A combined Iranian and Hezbollah attack on Haifa Bay, including strikes against civilian shipping near the natural harbor or gas rigs in the Mediterranean, is among several key threats Israel must now prepare for, according to a new assessment published by the Alma Research and Education Center last week.
With a demonstrated willingness to target key maritime assets using ballistic missiles, drones, cruise missiles, anti-ship munitions, explosive boats, and potentially underwater threats and commando capabilities, the center warned that the threat must be taken seriously, even though Israel has proven defensive capabilities against each individual threat.
Much of Israel’s energy and water needs depend on rigs and facilities located along the Mediterranean coast. More than 70% of Israel’s electricity is produced from natural gas extracted from offshore rigs, and more than half of the country’s water supply comes from desalination facilities that purify seawater, making attacks on this infrastructure potentially devastating for the Jewish state.
Hezbollah is still capable of disrupting these key assets, the center reported, even with its diminished capabilities. Hezbollah’s shore-to-missile and its naval unit still pose a significant threat, as was demonstrated with the drone attack on the Karish reservoir in July 2022.
Though Hezbollah’s arsenal is now understood to possess primarily short- and medium-range missiles, the center assessed that it retains limited anti-shipping cruise missiles such as the Yakhont and Ghadir, alongside anti-shipping ballistic missiles such as the Khalij Fars.
Highlighting this, the center assessed based on open-source information that Hezbollah used the Paveh Iranian cruise missile in March, which fell south of Bekaa in Lebanon. A thwarted smuggling attempt between Syria and Iraq on July 16 also showed that Hezbollah was attempting to access components of this type of missile.
Hezbollah launched three drones toward the Karish reservoir, which were successfully intercepted. The field had already been a source of tension, as Lebanon claimed part of the natural reservoir fell in Lebanese territory. Then-Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah described attempts to extract gas from the field as a “red line” for Hezbollah.
To face the combined risk the Iranian axis poses, the center noted that Israel has advanced many defensive protocols. The Saar 6 ships have carried out a test with the Barak LRAD interceptor, the long-range version of the Barak MX system, which seems to be directed at strengthening defensive layers against ballistic missile threats on aerial and maritime targets.
Additionally, the center noted seaports are already protected by a land-based multi-layered air-defense system, which includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2 and 3, with plans to integrate laser cannons to defend against drone threats.
Recently, the Navy also began operating unmanned underwater vessels in Israel’s economic waters to build a maritime intelligence picture, analyze threats, and protect strategic assets.
Many new layers of Israel's defense remain untested for joint-strike scenarios
Though advanced, the center noted that numerous newly developed and strategized layers of Israel’s defense have yet to be fully tested, and Israel must be prepared for a combined and coordinated attack on several energy and maritime targets simultaneously.
If such an attack combined ballistic missiles, attack drones, cruise missiles, shore-to-sea missiles, explosive boats, and suicide drones, in coordination with electronic interference, it must be known whether Israel’s defensive layers would still be able to detect and intercept.
Additionally, the center warned that there are threats of underwater attacks on gas infrastructure or access routes.
Beyond posing a risk to Israel’s water and energy supply, the center noted that seaports are essential for maritime trade – and such trade could be disrupted by an escalation.
In both the 12-day war in June and in March, Iran targeted Israel’s ports, gas rigs, and oil refineries as clear wartime targets. To mitigate many of these threats, Israel proactively elected to shut down several rigs, including the Karish and Leviathan.
However, the Bazan oil refinery, which has a maximum daily production capacity of approximately 26,600 tons of oil, around 70% of which is distributed on the domestic market, was damaged in attacks on March 30 and March 19, “illustrating that the threat to Israel’s energy hinterland is no longer merely a theoretical scenario but a capability that has been used in practice.”
Though proof that Iran maintains the capabilities and desire to harm energy infrastructure, the center noted that the wars demonstrated Israel was able to maintain partial continuity of its maritime and energy economy.
Proactive shutdowns, multi-layered defensive response capabilities at sea and on shore, and the maintenance of port operations, even under direct threat, were positive signs that Israeli infrastructure can cope under less than ideal conditions.
However, the maritime energy infrastructure of Israel is largely dependent on a few critical assets, meaning any successful attack would create pressure on the system. A Calcalist report in March warned, for example, that the loss of even one rig would translate to billions of shekels in damages to Israel.
One destroyed rig might be all Iran needs
While the loss of a rig may be the best-case scenario for Iran, the center warned that Tehran could gain simply by causing a temporary shutdown of production, frightening civilian crews, hardening marine insurance conditions, or creating risk to commercial shipping are enough to produce a strategic effect.
“This is exactly the result seen in the two most recent wars: Israel itself chose to shut down facilities so as not to risk a direct hit, indicating that the threat was perceived as sufficiently real to justify a calculated self-inflicted disruption to production continuity,” the center noted.
Over-hardening or preventative shutdowns are part of Iran’s strategy, the center suggested.
FOR YEARS, the Navy has focused on protecting energy grids and routes, designing Saar 6 ships to defend the exclusive economic zone and deploying advanced aerial and maritime defense systems, including C-Dome and MF-STAR radars, to respond to missile and drone threats against rigs.
However, Iran’s attacks have not only targeted these rigs but also complexes located nearby, creating the threat of an attack and the possibility of a costly shutdown with far greater ease than striking an offshore rig.
The attack on the Bazan complex, rather than an offshore rig, demonstrated that coastal processing facilities, refineries, pipelines, and power stations may be more accessible targets while being just as costly to disrupt.
Haifa and Ashdod ports are also key targets for the Islamic regime’s axis, as attacks or a sustained threat on these areas could disrupt the import of raw materials, fuel, military equipment, and civilian containers. These ports remained open during the June war, but imports were restricted to exclude hazardous materials, and additional resources were allocated to address threats in the maritime theater.
While Hezbollah and Iran’s capabilities mainly pose a risk to Haifa, the center noted that the Iran-aligned Houthi terror group in Yemen could also cause trouble for Israel’s southernmost city Eilat.
The Houthi threat to shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait has impacted shipping patterns, leading to a decline in port activity in Eilat by more than 90% since the Houthis first began their campaign against Israel. Such a threat led to multiple reports over the past few years that the port was facing closure due to financial collapse.
Another key threat Israel must address is the cyberspace arena. Iran, along with pro-Iranian actors, has claimed operations against energy companies, airports, banks, and infrastructure in the Gulf and in Israel. In some cases, these attacks have seen leaks, while others have attempted to penetrate operational systems.
For Israel’s energy and water infrastructure, this could translate to disruption of cargo-management systems, industrial control, ship coordination, electricity systems, communications, navigation, AIS, and GPS.
The center stressed that these threats meant it was essential for maritime infrastructure to be segmented, backed up, hold manual drills, be continuously monitored, and ready to operate under cyberattack.