For decades, the world has relied on a simple but powerful principle to prevent nuclear war: mutual assured destruction (MAD).
The logic is straightforward. When two adversaries possess the ability to destroy one another, including a second strike capability where each side is able to retaliate after it was attacked, neither side has an incentive to launch a nuclear attack.
This principle helped prevent direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and continues to shape relations among the world’s nuclear powers.
The MoU signed by the USA and Iran includes an Iranian commitment to “never develop nuclear weapons.” Recent history offers many reasons for skepticism.
Iran has repeatedly advanced its nuclear program despite international inspections, sanctions, diplomatic agreements, and military pressure.
Time and again, investigators uncovered activities that had not been fully disclosed. Whatever one’s view of Iranian intentions, the historical record suggests a remarkable ability to preserve nuclear expertise, rebuild capabilities, and exploit loopholes in monitoring arrangements.
As concerns grow that Iran may eventually acquire nuclear weapons despite all efforts to stop it, some analysts argue that the MAD logic should apply to Tehran.
They point out that the “skies have not fallen” after North Korea successfully developed a nuclear arsenal despite years of sanctions and international pressure. The world has adapted to that reality and, as lunatic as Kim Jong Un seems to be, deterrence appears to have prevented catastrophe.
Yet the Iranian case is fundamentally different.
The Soviet leadership was ruthless, but its primary objective was the survival and expansion of Soviet power. The same is true of North Korea’s ruling dynasty, whose overriding goal appears to be regime preservation. In both cases, nuclear deterrence rests on the assumption that leaders value their own survival and that of the state they govern.
Iran presents a more complicated picture. Since the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic has combined traditional state interests with a radical religious ideology. Its leaders frequently frame political struggles in theological terms and have long supported armed movements throughout the Middle East that embrace martyrdom and self-sacrifice.
Their ultimate goal is to force the world, particularly the Western World, to accept their version of Islam through a holy war (Jihad) in which those that refuse to surrender are annihilated. The presence of powerful ideological and religious motivations introduces an element of risk that does not exist to the same degree in other nuclear rivalries.
Supporters of deterrence respond that Iran’s leadership has repeatedly demonstrated pragmatism when faced with overwhelming force. That is true. Yet the issue is not whether Iran would deliberately seek national suicide.
The issue is whether decision-makers in Jerusalem, Washington, Riyadh, or elsewhere can afford to stake their security on the assumption that future Iranian leaders will always behave according to the logic of classical deterrence.
The recent conflict may have significantly damaged Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but infrastructure can be rebuilt. Scientists cannot be “uneducated,” engineering knowledge cannot be bombed away, and nuclear know-how cannot be permanently erased. Estimates of Iran’s recovery timeline vary.
Some experts believe it could take several years for Tehran to restore the capabilities it possessed before the war. Others argue that a determined regime, benefiting from the financial gains that Iran achieved in the MoU, working covertly and drawing on existing expertise, could recover much faster.
The exact timeline matters less than the broader reality: the challenge has almost certainly been delayed rather than permanently resolved.
Can deterrence contain Iran?
That is why policymakers should not embrace the idea that a future nuclear-armed Iran can simply be managed through deterrence.
The success of MAD during the Cold War does not automatically guarantee its success in every geopolitical context. Historical analogies can be useful, but they can also be misleading when important differences are overlooked.
The central question is not whether deterrence might work with Iran. It might. The question is whether the consequences of discovering that it does not are acceptable.
For Israel in particular, the answer is no. Given the country’s size, geography, and vulnerability, even a single nuclear strike could have existential consequences.
From that perspective, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold should continue to be viewed not merely as a policy preference but as a strategic necessity.
If that assessment is correct, then the recent war should be seen not as the final chapter of the nuclear dispute with Iran but as one phase in a longer struggle whose outcome remains to be seen.
The writer is an emeritus professor at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology where he has served in various leadership positions. He also serves as a member of the Board and as a strategic consultant to some companies and organizations.