If this war ends according to the emerging framework now being discussed, it must be said honestly: Measured against the war’s original objectives, this would amount to a defeat wrapped in the atmosphere of victory. This is not a matter of political interpretation or emotional instinct. It is a simple strategic assessment of goals versus outcomes.
Israel entered this campaign with a clear understanding that Iran is the head of the octopus, that its nuclear project constitutes the central existential threat to the State of Israel, and that Tehran would not hesitate to use such capabilities not merely as deterrence but eventually as an instrument of initiative. At the same time, Iran’s regional proxy network continues to expand precisely in order to wage a long-term, multi-front war of attrition against Israel.
Therefore, there is only one true benchmark for success: Has the Iranian nuclear threat and the threat posed by its proxy organizations been pushed away for generations, or merely postponed for a few years?
At this stage, it is difficult to conclude that the answer is positive.
The agreement currently under discussion has not even been signed, and in practice it appears divided into two stages: first, an arrangement regarding the Strait of Hormuz designed to stabilize the regional economic system and secure freedom of navigation and energy flows, followed by a broader nuclear agreement intended to guarantee regional stability.
Agreements erode over time
Yet in the Middle East, there is no such thing as a “temporary” first agreement. Iran understands very well that phased agreements inevitably erode over time, while the international community rapidly adapts itself to the existence of threats that were never truly removed.
Even proposals involving the transfer of enriched uranium to a third country such as Pakistan amount to little more than geopolitical improvisation disguised as strategy. The moment an American administration changes, the path for that uranium to return to Iran could become remarkably short. Such arrangements would leave Tehran with the ability to rapidly break out toward nuclear weapons capability and enrich sufficient military-grade material for a bomb within a relatively short time frame.
The clearest proof lies in the Obama-era nuclear agreement, which the Iranian regime eagerly embraced. That deal not only failed to prevent Iran’s race toward the bomb; it provided the regime with financial resources, legitimacy, and strategic breathing room that accelerated its long-term nuclear ambitions while weakening effective oversight.
But the story does not end with the nuclear issue itself. The nuclear project has dangerous strategic extensions that may be no less severe. Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, effectively Iran’s ground commando arm in Lebanon, was designed to invade the Galilee, seize Israeli communities, strategic infrastructure, and military bases. This was not a theoretical fantasy. At the beginning of the war, it was a viable operational scenario that came dangerously close to realization.
That reality imposes a clear diplomatic obligation on Israel: No agreement can be accepted if it addresses the head of the snake while leaving its poisonous limbs intact along Israel’s borders.
Israel must make one principle unmistakably clear: There can be no agreement with Iran that ignores Hezbollah, the Shi’ite militias, Hamas, and the broader network of terrorist proxies operated by Tehran across the region. It is impossible to speak seriously about regional stability while Iran continues to hold a loaded gun against Israel through its proxy armies.
Ultimately, the central question surrounding any future agreement is this: Are we seeking decisive victory for generations, or merely another agreement with metastases?
The difference between those two paths is the difference between genuine security and a far more dangerous war in the not-so-distant future.
The writer, an IDF lieutenant-colonel (res.), is CEO of the Israel Defense & Security Forum (IDSF), and serves as the operations officer of the Gaza Division in the IDF reserves.