This week’s developments in northern Israel require us to look at reality with clear eyes, beyond the immediate headlines. To understand the true significance of recent events, the situation must be examined across four strategic layers – from civilians under fire in the Galilee, northern Israel, through the streets of Beirut, all the way to the White House and the negotiations surrounding a potential agreement with Iran.
In practice, we are dealing with two separate developments. The first was the cancellation of the American green light previously given to Israel to strike in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut, after Hezbollah intensified its attacks on Israeli communities over the past two weeks.
The second was the publication of a joint statement by Israel, Lebanon, and the United States, which on the one hand emphasized the shared interest in reaching a peace agreement between the two countries and ending Iranian influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah. On the other hand, the statement also highlighted the gaps between the parties: Israel stressed the need to disarm Hezbollah, but Lebanon emphasized the need for an Israeli withdrawal from its territory.
The first layer: Northern residents and the need for confidence, not quiet
The strategic story begins and ends with people. Residents of Israel’s northern border communities have lived under a constant threat for the past forty years, and for the last three years they have effectively been living in an active and bloody war zone.
Rehabilitating this region requires far more than a temporary period of calm or promises on paper. Residents need a new reality – one that will not allow Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure to return to the border and threaten their lives once again.
At present, no one can guarantee such a reality, and this week’s events only underscored the extent of the gap between aspirations and reality.
While significant expectations had developed within the Israeli public regarding a major strike in Dahiyeh, reality demonstrated that even under emerging arrangements, a rocket barrage toward Safed was launched immediately after reports of a ceasefire, and in the days that followed Hezbollah UAVs crossed from Lebanon on several occasions, threatening northern communities.
Relative quiet alone is not a strategy. What is required is a comprehensive and systematic effort to change the reality inside Lebanon itself.
The second layer: The physics of the threat and freedom of action in the south
Above the concerns of residents lies the question of the strategic threat facing the State of Israel, and here it is important to acknowledge the achievements that have been made.
Does today’s Hezbollah resemble the organization it was three years ago? Unequivocally, no. Its rocket arsenal has been reduced by approximately 80-90 percent. The same applies to its stockpile of advanced and precision-guided weapons, which posed a direct threat to Israel’s population centers and critical civilian infrastructure.
In addition, the heavy price paid by residents of southern Lebanon, many of whom remain unable to return to their homes, has pushed back the threat of a ground invasion – which Hezbollah was fully prepared to launch on October 7 – and has also reduced the anti-tank missile threat against Israeli border communities. The current focus is therefore on neutralizing the FPV threat.
The achievements must be preserved and expanded: Hezbollah must be pushed north of the Litani River, and the Lebanese government must finally implement what it has never enforced – the complete removal of illegal weapons from the area.
The IDF has already crossed the Litani in specific sectors, and the next objective must be uncompromising enforcement throughout the entire zone. Such a policy would significantly reduce the drone threat to the residents as well, at least as long as Hezbollah does not acquire more advanced FPV capabilities.
At the same time, it is clear that this approach comes at a cost, namely the lives of IDF soldiers operating in southern Lebanon, who continue to face attacks by drones and rockets.
In this regard, the joint statement ignores a critical question: What happens if Hezbollah continues attacking Israeli forces in these areas? And how can the entire area south of the Litani be systematically cleared under a comprehensive ceasefire framework?
The third layer: The Beirut trap and the threat that will re-emerge
This is where we arrive at the core of the strategic danger. If southern Lebanon is cleared, but Hezbollah’s center of gravity simply relocates elsewhere, we may discover that “Hezbollahland” has merely moved to Beirut. Under no circumstances should Hezbollah be allowed to rebuild its capabilities under the protection of political or geographic immunity in the Lebanese capital.
If the Lebanese government refrains from acting in Beirut out of fear of igniting an internal Lebanese civil conflict, and if the Israeli government refrains from acting there because of American – or, in practice, Iranian – constraints, Hezbollah will be granted a sanctuary from which it can develop the next generation of threats: precision missiles, more advanced drones, or technological capabilities that are difficult to imagine today.
As long as Iranian money continues flowing into Beirut and the Bekaa Valley near the Syrian border, the impressive military achievements in southern Lebanon could evaporate within a few years.
The Lebanese government is weak and fears confrontation. It will not summon the courage to enforce sovereignty in Beirut unless Israeli strikes weaken Hezbollah there first. Israeli operations against Hezbollah assets in Beirut, while first and foremost serving Israel’s national security interests, also directly advance the broader interests of Lebanon itself.
The Fourth Layer: The Iranian Lever and Trump’s Intervention
At the top layer stands Iran, which has long understood that Hezbollah serves as an extraordinary instrument of diplomatic leverage. Due to the dangerous precedent of this week, Tehran knows now that whenever it comes under pressure, it can activate its Lebanese proxy and redirect international attention toward the Lebanese front.
Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump’s current diplomatic intervention is unprecedented in both its intensity and pace, and it brings with it understandable concerns in Israel.
The fear is that Trump may settle for a superficial agreement – an empty Iranian declaration that it has no nuclear ambitions, without requiring the removal of enriched uranium. The Islamic Republic has never had a problem issuing such declarations in exchange for sanctions relief and the flow of billions of dollars into its economy.
There is also concern that any agreement may leave untouched both Iran’s proxy network and its ballistic missile program. If a new American agreement restricts Israel’s freedom of action in Lebanon while money, weapons, and enriched uranium continues to flow into Iran, then the military strategic achievements of recent years could be squandered.
Bottom line
The real test posed by this week’s events is one of long-term determination. Israel must not purchase temporary tactical quiet in southern Lebanon at the price of accepting strategic rearmament in Beirut, and certainly not at the cost of a flawed regional agreement that ignores the Iranian stranglehold.
In this context, the subsequent joint statement issued by Israel, Lebanon, and the United States does not “sweeten the deal” because its value depends entirely on implementation. Can the Lebanese government truly guarantee that Hezbollah will withdraw and not return to areas south of the Litani?
This brings us to the operational component of the statement. Under American guidance, the parties agreed to rapidly advance the establishment of pilot zones in which the Lebanese Armed Forces would exercise exclusive control, excluding all non-state actors.
It is essential that the pilot zones be located as far as possible from the Israeli border, so that any successful Hezbollah attempt to re-establish a presence there will not come at the expense of Israeli civilian lives in the border communities.
Furthermore, given the Lebanese Army’s record of collaboration with Hezbollah to conceal its military activity in south Lebanon over the past two decades, it is critical to establish an independent and effective monitoring mechanism that verifies implementation on the ground rather than relying solely on Lebanese reporting regarding the exclusion of non-state actors from areas transferred to Lebanese control by the IDF.
At the same time, the entire concept of pilot zones will fail unless it is accompanied by a broader strategic framework that addresses the fundamental question: How does one bring an end to the reality of a Hezbollah state within the Lebanese state? The answer, clearly, lies in the necessary actions in Beirut – not in southern Lebanon.