Voices from the Arab press: Communication is not a prerogative

The cartoon captures a deeply rooted crisis in Egyptian public administration. Many officials believe that a clean professional record and tangible accomplishments compensate for a lack of communication skills. That assumption may appear ethical and comforting, but in reality it is primitive in a world where politics and administration operate within an open communications environment that tolerates neither silence nor incompetence. People judge not only facts themselves but also how they are presented and explained. When officials fail to shape meaning, others will do so in their place, often in distorted or hostile ways.

Modern states realized early on that communication is not a luxury used to improve the reception of decisions after they are made, but part of decision-making itself. German philosopher Jürgen Habermas articulated this when he described the public sphere as the space where legitimacy is formed through dialogue and communication, not through authority alone. Institutions maintain public trust not merely through coercive power, but through their ability to sustain understanding with society.

In recent decades, this dimension has become so important that leading Western universities now teach leadership communication as a pillar of modern administration. Research from Harvard Business School indicates that leaders with strong communication skills achieve higher levels of institutional trust, internal discipline, and crisis-management capacity, while institutional failures during crises are often linked more to communication breakdowns than to the substance of the problems themselves.

Major global experiences reinforce this conclusion. Former US president Ronald Reagan, known as “The Great Communicator,” viewed effective communication not as a secondary skill but as the essence of leadership itself. Winston Churchill likewise understood during World War II that a speech capable of shaping meaning could rival armies and fleets in influence.

Modern leadership literature repeats the same idea in more scientific terms: a leader unable to explain decisions and persuade the public eventually becomes a burden on the institution, regardless of technical competence.

The problem is that some Egyptian institutions still treat communication training as a luxury or ceremonial exercise, despite modern research showing that communication is not simply an innate talent but a set of skills that can be developed.

The issue can no longer be left to good intentions or personal effort. What is required is a redefinition of leadership competence itself. Senior positions should not go to people who possess technical expertise alone while lacking the ability to listen, persuade, and manage public messaging. Today’s official no longer works behind closed doors, but within an exposed arena where politics, media, public opinion, and the digital sphere intersect constantly.

Communication workshops are therefore an institutional necessity, not cosmetic improvement. They should include crisis management, public speaking, media engagement, trust-building, and effective human communication, and communication ability should become a core criterion in evaluating candidates for senior office, alongside technical experience and administrative integrity.

The modern state is governed not by decisions alone, but by the ability to explain them, persuade citizens of them, and contain their social and psychological consequences.

When communication fails, small crises grow, and limited mistakes become major fires.

When officials speak effectively, societies become more capable of patience, understanding, and participation.

Political communication is not merely polished statements, but the art of building trust in a volatile age. Those who fail to grasp this may discover too late that achievements themselves can collapse under the weight of silence and poor expression.

Many of the crises caused by communication blunders by senior officials, which shook trust in both them and their institutions, were not rooted in corruption or incompetence so much as in clumsy wording, careless statements, unnecessary harshness, or absence when presence was required.

The claim that “achievement speaks for itself” may sound appealing in an ideal world, but it is weak in an era shaped by digital platforms and ruthless public interpretation.

Before examining the Caspian’s importance to Iran, it is worth recalling that it is the world’s largest enclosed body of water, described by some as the largest lake or inland sea because of its size and salinity, bordered by Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.

Most US naval forces are concentrated in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Gulf, and the US Navy cannot access the Caspian, because it is landlocked and disconnected from the oceans. As a result, it has become a key channel, linking the five littoral states, and a central part of the “North-South Corridor.”

International estimates suggest Iran has diverted part of its trade from southern Gulf ports to the Caspian, increasing shipping traffic for grain, oil, food supplies, industrial equipment, and technology. Most activity in the Caspian occurs away from direct scrutiny, with Russian and Iranian vessels often disabling tracking systems while moving between ports.

Because of sanctions imposed on Iran since 1979 and on Russia after the 2022 Ukraine war, the two countries have developed alternative transport and payment networks, strengthened cooperation on shipping routes outside Western oversight, and coordinated maritime security operations in the Caspian.

Western reports also say Israel targeted Iran’s naval command center at Bandar Anzali on the Caspian in March, in what was described as one of the most significant attacks on Iranian military infrastructure during the war, suggesting an effort to disrupt potential military assistance arriving through the sea.

Other reports claim the Caspian has become a hub for activities ranging from Iranian drone exports to Russia for use in Ukraine, to smuggled oil and Russian military technology tied to the shadow economy.

The result is that the Caspian has become a symbol of profound geopolitical shifts. Russian-Iranian relations there are no longer merely about goods and trade, but reflect a broader attempt by Russia, Iran, and China to establish a parallel system for trading energy and sanctioned goods, using local currencies rather than the dollar. Iran has also developed expertise in smuggling Russian oil through the Caspian, exporting it to nearby states or through Hormuz under false flags.

Satellite imagery reportedly shows cargo vessels moving quietly between southern Russian ports and northern Iranian shores, signaling a major strategic transformation that received little attention while focus remained fixed on Hormuz.

Many observers now view the Caspian as a strategic artery for military trade, and some describe the Russian-Chinese-Iranian relationship as an “alliance of necessity,” with each side needing the others to withstand mounting military and economic pressures.

