The strategic implications of a criminal case brought under universal jurisdiction over the Hamas-led massacre that began on October 7, 2023, extend far beyond the possible punishment of its material perpetrators – whom Israel is already pursuing de facto – toward a much deeper consequence: the reformulation of the factual and legal framework through which the conflict is understood internationally, with direct impact on the construction of its legal truth and the broader narrative dispute.
First and foremost, because it demonstrates that this was not an isolated event, but rather a continuing crime prolonged through kidnappings and enforced disappearances – involving torture and murders committed in captivity – that persisted until the recovery of the final hostage or the return of their remains.
This is consistent with international doctrine and with the position of the United Nations itself, which classifies enforced disappearances as “continuing crimes” that persist until the fate or whereabouts of the victim are clarified (UN Doc. A/HRC/16/48, 1/26/2011). Consequently, the criminal act extends until January 26, 2026, the date on which the remains of the final hostage were recovered.
That continuity is reinforced by the persistence of attacks against the civilian population carried out not only by Hamas, but also by other actors who progressively joined the aggression: Hezbollah, beginning on October 8, 2023, and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, beginning on April 13, 2024, to support and expand the initial assault, escalating both the scale and intensity of indiscriminate missile, rocket, and projectile attacks against the entire civilian population of Israeli territory.
Such conduct falls not only within the category of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, but also – insofar as it involves acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic or religious group – within the category of attempted genocide under Article 6 of the Statute, the consummation of which was prevented only by circumstances beyond the perpetrators’ control.
The specific intent (dolus specialis) emerges not only from the operational dynamics of the attacks themselves, but also from the founding charters and manifestos of the organizations involved, as well as from the repeated public statements of their leaders explicitly reaffirming the same exterminatory objective.
Within this framework, the prosecution of the material perpetrators necessarily extends to their financing networks, logistical support structures, and mechanisms of international coordination – potentially enabling arrest warrants, extradition requests, and even trials in absentia should the perpetrators refuse to appear or remain under state protection.
Yet there is an additional dimension: the prosecution of organized forms of legitimization, propaganda, and ideological support for these crimes disseminated through media platforms, satellite organizations, and transnational advocacy networks, which may themselves fall within criminal categories associated with incitement or the glorification of international crimes.
Properly characterizing the events as a continuing crime also carries another decisive consequence: it radically alters the legal framework in which Israel’s actions must be assessed, since they can no longer be treated as an isolated and disconnected phenomenon, but rather as a sustained reaction to an ongoing criminal assault.
As long as Israel remains the victim of a continuing aggression, any potential criminal responsibility can only be examined in terms of self-defense and its possible excesses.
Legal characterizations within the Rome Statute system
It is particularly significant that such a legal characterization could emerge from a jurisdiction integrated into the Rome Statute system, because it directly affects other jurisdictions operating within the same international legal order – particularly certain European jurisdictions currently pursuing proceedings against Israeli citizens as alleged perpetrators of war crimes.
The emergence of an opposing legal characterization within the same international system creates a tension capable of obstructing the advancement of such prosecutions, given the internal contradiction generated within that shared legal order.
But the most decisive impact concerns the International Criminal Court (ICC) itself, where the prosecutor has constructed the case around a false and artificial temporal fragmentation: Hamas is accused of a crime allegedly committed and completed on October 7, while Israel is charged with a supposedly separate act beginning on October 8 and continuing thereafter.
The inconsistency of that construction becomes evident for two reasons.
First, because the Israeli response did not begin on October 8, but on October 7 itself, simultaneously with the initial aggression and while it was still unfolding. Given that this is a matter of public knowledge, the temporal separation appears to be a deliberate distortion intended to artificially dissociate a single continuum of events into two ostensibly autonomous crimes, thereby enabling the prosecution of the victim.
Second and equally deliberate is the attempt to treat the initial crime as having been completed on October 7 despite its continuation through the kidnapping, captivity, and disappearance of 251 abducted persons, since the prosecutor cannot plausibly ignore the international doctrine governing “continuing crimes” under precisely these circumstances.
Accordingly, if a legal characterization becomes established within a Rome Statute jurisdiction under which October 7 constitutes a continuing crime prolonged through kidnappings, captivity, and ongoing attacks against civilians, then an alternative factual and legal framework emerges – one capable of supporting well-founded challenges to the current international indictments and to the precautionary measures adopted on that basis.
In that sense, Argentine jurisdiction operates as a corrective mechanism, compelling a reframing of the accusations against Israel as questions concerning possible excess or disproportionality in the exercise of legitimate self-defense.
The issue acquires an even broader dimension because Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute and therefore appears before the ICC exclusively in the position of the accused, and solely in a defensive posture.
The opening of proceedings within its jurisdiction allows Israel, indirectly, to move onto the offensive by introducing into the same international legal system an alternative construction capable of reshaping the narrative and juridical architecture currently governing the international arena.
The writer is an architect, author, and journalist. He has published several books and recently initiated a criminal case in Argentina under international jurisdiction to prosecute the October 7 massacre as crimes against humanity and genocide.