Of all of the battle spaces of the last three years, from Gaza to Syria to the West Bank to Lebanon, the Ali Taher Ridge battle was the most complex to win, Egoz Special Forces Commander Lt.-Col. "M" told The Jerusalem Post in a rare on-record interview on Wednesday.

The operation to capture the ridge at the edge of the IDF's zone in southern Lebanon lasted months, as dozens of terrorists, estimated to number around 50, were entrenched inside the tunnel until the IDF took control on September 3.

M viewed the defeat of Hezbollah at Ali Taher by his forces and IDF Division 36 more generally as a major setback to the terror group and to Iran "both on a symbolic and command and control operational level."

IDF troops operate in the area of Lebanon's IDF Ali Taher Ridge in a video released on September 16, 2026. (courtesy: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)

The IDF carried out the operation to destroy the 14 tunnel routes on the ridge, stretching about 5.4 km in total and built with Iranian help over 20 years, using a staggering 1,100 pounds of explosives, under the codename “Chisel of Flames.”

M told the Post that the challenges were multifaceted.

How did an elite IDF unit win the battle of Ali Taher Ridge?

First, he said that the ascent of the 600-meter-high ridge was extremely difficult and contained very few paths.

This made it easier for Hezbollah to booby-trap access routes to its underground lair.

Next, M said that the volume of explosive drones that were sent to attack the Egoz special forces was unprecedented.

"The ridge and lair were totally Iranian, with Hezbollah forces, one of the largest underground complexes in Lebanon," with command and control authority over the entire Nabatiah area, said M.

He added that, "From the Ali Taher Ridge command center, Hezbollah managed all of its long- and short-range firepower attacks on the IDF as well as on Israeli civilians in northern Israel. Hezbollah felt very safe here and thought they were immune," to assault.

But M said his Egoz commandos " went in hard and fast, initially with small groups of forces to surround and cut off the area. Then we sent small probing forces into the very complex underground headquarters from which there were dozens of terrorists, rockets and drone threats regularly."

Next, M said that to avoid the myriad boobytraps Hezbollah set for them, his special forces had to use a variety of advanced technologies as well as super-honed field skills, such as being able to practically see and smell traps and drones moments before they struck.

It helped, M noted, that the Egoz special forces achieved complete surprise against the Hezbollah forces at Ali Taher by using various tactics to distract them from the commandos' approach until it was too late.

This meant that when Hezbollah started using more drones and firepower, they did not know where to direct their fire, M explained.

M said that in many instances the gunfights were so close that his commandos "saw the fear and surprise in the enemy's eyes up close."

Despite the surprise, M credited the Hezbollah fighters in the complex with "fighting back more fiercely than in any other battle in Lebanon – they know how important the battle was."

Yahalom Tunnel Special Forces Capt. "D" told the Post that the area near Hezbollah's lair and inside were covered in surveillance cameras and a variety of short-range and long-range improvised explosives so that anyone entering might think they were safe after getting past one explosive, only to fall victim to the next one.

Next, D said that his Yahalom forces used a wide range of techniques to analyze all the different pieces of the Ali Taher Ridge tunnel network until they could break it down into exactly which sections they wanted to take over and which sections they could just dynamite and cut off.

To do this, D said they brought in top experts from across the IDF to develop the best and most creative plan.

D added that there were literally dozens of times during the battle over Ali Taher when he could have been killed if something had gone slightly differently.

In one example, D noted that he was centimeters away from stepping on a well-camouflaged mine, but had a sixth-sense feeling that something was suspicious about the topography and stepped back from what would have been a fatal move forward.

In another incident, a drone struck the vehicle he had been traveling in only moments after he exited, destroying the vehicle but leaving him unharmed.

Both M and D said the large boulders in the terrain were a special challenge, but that Egoz and Yahalom rose to the occasion, clearing the way for additional forces and blowing up the entire complex.

In addition, both M and D talked about Iran's heavy contributions to the technological and tactical construction of the complex, making it unique in southern Lebanon.

Moreover, D described a creative process for rapidly moving explosives from nearby trucks deep into the Hezbollah headquarters, both for efficiency and so that the terrorists could not intervene.

Questioned about the difficulties of the Israeli security cabinet and Trump administration at one point ordering a pause from operations against Hezbollah at Ali Taher so as not to undermine the broader ceasefire with Iran, M said that the IDF and political echelon were fully coordinated at all times.

"Wherever and whenever an area was defined at a battlespace, we did everything to arrive at the desired outcome," said M.

Until the IDF destroyed the complex, it had served as the “nerve center” for the Badr Unit, and Hezbollah had no infrastructure of a similar scale north of it until reaching the Dahiyeh neighborhood of Beirut.

According to the IDF, the operation began with the crossing of the Litani River and an attempt to surprise Hezbollah.

The IDF carried out deception operations designed to make the terror group believe that soldiers were preparing to cross in another area, while at the same time opening a hidden bypass route over several days.

While most Hezbollah fighters were killed, some did manage to escape given the large number of tunnel shafts connected to the network.

Aspects of the operation were also conducted gradually so there was no dramatic single moment until it was too late in order to lure Iran into complacency when Hezbollah started to desperately call for help.

M concluded, "After what we did to them here, they understand we can get to them anywhere."