Israelis have rarely been more critical of Europe. Since the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023, relations between Israel and several European Union member states have entered one of their most difficult periods in recent memory.
Disagreements over Gaza, humanitarian access, settlements, settler violence, international law, and recognition of a Palestinian state have deepened political tensions.
At the same time, Jewish communities across Europe have faced a severe resurgence of antisemitic violence, heightening Israeli anxieties about the continent and exposing a profound challenge to the EU’s democratic values.
Yet Israelis continue to be drawn to Europe. Demand for citizenship in EU member states remains substantial and has increased in several countries. European universities continue to attract Israeli students. Horizon Europe – the EU’s funding program for research and innovation – remains highly valued by Israeli scientists.
The EU remains Israel’s largest trading partner, and millions of Israelis travel across the continent each year because it still represents opportunity, stability, and openness.
The annual publication of the Henley Passport Index helps illuminate this apparent contradiction. Governments celebrate incremental gains in the rankings, travelers compare visa-free access, and headlines announce which passport has become the world’s most powerful.
The index measures the privileges attached to citizenship, not the desire to acquire it. But read alongside naturalization patterns, it points toward an overlooked measure of soft power: the attraction political communities exert on outsiders.
Viewed through this lens, the EU’s greatest source of international influence lies largely outside the remit of its foreign ministries. It is embedded in institutions Europeans have spent decades building. If foreign policy is ultimately about shaping the preferences of others, then Europe’s strongest instrument is not diplomacy alone but the enduring attraction of the European project itself. The Israeli case illustrates this with unusual clarity.
The attraction extends beyond economics and education. Israeli footballers aspire to play in Europe’s leading leagues, Israeli clubs measure success by qualification for European competitions, and many Israelis follow European football closely. Sport, like science, higher education, and culture, projects influence without intending to do so. It succeeds because people associate excellence, opportunity, and prestige with European institutions.
Europe’s diplomatic standing among many Israelis may have weakened. Its institutional attraction has not. The two have moved in opposite directions.
This divergence raises a broader question about how international influence should be measured. International relations traditionally emphasizes military power, economic leverage, alliances, and diplomacy. Joseph Nye, the American political scientist, challenged this understanding by arguing that attraction constitutes an independent source of soft power. Yet attraction is notoriously difficult to observe. Opinion polls fluctuate, and official rhetoric often reflects immediate politics as much as deeper preferences.
Citizenship tells a different story. Applying for citizenship requires time, money, and often years of legal effort. Not every application expresses admiration for the country issuing the passport. Some are plainly instrumental – an insurance policy, a route to study or employment, or a means of preserving mobility. But even instrumental demand rests on confidence that the laws and institutions behind that citizenship will continue to protect the rights it confers.
Applications, therefore, reveal something opinion polls cannot: they demonstrate that people are willing to invest years of effort to become members of a political community. Few indicators provide a clearer behavioral measure of institutional attraction.
Debates about the EU’s global role often overlook the strategic significance of this process. Discussion usually centers on defense spending, strategic autonomy, sanctions, and foreign policy coordination.
These questions matter, but they can obscure the EU’s most durable comparative advantage. Its universities educate future political, scientific, and business leaders. Its courts provide legal certainty. Its research institutions sustain international collaboration. Its single market, cultural industries, sporting competitions, and freedom of movement create an ecosystem of attraction that no foreign ministry could design, and no public diplomacy campaign could reproduce.
Political community
For Israelis, this attraction persists despite genuine political disagreement. An Israeli may strongly oppose the policies of a particular EU member state while continuing to admire European universities, scientific institutions, legal systems, sporting culture, and civic freedoms. Governments and diplomatic positions change. Institutional legitimacy accumulates over generations and erodes far more slowly.
For many Israelis, the attraction also carries a historical dimension. Recovering citizenship stripped from parents or grandparents through persecution, expulsion, or genocide may represent more than administrative convenience. It can also reflect confidence in Europe’s effort to confront its past through democratic institutions and the rule of law – and in the ability of political communities to rebuild legitimacy across generations.
The implications extend beyond Europe. In an era defined by hard power and economic coercion, institutional attraction remains a strategic resource. Governments rise and fall, and diplomatic crises pass. Institutions that attract students, researchers, investors, entrepreneurs, athletes, artists, and future citizens generate influence that outlasts political cycles.
The Israeli case, therefore, offers a broader lesson about statecraft. Military strength deters. Economic power shapes incentives. Diplomacy manages crises. Attraction creates a form of voluntary association that coercion cannot. That makes institutional legitimacy not merely a feature of good governance but a strategic asset.
Despite political tensions, antisemitism, and repeated predictions of European decline, many Israelis continue to seek citizenship in EU member states and participate in Europe’s academic, scientific, economic, cultural, and sporting life. That paradox suggests that Europe’s greatest foreign policy achievement lies not in what it says to the world but in the political community it has built.
In an age of geopolitical competition, few forms of international influence are more enduring than a society that others still choose to join.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute and a professor of European studies and international relations in the department of politics and government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.