The IDF will expand its forces and prepare for a surprise attack on multiple fronts even without advance warning, under a new approach shaped by the military's investigation into the failures surrounding the October 7 massacre.
The changes were among the main conclusions presented Sunday at a conference of the IDF's senior command staff, led by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir, as the military reviewed its October 7 investigations and outlined how it would implement its findings.
Under the changes, the IDF will base its readiness on what its enemies are capable of doing rather than assessments of what they intend to do. The military will also increase the number of forces kept on alert and in reserve, strengthen the defense of border communities, expand commanders' freedom of action in the field, and overhaul elements of its intelligence and warning systems.
"One of our greatest lessons from October 7 is the need to expand our security margins," Zamir said at the conference. "We need to build the IDF's order of battle to meet all the multi-front challenges and threats. The size of the IDF is our strategic depth."
"We are building the IDF's strategy with preparedness for a surprise war as our reference scenario, including thwarting serious threats as they emerge. This is our operational compass," he said.
The conference, held at the Glilot base and attended by officers at the rank of brigadier-general and above from across the IDF's commands, directorates, and branches, was intended to summarize the October 7 investigations, examine how their findings are being implemented, and outline the next stages of the military's review process.
At the start of the conference, commanders observed a moment of silence in memory of those killed in the massacre.
Strategy, operations, force buildup, and intelligence
The IDF divided its findings into four main areas: strategy, operations, force buildup, and intelligence.
Planned changes include increasing the number of forces kept on alert and in reserve, revising the military's approach to defending border communities, giving forces in the field greater autonomy, strengthening firepower and intelligence-gathering capabilities along the borders, and changing working methods within the Intelligence Directorate.
According to data presented at the conference, the number of forces assigned to readiness and reserve roles across all sectors has more than doubled. The IDF has also established dedicated reserve and force-multiplier readiness arrangements and redistributed forces and equipment across sectors to enable a faster response in any area.
The military determined that it must be prepared for a surprise attack on several fronts simultaneously, even if both deterrence and advance warning fail.
Readiness will be based on what an enemy is capable of doing rather than on assessments of what it intends to do. The IDF will also place greater emphasis on proactive offensive operations intended to prevent serious threats from developing.
The military also decided to strengthen its ground maneuver capabilities and improve headquarters' ability to build an accurate picture of events and to continue operating in extreme situations and periods of uncertainty.
It also seeks to deepen strategic and operational expertise and encourage a culture in which officers question assumptions and raise concerns about shortcomings within the system.
At the operational level, threat scenarios, defense plans, readiness arrangements, and reserve deployments will be updated as enemy capabilities change. The scenarios will be reviewed every six months and examined across multiple branches of the military.
Israeli military to expand surprise drills, extreme-event scenarios
The IDF will also expand surprise drills, extreme-event scenarios, and Chief of Staff readiness tests to improve the military's transition from routine operations to war and strengthen both defensive and offensive preparedness.
The military intends to give its regional commands a stronger role in developing expertise about the areas under their responsibility and to incorporate their assessments into General Staff planning. Commanders in the field will also receive greater operational independence and freedom of action.
One of the main areas of change concerns the defense of Israeli communities near the country's borders.
The IDF determined that a community is "vital terrain and the object of defense," and that during an infiltration, forces must seek contact and reach the community quickly.
The locations of military outposts will therefore be adjusted based on their proximity to communities and their ability to defend them even when only limited forces are available.
Regional defense forces and security units in communities will also be expanded, including defense platoons, Yatam units, regional defense battalions, and David brigades.
The IDF also seeks to clarify responsibilities during emergencies, establish a single authority to respond to incidents, and strengthen coordination between military and civilian bodies.
Regional brigades and divisions will receive greater independent strike capabilities, along with increased access to ground and air firepower along the borders.
The IDF will also establish a multidimensional, multilayered intelligence-gathering network for each sector, operable from several locations. Coordination between forces in the field and the Intelligence Directorate will also be strengthened.
In the intelligence field, advance warning has been redefined as a core mission of the Military Intelligence Directorate, alongside understanding developments on the ground and building a comprehensive intelligence picture.
The IDF also plans to define intelligence responsibilities more clearly while deliberately allowing some overlap between intelligence bodies and formalizing how they work together.
The intelligence work of individual divisions and their ability to build a complete picture of events will also be examined. Warning systems across different fronts will be synchronized, while each level of command will retain the ability to reach its own independent assessment.
Greater emphasis will also be placed on distinguishing between long-term strategic analysis and short-term tactical intelligence, while encouraging greater criticism and questioning within the intelligence system.
This approach was also reflected when Zamir presented a certificate of appreciation during the conference to Chief Warrant Officer V. from Unit 8200, who warned before October 7 that Hamas was preparing for a large-scale surprise attack.
"V. is a clear example of intellectual courage and professionalism," Zamir said. "In our organizational culture, we must not allow appeasing discourse, intellectual tyranny, or the suppression of critical thinking."
Zamir also addressed the military failure on the day of the massacre, saying, "On October 7, the IDF failed miserably," but added that afterward, "the IDF got back on its feet and proved itself to possess a determined spirit."
"Our duty is to ensure that they are not repeated," he said.
The Chief of Staff added that the conference was the "opening shot" in a broader process of investigating the war, and that 2027 will be designated by the IDF as the year to investigate the entire war and draw lessons from it.
In the coming period, the investigations into Operation Roaring Lion, among others, will be completed, after which the IDF will summarize the war's findings overall.