Turkey’s draft law set to offer amnesty to members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) would allow Ankara to shift its intelligence and economic resources from its “long-running counterterrorism campaign” to other regional priorities, Turkish foreign policy analyst Burak Can Celik told The Jerusalem Post on Thursday.
Celik’s comments came a day after Turkey’s ruling alliance submitted a draft law to parliament meant to achieve peace with the PKK, in part by protecting many former militants from prosecution and suspending prison sentences for some others.
The draft law marks a leap toward ending an insurgency that has killed over 40,000 people since 1984, sown deep discord at home, and fuelled violence across borders in Iraq and Syria.
He predicted that the most immediate consequences would be seen in Iraq, where a reduced security threat could ease tensions with Baghdad and could, eventually, reduce the intensity of Turkish cross-border military operations, which would “create a more stable environment for energy infrastructure, trade routes, and regional connectivity projects, such as the Development Road.”
However, the end of the PKK threat would not necessarily mean that Turkey would rapidly withdraw its military and intelligence presence from northern Iraq.
PKK deal could reduce Turkey’s Iraq presence, free resources for wider regional goals
Ankara regards its regional security capacity as important not only for countering the PKK, but also for protecting its borders and maintaining regional influence. A reduction in Turkey’s military presence may therefore be possible, but a gradual and conditional adjustment would be more realistic than a complete withdrawal.
Outside Iraq, the end of the long battle against the PKK would also free resources to focus on its interests in Syria, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and NATO. Though Celik theorized that Ankara’s foreign policy wasn’t necessarily on the path to moderation.
“Turkey, no longer constrained by such a significant internal security challenge, could act with greater confidence and assertiveness on certain regional issues,” he said. “The outcome of this process could therefore affect not only Turkey’s domestic security environment, but also the balance of power Ankara seeks to establish in its relations with neighboring countries.
The bill would suspend prison sentences for those convicted of PKK membership or aiding the group, according to the text seen by Reuters. It also legally protects militants who were not involved in killings and who return to Turkey within six months of the law passing parliament.
PKK officials convicted of serious crimes, including leading a terrorist organization and aggravated life sentences before 2005, would not benefit from legal protections or suspended sentences. This means PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, jailed since 1999 with an aggravated life sentence, would remain in prison.
Describing Ankara’s decision as “pragmatic,” Celik explained that there were few options to achieve a comprehensive disarmament “without creating a legal exit route for members of the organization who were not directly involved in armed attacks or serious crimes.”
He suggested that “in an environment where everyone who surrenders expects to face automatic arrest and lengthy prison sentences, there may be little incentive for lower-ranking members in particular to lay down their weapons,” and so a limited mechanism for an amnesty can be seen as a way to make disarmament achievable without it being viewed as a concession.
Though efforts began in 2024 to achieve a peace agreement, regional escalation created barriers to achieving a mutually lasting calm. Celik suggested that the reason for the renewed movement is that Ankara has expanded its military capacity, particularly in northern Iraq, while the PKK has come under significant pressure.
“The process appears to be taking place at a moment when the state believes it is in a stronger position than during previous peace initiatives,” he said. “The government is therefore likely to present it not as a negotiation based on mutual concessions, but as the final stage of a long-standing security strategy.”
With elections scheduled for 2028, and new momentum in place to challenge Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s 23-year rule, he added that such a large initiative could not be considered entirely separate from domestic politics.
“Ending the conflict could represent a significant achievement for President Erdogan’s political legacy, reshape the government’s relationship with Kurdish voters, and influence future constitutional discussions,” he explained. “The potential political consequences of the process, as well as the advantages the government may derive from it, are therefore also being debated within Turkey.”
Transparency and legal clarity will determine support for PKK peace process
Longer term, the issue of the PKK has been a challenge of “security and social stability” that would have needed to be addressed eventually, he claimed, adding that the “existence of political motivations does not eliminate the fact that the process may also respond to a genuine and significant strategic need.”
“The decisive question will be how transparently, institutionally, and legally predictably the process is conducted,” he continued, noting that there needed to be a clear and above-board distinction for differentiating between “individuals responsible for serious crimes” and lower-ranking members; also, “proper consideration for the sensitivities of victims will be essential for maintaining public support.”
Failure to ensure these mechanisms are in place could be viewed by one section of society as ”creating impunity,” while another may see it as “insufficient and unrealistic,” Celik warned.