Yet the central question remains whether the Caspian can fully compensate Iran for losing access to the Gulf and Hormuz. Most analysts agree the answer is no. Despite its importance, the sea is enclosed and can support only limited oil exports, perhaps no more than 10% of Iran’s production. Its capacity is far smaller than the southern Gulf ports, and transportation through the Caspian is slower and more expensive.

Still, for Iran, the Caspian remains an economic and strategic outlet that helps soften the impact of sanctions and blockade.

Once again, it cannot replace Hormuz. Iran lacks pipelines capable of moving southern oil northward, and even if such pipelines existed, there would be limited markets because the Caspian itself is enclosed, and Russia is already a major oil and gas exporter.

What can a country like Lebanon do when one internal faction works directly for Iran and wages war against the Lebanese state and its institutions? Inside Lebanon are forces more interested in entrenching Israeli occupation than in ending it, regardless of the cost.

The tragedy is that Lebanon entered negotiations under difficult and complex circumstances without a unified domestic front. The internal attacks targeting the delegation led by lawyer Simon Karam, the former ambassador to the US, exposed a critical weakness.

Lebanon can accomplish nothing without a national consensus on how to conduct direct talks with Israel in Washington.

More importantly, Lebanon cannot move forward without acknowledging that it must pay a price if it truly wants to end the Israeli occupation brought about by Hezbollah and, behind it, the Iranian regime.

From that perspective, the maximum achievable outcome was an extension of the ceasefire, though nothing indicates Israel intends to respect it.

One must acknowledge that Lebanon’s real problem is its inability to prove that it is a sovereign state capable of controlling war and peace on its territory. Once again, Lebanon in 2026 must demonstrate that its state is the real authority and not Hezbollah’s state – a mere brigade within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Only then can it negotiate with Israel on equal footing.

It was striking that before the Washington talks, Speaker Nabih Berri did not meet Karam, and no gathering was held at Baabda Palace between President Joseph Aoun, the speaker, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam before Karam’s departure.

Such a meeting was needed to show that the Lebanese state stood fully behind its negotiator, enabling him to say he represented Lebanon in all its components: Christians, Sunnis, Druze, and Shi’ites alike.

Instead, Lebanon appeared incapable of giving unified support to its delegation in the US-sponsored talks.

Lebanon went bravely into negotiations even as Israel continued its war against the small country, whose fate remains tied to the Iranian regime dominated by the Revolutionary Guard.

The Lebanese delegation ultimately faced one central question: Is Lebanon prepared to pay the price of defeat?

To answer that question, Lebanon first had to acknowledge that it had been defeated. Nothing demonstrates the scale of that defeat more clearly than Israel’s control over 68 southern towns and villages it is systematically destroying, along with the displacement of roughly 1.2 million Shi’ite citizens from southern Lebanon.

Lebanon cannot sustain the burden of so many occupied and destroyed communities on one hand and such massive displacement on the other.

In numerical terms alone, including the symbolic town of Bint Jbail, Lebanon must absorb the consequences of losing two wars with Israel.

Is Lebanon prepared to bear the cost of two imposed wars that ended in devastating defeat?

There is no escaping this question, if Lebanon wishes to avoid further destruction and displacement.

Lebanon needed a national consensus to answer it. Karam could not realistically go to Washington seeking an end to renewed Israeli occupation without that consensus.

Israel will continue its attacks so long as Hezbollah’s weapons remain, and Lebanon must begin considering how to rid itself of them.

Eventually, it must ask itself a very simple question: What is the price of Israeli withdrawal and the return of people to their southern towns and villages or what remains of them?

Once that price is understood, Lebanon will need a unified national position rather than leaving the burden of negotiations solely on the president and government represented by Salam.

Developments in Iran reveal a clear divide between a hardline faction that sees continued war and tension as a source of influence and political advantage, and a more moderate current that views de-escalation and diplomacy as essential for political and economic stability.

Over time, however, those gatherings became platforms exploited by hardliners to impose an extreme discourse toward both domestic and foreign audiences, embarrassing the Iranian leadership and undermining its narrative of political unity.

In recent days, voices from both conservative and reformist camps have warned of the dangers posed by extremist dominance over these platforms, arguing that such rhetoric threatens national cohesion and is being used to mobilize against moderates within the ruling establishment.

In this context, the Iranian outlet Khabar Online sharply criticized state television and official media for giving disproportionate space to extremists and broadcasting hostile statements against politicians while simultaneously speaking of national unity.

The outlet argued that official media discourse now contradicts calls for internal solidarity by amplifying voices that deepen divisions.

He argued that some hardliners view continued tension and confrontation as central to their political project because their influence and status depend on Iran remaining trapped under sanctions and crisis.

It wrote that war is not an end in itself, but a means of defending stability and national rights, while groups that thrive on “permanent tension” oppose any negotiations or settlements that could produce political or economic relief for Iran.

Criticism has not come only from reformists. Mohammad-Kazem Anbarlouei of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party criticized the raising of divisive issues – such as hijab policies, negotiations with the West, and prosecutions of political figures – during public gatherings, arguing that preserving unity in the Iranian street must remain the top priority.