‘I want to be reimbursed’: How will Gulf nations receive Trump’s push for protection payments?

US President Donald Trump wants Gulf states to compensate the United States for the protection provided to them amid Iranian attacks, he said on Monday.

“I want to be reimbursed because we’re protecting a very rich portion of the world. We’re spending money, so... we are going to be reimbursed for protection,” the president told reporters in the Oval Office.

The US doesn’t “need” those countries because “we have more oil than any other country in the world,” he said. “We’re protecting all of them, and we’ve done a very effective job.”

“Those Investments will be MASSIVE but, at the same time, extraordinarily good for them, and their future,” Trump wrote on social media. “As everyone is aware, we have the largest Dollar Investment into the United States, of any Country in History, but these new Investments will make that Number even larger, and we will see Factories, Plants, and Equipment pour into the United States at Historic levels, which will create additional millions of High Paying AMERICAN Jobs! America is WINNING again, winning like never before.”

“POTUS is absolutely right. Whoever provides secure and safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz should be compensated for this service,” Araghchi wrote on social media. “Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER.”

Asked what Trump’s motives could be, Freilich said, “Money is his primary motivation in life; he thinks only in monetary terms.”

Though the financial demand on Gulf states may be a new development, Yoel Guzansky, the head of the Gulf Research Field at the Institute for National Security Studies, said it was likely something Gulf states expected from Trump, who has built his identity on being a businessman.

“Trump, he is transactional, always looking for where the money is,” Guzansky said. “He’s a businessman, he admits it, and he’s not ashamed of it; he’s proud of it, and the Gulf States understood that from the beginning.”

Guzansky argued that the security benefits of hosting US forces ultimately eclipse the risks, tipping the balance in favor of a continued American presence. This benefit outweighs the cost of US protection for Gulf states, even though Washington’s regional military footprint is frequently cited by Iran to validate its own attacks.

Without America’s presence in the region, Guzansky argued, many Gulf states would have been conquered by Iran, or at least subjected to Iranian attempts. “There’s a price to pay for US bases in the Gulf, but one cannot live without them because the threat of Iran is still there,” he said.

Though perhaps expected, Kristian Alexander, a geopolitical analyst based in Dubai, told the Post that Gulf states would be uncomfortable with the relationship being reduced to “transactional” exchanges of protection for payment.

“From the Gulf perspective, the relationship has never been one-sided. Gulf states host US military bases, provide critical logistical infrastructure, facilitate intelligence cooperation, purchase substantial quantities of American defense equipment, and contribute to regional stability in ways that directly support US strategic interests. They are therefore likely to argue that they already shoulder a significant share of the burden associated with the regional security architecture,” he said.

Guzansky, however, contended that the problem would not be paying for America’s protection; the issue would lie with what that protection would look like.

“I think they expect more from the US, not just from this administration, but from the US as a whole, to do more for their defense than it has done so far during this war,” he said. “There is a lot of disappointment in the Gulf with US strategy toward Iran and with the way the US conducted itself during the war. So yes, there is a transactional element, but the question is: what do we get in return? I think there is a gap between what the US understands as protection and what the Gulf states understand as protection.”

That gap in trust and expectations has largely contributed to the continued dialogue held between Gulf states and Iran, he continued, saying the talks and financial involvements were “not because they love Iran” but out of “fear.” Aware that the US “can’t wait to leave the Gulf,” the states are less likely to throw their full weight behind any US efforts, even as they build deeper military ties, because they need to maintain some level of appeasement because the US, while capable, cannot be fully relied upon.

Alexander suggested that the need to balance relations with the US and Iran would also create some difficulty in paying for protection.

“Gulf capitals have spent the past several years pursuing a strategy of strategic de-escalation with Iran. The GCC as a whole has increasingly prioritized crisis management over confrontation. Against that backdrop, rhetoric emphasizing ‘protection’ against Iran could complicate these carefully managed diplomatic efforts by reinforcing Tehran’s long-standing narrative that Gulf states are facilitating American pressure against Iran,” he argued.

Many of the Gulf states pushed for the conflict with Iran to be resolved through diplomacy, particularly Qatar and Oman, and the efforts eventually materialized in a failed memorandum of understanding that offered no real resolution to the Hormuz crisis and gifted Iran what many experts see as a financial lifeline.

“The US is the strongest military power in the world, but it faces many constraints on how it can use that power. The political will, if you may, was not there. So the Gulf states will do everything possible to strengthen their relations with the US, maintain a continued dialogue with Iran, and strengthen their own militaries. This is hedging, doing several things in parallel because none of these options is perfect. You hedge your bets, as you would with financial risks,” he said.

Asked about Trump’s motivation in Washington receiving some kind of financial gain for its continued involvement, especially given that the war lacks popularity, Guzansky said he wasn’t sure but it was possible that a continued military presence in the region would be “easier to sell as a business transaction.”

“There is a lot of opposition in the US, especially within the Republican Party, to what is called the ‘long war’ and foreign intervention. This is what I was referring to earlier, the pressure on Trump to step back, move away from the war, and cut his losses. But it is very difficult when the Strait of Hormuz is at stake, and the stakes are high. So would it be easier to sell this as a business transaction? Perhaps to some in the Republican Party, maybe. I really don’t know; I would only be guessing,” he concluded.

Alexander said the payments might have more “mixed results” than anticipated.

“On one hand, they [the request for payments] reinforce US deterrence by signaling continued American willingness to secure the Strait of Hormuz,” he said. “On the other, they could strengthen Iranian messaging that Washington’s military presence is driven as much by economic and commercial interests as by regional security. Tehran will almost certainly seek to exploit such statements in its information campaign, portraying the United States as treating Gulf security as a revenue-generating enterprise rather than a collective security commitment.”