. It will preserve the strategic alliance and cooperation with the United States and reaffirm America’s long-standing commitment to Israel, despite the changes taking place in the relationship.

The writer, a brigadier-general in the reserves and a professor, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington. He served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s national security adviser and as acting head of Israel’s National Security Council.