Israel's new IDF Space Division marks major shift in military strategy after Iran war - opinion

In Israel today, the responsibility for developing and operating space capabilities is divided among the Directorate of Defense Research and Development (MOD/DDR&D), the Air Force (and Space), the C4I and Cyber Defense Directorate, the Depth Corps, and the Planning Directorate (J5). Establishing the division does not mean that the struggle over who will lead the space domain in the IDF is over. On the contrary, it is only the beginning, and I will address that subject in future articles, when applicable.

In an article I wrote in 2023, as part of my keynote address at Israel’s first GEOINT conference, I described in detail the development of VISINT (visual intelligence), alongside SIGINT (signal intelligence - communications and electronic intelligence) and HUMINT (human intelligence, gathered through agents). VISINT, not from space, of course, has long served as an important source of intelligence and as one of the earliest methods used to obtain the intelligence needed, dating back to the Bible and the dawn of history.

In that 2023 article, I recommended and predicted that Israel would soon need to take a serious look at how it manages the space domain and that, at the end of the process, it would probably establish an independent Space Command to handle the many issues related to space. I did not address the very important question of who would build the force and who would be responsible for operating it.

As part of the efforts to advance defense R&D in Israel, which I wrote about last week, Israel developed its own “Blue and White” VISINT capabilities. These included building an independent space capability and developing centers of expertise in Israel’s defense industry, with the involvement of the Ministry of Defense, DDR&D/MAPAT and the Space Program Directorate (MATA), the Military Intelligence, the Air Force, and the C4I and Cyber Defense Directorate.

Before the latest rounds of fighting in GAGA, Lebanon and Iran, VISINT, led mainly by Unit 9900, was the “stepchild” of Israel’s intelligence community, alongside the traditional leader's intelligence-collection and technology units, 8200 and 8153. It is no longer this way, especially when space is factored into the equation. The unit’s achievements in combat, on all fronts, were exceptional, and it has rightly earned a place among the big ones and the leading units.

At the same time, space is becoming a domain used for far more than intelligence collection only. It supports communications and navigation satellites, LEO constellations for specialized needs, missile-launch detection, warfare in and from space, and the completion of operational "closing kill circles", among other functions. This makes it clear why the United States, Russia, China, and most European countries have established independent space commands.

He also added, “Space is too big for the State of Israel”. He was not alone. In Israel, too, most decisionmakers raised their eyebrows when “the space enthusiast”, Brig. Gen. (res.) Haim Eshed, first proposed developing an Israeli space industry, both in launch capabilities and in satellites and observation. Eshed later served for more than 30 years as the first head of Israel’s space program at DDR&D. Military Intelligence, backed by the Planning Directorate, strongly opposed developing an independent “Blue and White” capability. It argued that Israel could get everything it needed from the United States and, in any case, would not succeed in developing the capability on its own.

Fortunately for Israel, the Ministry of Defense and DDR&D were almost entirely independent in their decisions, at the time, including in how they used the R&D budget allocated to them and their directorates. The Space Program Directorate (MATA) was established, and the rest is history.

The rapid development of new technologies, especially AI (artificial intelligence) and HPC (high-performance computing), together with Israel’s leadership in some of these fields in academia, the IDF, and the defense industry, makes it possible to gain significant progress in the technologies needed to advance space capabilities. These include encryption, big data, machine learning, advanced communications, quantum technologies, and many more.

Israel’s unique needs in space are (The focus remains on visual intelligence, but extends beyond it):

A. Very high VISINT resolution.

B. Short revisit times for high-value targets, with continuous coverage as the aspiration.

C. Versatile satellites in terms of size, cost, and on-demand launch capability.

D. A range of sensors: super- and hyperspectral, IR, color, SAR, and more.

E. Versatile ground stations able to receive data from any space-based source, in any format and of any type, without lengthy and costly custom development.

F. Advanced capabilities to analyze the information received, given its huge volume and variety: automation, object tracking, and change detection.

G. Space-based SIGINT capabilities: ELINT, EOB (electronic order of battle mapping), and COMINT.

H. Missile-launch detection and support for defense against enemy missiles (BMD).

I. Continuous monitoring of space activity, with an emphasis on detecting threats in and from space, as well as monitoring the space communications spectrum.

K. Continuous, broadband satellite communications for forces operating in the depth of enemy territory.

L. Use of the space domain as part of navigation warfare.

M. Warfare in and from space (in the future).

This is only a partial list of capabilities that can be named within the classification limits.

