There is a well-established principle in security logic that says the most dangerous threat is not the loudest but the most neglected.
When you survey the agenda of regional strategic debate today, it becomes glaringly apparent that the issue of Iranian chemical and biological weapons receives scant attention, if not altogether absent, compared to the absolute priority given to missiles, drones, and interceptor systems.
This gap is more than inattention; it reflects an imbalance in the ordering of priorities that merits pause.
The public discussion concentrates on what can be seen on radar screens, while less visible threats remain outside the circle of focus, even though their potential effects may be more complex and longer-lasting.
This issue originates from more than media narratives or opposition claims; it rests partly on official, declared positions.
In July 2024, the US State Department imposed sanctions on an Iranian company for allegedly contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Washington has also maintained since 2018 that Tehran has kept some of its activities opaque to international verification mechanisms.
It is true that the data alone fall short of confirming an active, full-fledged program, but they keep the door of strategic doubt open, and that in itself is a factor that demands serious engagement.
Even so, this file remains deferred in much practical debate.
In military assessment rooms, the focus revolves around the cost of missile-versus-missile exchanges, interception efficiency, and saturation tactics, while chemical and biological threats are relegated to a lower priority as though they were a far-fetched scenario.
The real problem, however, is less the probability of the danger than the level of preparedness to confront it should it materialize.
The irony is that a region that has spent hundreds of billions on building advanced air defense umbrellas may one day face a threat measured less by the number of missiles shot down than by the scale of disruption that could afflict a city, a port, or a critical facility within a few hours.
Some threats aim less for widespread destruction than for delivering a psychological or economic shock that far exceeds the scale of the means used.
Part of this concern arises from the very nature of these weapons.
They are relatively cheaper than many conventional systems, more elusive to monitoring and tracking, and fall outside the classic interception logic upon which modern air defense systems were built.
Moreover, activities linked to chemical and biological weapons can overlap with legitimate civilian sectors such as the pharmaceutical industry or scientific research, rendering them less detectable and identifiable.
This type of capability, therefore, can seldom be reduced to a single site or facility that can be easily targeted. In this context, reports occasionally surface about the use of potent chemical substances inside Iran.
One such report, issued by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in January 2026, indicated the use of fentanyl derivatives to disperse protesters. This account remains unsettled at the international level and lacks broad consensus.
Yet the mere fact that it circulates in research circles raises a crucial question about the limits of employing such tools and the possibility that psychological and political barriers associated with them may be eroding.
If this hypothesis seems far-fetched to some, previous regional experiences offer instructive models.
Iraq used its chemical weapons domestically before expanding their use in the war with Iran, while Syria employed banned substances in an internal context before the issue turned into a full-blown international crisis.
The same trajectory need not repeat itself, but it indicates a precedent that should inform analysis of dictatorial regimes amid conflict and pressure.
From precedent to preparedness
Notably, the external use of chemical or biological weapons remains fraught with high political and military costs, potentially including maximum sanctions, harsh international responses, and perhaps direct intervention.
This deterrent factor remains impossible to ignore, but it does not obviate the need for preparedness in a regional environment witnessing rapid changes and a decline in the effectiveness of some forms of traditional deterrence.
The most alarming scenario is less a large-scale attack than a limited and focused use that is difficult to attribute immediately to a specific party, such as hitting a critical facility, sensitive infrastructure, or a crowded area.
These scenarios need no massive capabilities, yet they could produce a strategic impact far exceeding the scale of the means used, especially if they confront environments ill-prepared for this type of threat.
Gulf states have demonstrated in recent years a remarkable ability to counter missile and drone threats by building advanced layers of air defense.
But a threat invisible to radar and affording insufficient early warning time requires a different strategy, one that begins with detection and preparedness and demands more than post-incident crisis management.
Thus, rebalancing strategic attention is urgent.
This requires integrating the chemical and biological weapons file into the core of security assessment, strengthening civilian and military detection and response capabilities, developing early warning centers and health-security coordination, and conducting regular joint exercises for managing such scenarios.
Supporting international efforts to enhance transparency and oversight of dual-use activities also remains an essential part of any effective preventive strategy.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.