According to a Persian expression, an egg thief will ultimately become a camel thief. That is why one must punish and correct the egg thief in time, before he starts stealing even bigger things.
The ayatollah regime began as an egg thief and aspired to become a camel thief. If the regime is not stopped, it will turn into a jihadist empire. Ali Khamenei has been working towards this ambition for 37 years. A totalitarian regime does not change with a few heavy bombardments.
However, a totalitarian regime will be weakened by bombardments. It is ground forces that put an end to a totalitarian regime. The Allies could never, ever have destroyed Nazi Germany without the deployment of ground forces.
A totalitarian regime is not a banana republic. This form of tyranny does not survive by the grace of individuals. Its ideology is the foundation and the cement of the regime.
Political Islam, or Islamism, despite its modern aspects and appearance, has its roots in the original Islam of Medina. It was there that the Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic state. Ayatollahs have been able to combine the ancient politico-religious tradition with the modern form of tyranny, namely the totalitarian state.
The founder of the Islamic Republic wrote as early as the 1960s: “Our Prophet was also a politician… The reasons for the formation of an Islamic regime are: (1) The Prophet himself established a regime. History bears witness to his regime.”
The Iranian regime bases its actions on the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. The idea of a stable agreement with Islamists is a delusion. The Prophet Muhammad, too, concluded a peace agreement with Mecca, agreeing not to attack one another for a period of 10 years.
The Treaty of al-Hudaybiya (628) enabled Muhammad to prepare for the decisive attack on Mecca. Muhammad also used that time to resolve the “Jewish problem” in the vicinity of Medina. The Battle of Khaybar put an end to the Jews there.
In 630, Muhammad attacked Mecca. The city fell into the hands of jihadists. The regime change on the Arabian Peninsula was irreversible. Islamists live according to the rules and actions of Muhammad.
Any peace treaty with the enemy is temporary, because ultimately, everyone must be subjected to Islam (Pax Islamica). This is the basis of jihadist diplomacy. For more than 40 years, this political-military approach has been taught at the military academy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The Islamic Republic is beginning to get used to American military and political tactics. The regime’s hard core is no longer in a state of shock; its approach is coherent and consistent: the survival of the Islamic State of Iran.
Tehran is pursuing a long-term strategy consisting of two options: one, a repeat of the Obama deal plus the Strait of Hormuz; and two, a Trump-Vance deal on paper forever, but in reality, for 2.5 years (the removal of enriched uranium from Iran). The basis of this strategy is embedded in a time limit: the next US presidential election. In fact, the Ayatollah regime is in a favorable position.
So where did it go wrong? The Strait of Hormuz.
The IRGC was able to hold the US hostage in the Strait of Hormuz. The generals I spoke to frankly could not understand why, in the first week of the war, America did not make every effort to occupy large sections of Iran’s coastline. According to the military officials I spoke to, the occupation of the coastline was, and remains, a viable military strategy.
Had America occupied the key sections of the coastline, including a few cities, the regime would no longer have been able to keep the Iranian economy running. What’s more, Washington has another trump card up its sleeve: Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and his supporters. They could have been stationed in that area, and the occupied territory would then become liberated territory.
With the elimination of military and political leaders in Tehran and elsewhere, the regime would, according to this scenario, collapse within a few weeks.
Why? Because the people hate the regime.
On January 8-9, the regime murdered tens of thousands of Iranians in various towns and villages across Iran. It was, and still is, possible that the regime signed a capitulation agreement on condition of amnesty and the relocation of several political and military leaders.
None of this sat well with US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance’s military mindset. Now the White House is paying the price for this: negotiating with an enemy who has already taken you hostage. Neither peace nor war is the result of an operation that began well but ended in a quagmire of doubt, uncertainty, and arbitrariness.
Trump is the first American president in 47 years to be respected and trusted by the majority of Iranians. Iranians trusted Trump’s words. The Iranians were and are Trump’s best ally in his war against the ayatollahs. However, they are not America’s ally in negotiations with their own murderers.
Trump could go down in history as the dealmaker behind “Obama Deal 2.0” or as the president who put an end to one of America’s oldest and most dangerous enemies. Negotiating a deal with the Ayatollah will only serve to preserve the Iranian regime. With the help of Russia and China, they will later develop into a true jihadist superpower.
If this war ends with a deal, then no one in the Middle East or elsewhere will have any respect for American power, which is being driven out of Afghanistan by a Taliban deal and out of the Persian Gulf by a deal with the ayatollah. Trump is rightly concerned about endless wars. But the war against the IRGC does not fall into the category of endless wars.
Ultimately, it is the Iranians themselves who form the ground forces of a civilization offensive against the Ayatollah regime. This is not the start of an endless war, but the beginning of lasting peace and the gradual end of Islamic terrorism.
With this, President Trump will go down in history as the American president who, after 47 years, has established Pax Americana in the Middle East.
The writer is a professor of jurisprudence (legal theory and legal philosophy) at the Faculty of Law, Leiden University.