How do Israeli election results impact timing of possible new Iran war? - analysis

How do those results impact a possible new conflict with Iran?

In recent weeks, Netanyahu was seriously considering renewing the conflict with Iran.

But Zamir's opposition was only to an attack before Israeli elections were held yesterday, and Trump's opposition was only to an attack before the US midterm elections of November 3.

In fact, Trump has made numerous rumblings about resuming strikes on Iran soon after the US midterm elections and in his endorsement of Netanyahu, made reference to wanting Israel involved again as well.

If Eisenkot had won the battle of the blocs and, in a head-to-head with Netanyahu, as the polls forecast, he might have been able to start forming a government before the US midterm elections.

In such a scenario, it is doubtful that Netanyahu could have ordered a new attack on the Islamic Republic.

At that point, Liberman must make the excruciating decision to break a promise: either make a deal with the Israeli-Arab parties, make a deal with Netanyahu, or go to a second round of elections.

Even if Liberman moves toward one of these options for forming a new government, it would only start complex negotiations over what each side would need to do to pave the way for a partnership.

Once they agree on that, a separate negotiation will determine who gets which ministries and other jobs.

All of these issues will likely take more than the four days between Friday and the US midterm elections, since they usually take weeks or even months.

This means that Netanyahu will likely have the freedom to attack Tehran if Trump wants to or would not stop him.

Zamir is in favor of attacking Iran under two conditions.

The first has been and remains that Iran was either about to actually strike Israel, and the second was and is that Trump restarted the war first, and Israel had full backing offensively and defensively from the US for engaging in another round of conflict.

Generally, Zamir’s instinct has been that he is ready to strike the Islamic Republic if it starts recovering its threat capabilities too fast, which it has not yet done, or if such a strike would be part of a well-thought-out and considered strategy to finally push Tehran into making key nuclear concessions to the US.

He was against attacking before elections so as not to undermine election day voting by a potential Iranian ballistic missile counterstrike and to avoid the cloud of impropriety that an attack leading into elections might have been carried out to help Netanyahu's chances.

Post-election, there is no reason to bar an attack, though Zamir is also not rushing toward one, given that he does not view Tehran as having come much closer to any substantial nuclear or ballistic-missile threat.

To be sure, both issues remain threats, but both have been put off by some period of years due to US-Israeli airstrikes in June 2026 and early 2026.

This means that Netanyahu's main obstacle would be Trump.

Trump did not want to attack leading into the midterms because the Iran war is already dragging him and the Republican Party down in the polls.

But post-midterms, and with him unable to run for a third term, he will be unrestrained and could follow his whim to hit Iran again.

His top advisers have been and are mostly against a return to war, and while some think a few days of war might loosen Iran up some, others think Iran's refusal to crack since February has shown a few more intense days will not sway them either.

So he may have little to gain, and some of his advisers have also warned that Tehran has shown it is willing to keep firing after a US ceasefire, such that the conflict might last longer than a few days, even if Trump wants to stop.

This could lead Trump to walk away from the price tag of another round and to continue his long-term slow wearing down of Iran economically.

In fact, this series of Trump dizzying switches from economic pressure to sudden threat to go to war, to backing down back into economic pressure, happened in August, earlier in October, and at other times.

These inconsistent switches probably have also undermined the viability of his threat in the eyes of the Iranians.

Another possibility is the Iranians finally get scared by his latest threat of force, and offer a real deal on the nuclear issue.

That would for sure  lead to delaying any Iran attack.

But if Trump does ultimately favor attacking, it could not come at a better time for Netanyahu.

If Netanyahu is involved with attacking Iran as he holds a Jewish majority in the vote count, and just as Eisenkot and his camp are trying to rally together, a return to a focus on war with the Islamic Republic would place the nation's focus where Netanyahu prefers it.

Will Eisenkot and company find it harder to cut a deal with the Israeli-Arab parties while Israelis have ballistic missiles raining down on them?

Might they feel more ready to cut a deal with Netanyahu if Iran has pushed out October 7 and haredim serving in the IDF as the focus of the national conversation?

None of this means that Israel attacking Iran may not be justified on its own – until Tehran makes new nuclear concessions, such an attack could be justified in theory based on the idea of getting it to make those concessions.

And anytime the US offers to assist with cleaning house, many Israelis would say that Israel should not miss the chance to jump on board – as opposed to having to fight Iran solo at some later date.

Still, as long as Zamir is in no rush to strike Iran, Netanyahu would need to justify the attack with more than vague statements about Iran making new progress toward threatening Israel.

It is hard for him to both claim he succeeded at removing the nuclear and ballistic missile threat in one sentence, and to then demand a new strike now, because time is running out.

How Netanyahu explains a third round of conflict, if it happens during coalition negotiations, will be crucial to any attack's success and legitimacy among the wider Israeli public.