On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement, known as the Mecca Pact. At its public core is a political commitment modeled in part on NATO’s Article 5 – namely, an armed attack on one party is to be regarded as an attack on all.
On September 8, the Houthis launched a major wave of attacks against Saudi Arabia, striking civilian and economic sites and energy infrastructure in several southern cities. Subsequently, the country has been attacked time and again by the Houthis. Civilian and economic facilities have been struck; King Khalid Air Base and Aramco facilities have been targeted.
Why have Turkey and Pakistan not rushed to Saudi’s defense?
Rather like the small print on insurance policies, the Mecca Pact seems to exclude as much as it offers. The publicly released description of the agreement, while making much of the NATO-like commitment, does not specify an automatic military response should one of the parties be attacked. Nor does it publicly stipulate the circumstances in which troops must be deployed. In fact, the full text of the agreement has not been released, so important questions about its scope and implementation remain obscure.
Rather late in the day, on Saturday, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, chief spokesman for Pakistan’s military, is reported as saying, “Pakistan fully stands with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both diplomatically and physically…We will go to any extent.”
But the statement, whatever it meant, was too late. Given the ambiguities inherent in the Mecca Pact, and the obvious reluctance of either Pakistan or Turkey to become involved in a military operation in Yemen, it is not surprising that Saudi Arabia turned to Washington for support that subsequently connected it to Israel.
CENTCOM is the US military command responsible for the Middle East and parts of Central and South Asia. It directs US military operations and security partnerships in that area.
Sometime during the week of September 7, at a secluded ski resort in Germany (rumored to be Garmisch-Partenkirchen), CENTCOM’s commander, Admiral Brad Cooper, hosted a conference of senior military leaders from eight countries.
It is extraordinary, but the fact that sitting round the same table were Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the IDF chief of staff, and military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt. CENTCOM, functioning as an intermediary, had succeeded in connecting Israel with Arab militaries that do not have diplomatic relations with it – in particular, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
According to a report by Axios, the respected digital news outlet, the central purpose of the conference was to discuss the continuing US-Israeli war with Iran, and the broader regional-security situation.
Cooper reportedly assured those present that, despite Iranian attacks on US bases, the US would retain forces in the Middle East. He also primed the group on plans to expand maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
Zamir is said to have briefed the participants on IDF operations on several fronts.
Axios further reports, citing “a source with knowledge of the matter,” that Israel and Saudi Arabia, with CENTCOM assistance, began discussing how Israel could assist Saudi military operations against the Houthis. The possible support mentioned is ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), on the lines of the assistance that Israel has reportedly provided to the UAE.
US agrees to assist Saudi Arabia
On September 14, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met Cooper in Jeddah, amid the rapidly worsening Houthi offensive. The next day Reuters reported that Washington, while declining to conduct direct US strikes against the Houthis, had agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with targeted assistance.
That same day, September 15, The Jerusalem Post reported that Israel and Saudi Arabia had held CENTCOM-mediated discussions about Israeli intelligence assistance to Riyadh against the Houthis. Regional diplomatic sources had told the paper that the Saudi side was seeking intelligence that could help build a picture of Houthi deployments, and thus anticipate future operations.
A similar report emanated from the Institute for the Study of War in a document published jointly with the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. It commented that this prospective arrangement would: “…resemble Israel’s current intelligence support relationship with the United Arab Emirates.”
There is no doubt that the Iran war is creating an unusually powerful common-security denominator. The countries represented in CENTCOM’s conference have very different political relationships with Israel, but they share an immediate security problem: Iran. Iranian-aligned armed groups have acted against some of them and are capable of threatening all.
Israel possesses substantial intelligence and surveillance capabilities concerning Iran and its regional partners. Saudi’s cities and energy infrastructure have been struck repeatedly by Houthi missiles and drones. CENTCOM possesses the command-and-control machinery that can connect Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Although Saudi Arabia still has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the emerging arrangement potentially constitutes a major step in Saudi-Israeli military normalization. Israeli intelligence is being used to help defend Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, even without diplomatic normalization.
This arrangement gives Saudi Arabia considerable political cover. Publicly, its relationship with Israel can remain highly constrained; operationally, cooperation can become increasingly sophisticated.
So the present position, according to media reports, is that Saudi Arabia is being offered direct targeted support by the US, while CENTCOM is mediating Saudi-Israeli discussions on intelligence assistance against the Houthis.
Saudi-Israeli collaboration is nothing new. There is a 60-year history of covert strategic cooperation. But the Saudi-Israel connection remains as delicate as it has ever been. It is not any form of military alliance, nor has there been any change in Saudi policy on formal normalization. In fact, reports emanating from Saudi sources suggest that Riyadh, even while seeking Israel’s help against Houthi attacks, is still resisting movement on normalization.
Meanwhile, the law of unintended consequences is in full play. While the Houthis continue their strikes on Saudi Arabia and make territorial gains in areas surrounding one of the world’s critical maritime choke points, the Bab el-Mandeb, they are inadvertently fostering greater military cooperation than ever before between Israel and Arab states, and both reviving and strengthening Israel’s covert security links with Saudi Arabia.
The writer, a former senior civil servant, is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.