Tehran is using military coercion to force Gulf states to accept the Islamic Republic’s administration over the vital Strait of Hormuz, according to a new assessment by the Institute for the Study of War.
The recent attacks on Gulf nations are an attempt to circumvent the intent of Clause 5 of the memorandum of understanding, which calls for dialogue with Oman and Persian Gulf littoral states to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz within the framework of international law.
Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission member Alaeddin Boroujerdi insisted on Wednesday that commercial vessel traffic through the strait must occur under Iranian oversight and management, specifically through the IRGC Navy.
Similarly, on Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei claimed that Clause 5 confirmed Iran’s responsibility to determine arrangements for safe passage of vessels.
Baghaei, writing off an allegation that a Qatari vessel was targeted as “questionable,” asserted that Iran was taking the necessary steps to absorb the responsibility for the administration of Hormuz, and insisted that ships not following Iranian orders were responsible for disrupting “Iran's efforts to facilitate safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz,” according to the foreign ministry.
MoU: the absence of any real 'durable' peace framework in the Gulf
Bahraini analyst Dr Ahmed Alkhuzaie wrote to the Post to say that Iran’s recent escalations against Gulf nations proved that the MoU, which was “intended as a vehicle for de-escalation,” has exposed the absence of any real “durable” peace framework in the Gulf.
“The collapse of the MoU was virtually predetermined by its design flaws. From inception, it lacked a commencement date, structured sequencing, and concrete deadlines. Without a timeline, there were no objective benchmarks to measure compliance, rendering the agreement unenforceable from day one. This procedural weakness was compounded by the absence of enforcement mechanisms; the text contained no penalties or escalation clauses if commitments were broken, leaving Iran with zero deterrent against violating the spirit of the deal,” he explained.
“For Gulf capitals, the MoU was already viewed with skepticism, seen less as a genuine security guarantee and more as an American attempt to temporarily manage tensions. Iran’s renewed aggression has validated these anxieties, reinforcing the perception of US unreliability and leaving Washington caught in a dangerous strategic trap; the US must now either launch a kinetic military retaliation that risks the wider war it sought to avoid, or stand down and finalize the erosion of its regional credibility.”
Dr Kristian Alexander, a geopolitical analyst based in Dubai, claimed Tehran has not entirely abandoned its diplomatic approach, but is now trying to combine both to pressure regional acceptance of its claim to Hormuz.
Tehran used the MoU to assert its claim to Hormuz had political acknowledgement, but reverted to maritime attacks when that MoU began to unravel to “preserve leverage,” he explained.
As Iran’s “most important strategic bargaining chip,” Hormuz has become increasingly perceived as the regime’s “golden weapon” with more immediate usefulness than its nuclear file, he continued. Beyond perceiving the vital waterway as a weapon, it also provides the opportunity for the regime to survive its mounting economic challenges, “Whether through formal transit charges or other mechanisms.”
“Iran is trying to redefine the Strait from an international waterway into a zone of Iranian-managed security. That is unacceptable to Washington, Gulf states, and global shipping markets, but it explains Tehran's pattern: threaten disruption, negotiate relief, then reassert control when diplomacy fails,” Alexander highlighted.
Though Iran has already begun intensive attacks on Middle Eastern nations, with Bahrain and Kuwait seemingly receiving the brunt of the aerial assaults, Alexander predicted Iran would become more aggressive should the MoU formally collapse.
“Tehran may avoid a formal, total closure of Hormuz because that would invite overwhelming military and diplomatic pushback. Instead, it may rely on calibrated harassment such as ship inspections, seizures, drone overflights, mining threats, insurance-risk escalation, and pressure on vessels linked to US allies,” he predicted.
“Naval mines deserve particular attention because they provide Iran with one of its most effective asymmetric tools. Mines are relatively inexpensive to deploy, difficult to detect quickly, and can disrupt commercial shipping long before they actually strike a vessel. Their strategic value lies less in sinking ships than in creating uncertainty, forcing costly minesweeping operations, driving up insurance premiums, and deterring shipping companies from entering the Strait altogether.”
In short, Iran doesn’t need to attack shipping, only create the fear of a threat to raise uncertainty and leave the West and its neighbors to feel the economic consequences.