All these capabilities must be developed with an economic mindset that makes it possible to develop and procure everything needed, what is known as affordability.

The list makes clear that significantly greater resources must be directed to this field, while protecting Israel’s centers of expertise and its indigenous “Blue and White” capabilities. This is precisely what "the Nagel Committee on the Defense Budget" recommended, as I have mentioned in several previous articles.

The PM and Defense Minister understood the importance of space and made courageous decisions to allocate larger budgets to the field over the coming decade, beyond the ambitious recommendations of the "Nagel Committee". Even so, the substantial budgets allocated to this important and developing field are still a "drop in the ocean" compared with, for example, the enormous US budgets. Only recently, President Trump decided to allocate hundreds of billions of dollars to advance his ambitious “Golden Dome” program, a large share of which will go for sure toward developing capabilities in and from space. Israel can and should have an important and central role in this major program.

The natural and ultimate aspiration, though it is unclear when it will move from fantasy to reality, is to build a capability that provides continuous, real-time video surveillance at suitable resolution of every intelligence area of interest, anywhere in the world. This may seem like science fiction at present, or like a capability reserved for superpowers or action fictional movies unrelated to reality. But reality is changing before our eyes at a rapid pace. If the necessary resources are invested, the day this aspiration is realized may not be far off.

For more than two decades, the modern battlefield, and in fact, the battlefield of today, has been described as an “empty battlefield”. The enemy knows that if it is exposed, it will almost certainly be destroyed. This leads to enormous investment in concealment, whether underground or through other means. The only nearly reliable way to overcome this problem and keep track of the enemy at every stage is through VISINT capabilities, especially from space, but also from altitude layers below it.

The ability to maintain custody, as continuously as possible, over areas and targets before, during, and after any operation, including for battle damage assessment (BDA), has become a central factor in deciding whether to launch an operation at all. The ability to locate a target, stationary or moving, with a high degree of precision is generally what enables precision weapons to accomplish their mission.

Two other aspects that I will not expand on in this article are the transformation of space into an active part of the battlefield (warfare in and from space) and its growing role in navigation warfare.

The more technologically advanced a country is, and the more it relies on its space capabilities, the more vulnerable it will be to space becoming an inherent part of the future battlefield, not merely a domain for intelligence collection only.

Space and satellite communications are central channels for spreading “deceptions,” fake news, and communications fraud. At the same time, space is also a tool for defending against these threats when they are directed at us.

The price of admission to the group of countries with significant space capabilities is high and requires mastery of key technologies. Control of these capabilities allows political or senior security officials to “trade” in this commodity, both in systems and technologies, and in the information that is collected.

In recent years, massive civilian investment has created both a risk and an opportunity for decisionmakers seeking to use space as a valuable commodity. The civilian market’s access to high-quality, relevant geographic information at reasonable “prices” can provide an additional, relatively reliable and “inexpensive” source of information. It can also mistakenly lead to the belief that governmental investments can be reduced. At the same time, civilian availability makes Israel a less attractive supplier of capabilities and allows its enemies to obtain high-quality information about targets in Israel.

On the other hand, even the leading players in the civilian market, however large they may be, remain highly dependent on governments, both as investors and as regulators. Moreover, when it comes to the reliability and ability to meet commitments to deliver the promised product in a crisis, agreements between governments remain far more dependable than contracts with commercial companies.

Israeli academia has a very important role to play in advancing space capabilities. Alongside the work already underway, there is considerable room to do much more.

Academia is responsible for “breaking glass ceilings” and tackling subjects characterized by high risk and high potential value.

Examples of areas where academia can and must take the lead include specialized constellations and orbits, swarms of nanosatellites, small and efficient space electric engines, miniaturization and weight reduction, and future space sensors and technologies, including electro-optics, lasers, and quantum communications.

Academia must also address the threats to space capabilities and offer solutions in key areas such as cyber threats.

It can also develop solutions to improve economic viability via "more for less” initiatives, as well as work on affordability, life-cycle costs (LCC), specialized materials, and more.

Israel must do everything possible to maintain near-complete independence in its space capabilities, across all aspects of “Blue and White” development, with the possible exception of GEO launch capabilities.

A country will receive what it needs, even from its greatest allies, only if it demonstrates independence and the ability to provide for its own needs. That is a lesson we can learn from the answer Prime Minister Rabin received from the US president in 1976, when Israel still had no space capabilities.

Continuing to invest and increasing the resources devoted to developing independent space capabilities will ensure Israel’s continued leadership and independence in this important field.