A diplomat serving at the United Nations was quoted as saying during the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis of 1982 that Britain was a Mini Morris country with a Rolls-Royce diplomacy.
Paraphrasing that, one can say that Israel is a Rolls-Royce country with a Mini Morris diplomacy.
On the one hand, Israel is endowed with the best and the brightest, making it a leader in technological and scientific innovation and one of the most advanced public medical services in the world. On the other hand, Israel is a country in which its singular military prowess is unmatched by its diplomatic feebleness.
To be sure, Israel does not lack good diplomats. It lacks a pronounced diplomatic dimension in its national security policy. The problem is not personal but structural, not operational but conceptual.
The increasingly limited role of the Foreign Ministry in the shaping of Israeli foreign policy has been a source of controversy and criticism. In a country in which the military dimension of national security policy takes precedence over the diplomatic dimension, the input of the defense establishment is significantly more pronounced than that of the Foreign Ministry.
Further, the Prime Minister’s Office has centralized, if not altogether monopolized, the shaping of foreign policy regarding Israel’s relations with the United States, its principal ally, and with the Arab world.
Indeed, other crucial policy matters, such as Iran’s nuclear program, are also mainly within the purview of the Prime Minister’s Office. Thus, Israeli foreign policy on the major strategic issues is generally formulated outside the purview of the Foreign Ministry.
To be sure, the role of the Foreign Ministry in the decision-making process depends also on the Foreign Minister and his or her relationship with the prime minister.
Thus, for instance, Moshe Dayan, who served as Israel’s foreign minister from 1977 to 1979 under prime minister Menachem Begin, was very influential, particularly concerning the peace process with Egypt.
The same could be said about Abba Eban, who, under prime minister Levi Eshkol between 1966 and 1969, was directly involved as foreign minister in formulating and implementing Israeli foreign policy; the Foreign Ministry under his leadership was active in the diplomacy conducted by Israel both before and in the wake of the Six Day War in 1967.
Moshe Sharett, as Israel’s first foreign minister, played a central role in establishing the Israeli Foreign Ministry and in enlisting outstanding diplomats to work for it. Although his relationship with the prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, was far from being harmonious, he struggled politically to enlist adherents within the government for his moderate line, winning a few battles in the cabinet against Ben-Gurion.
The Foreign Ministry was both visible and active, if not always significantly influential, in determining Israel’s policy on major, strategic issues.
To be sure, the relegation of the Foreign Ministry to a secondary role in the national security decision-making process was bemoaned by the Winograd Commission, established by the Israeli Government in the wake of the Second Lebanon War in 2007. In its recommendations, the Commission called for the full incorporation of the Foreign Ministry in security decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.
Incidentally, as a result of the recommendations submitted by the Winograd Commission, an agreement was signed between the IDF and the Foreign Ministry to provide the latter with raw intelligence material necessary for its intelligence and political analyses.
Indeed, many years before the publication of the Winograd Commission Report, the Agranat Commission, which was set up in the wake of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, had urged the Israeli Government to strengthen the Research Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to accord it, among other things, a more pronounced role in the decision-making process on national security matters.
Foreign ministers shape Israel’s security agenda
Thus, there has been a growing awareness that the Foreign Ministry should have a significant role in shaping Israel’s national security policy. However, translating that into action has depended on changing political circumstances. This structural deficiency is met once a foreign minister has political or personal clout.
However, the problem goes deeper than that. Conceptually, national security is identified almost exclusively with hard power, which is understandable in a country beset by constant threats, but can turn out to be detrimental to Israel’s national interests.
Diplomacy, particularly under the present Israeli government, is regarded, at best, as a temporary tool to be employed ad hoc. Indeed, it is regarded narrowly. It is aimed at achieving short-term goals. Diplomacy is not embraced as an integral element in shaping national security policy. It is not even considered to be a tool to be employed tactically to gain international legitimacy.
Israeli diplomats do their best, and many of them are outstanding professionals. The problem does not reside with them, but with the decision-makers.
Certainly, a good decision-making process is no substitute for a flawed policy, but it can mitigate its negative repercussions. By the same token, a successful diplomatic strategy is no substitute for an incoherent policy, but it can soften its adverse consequences.
Shaping national security policy holistically, encompassing the diplomatic dimension as a central feature, both conceptually and institutionally, is essential for Israel’s long-term interests. It may not turn enemies into friends, but it may avoid turning friends into enemies.
The writer is a lecturer at the School of Political Science, Government, and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University. He holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University and a master’s in International Relations from Cambridge University.