The hour of decision in Samaria - opinion

At stake is a question that reaches far beyond three refugee camps: can a sovereign state effectively defend its citizens when its elected government and military commanders believe that the conditions for a safe return have not been met, yet face judicial pressure to establish a timetable for that return?

The High Court’s demand for a timetable does not itself order the immediate return of displaced residents or require the IDF to withdraw. It does, however, raise a legitimate strategic concern: a judicial deadline must not become a substitute for the intelligence assessments and operational judgments required to determine whether an area can be safely repopulated. The government must demonstrate why restrictions remain necessary and insist that security conditions, rather than an arbitrary calendar, govern its decisions.

The hour of decision has arrived. Israel must reconsider Oslo, confront the limits of judicial power, and formulate a durable strategy for preventing the emergence of a hostile political and military entity capable of threatening the country’s heartland.

The evacuated camps of northern Samaria cannot be evaluated simply as residential neighborhoods. Where armed factions establish weapons caches, concealed explosive devices, recruitment networks, command structures, and logistical infrastructure, the physical environment can become an integral component of an insurgent military system.

The central question is whether those networks have been dismantled sufficiently to prevent their reconstruction. Weapons discoveries, intelligence assessments, the capacity of armed groups to recruit new members, and the availability of concealed operational routes must all inform that determination.

If the IDF continues to uncover weapons and explosives, the government must explain why a premature return would not facilitate the reconstitution of hostile infrastructure. If military intelligence indicates that armed organizations could exploit a renewed civilian presence to conceal operations, rebuild supply networks, or prepare attacks, those findings must carry substantial weight in determining the security arrangements.

The lesson of October 7 is not that every civilian in a hostile environment is a combatant. It is that Israel must distinguish between the existence of civilian life and the operational structures that armed organizations may establish within populated areas. It must not permit the protection of civilians to become a shield behind which terrorist infrastructure can regenerate.

At the same time, military control cannot be measured by the number of buildings demolished or the length of time an area remains evacuated. Its success must be demonstrated through the sustained reduction of hostile capabilities, the prevention of attacks, and the ability to detect and disrupt attempts at rearmament.

The government’s responsibility is therefore to establish clear, measurable security conditions for any return, reassess them as circumstances change, and maintain effective military control where necessary and legally permissible.

A policy that fails to prevent the return of armed networks has not achieved lasting security. A policy that cannot demonstrate how it reduces the threat must also be reconsidered.

Israel’s constitutional crisis cannot be understood solely through the latest ruling concerning Samaria. It reflects a longer struggle over the relationship between elected authority and judicial power.

The concept of a “juristocracy” describes a political system in which judges exercise a level of influence over major public-policy decisions that critics regard as exceeding the proper limits of judicial review. In Israel, critics of the Supreme Court have argued that its expansive approach to judicial intervention, the development of broad doctrines of review, and the absence of sufficiently effective institutional checks have weakened the separation of powers.

The concern is not that courts should never review government decisions. Judicial scrutiny has a legitimate role in a democratic state. The concern is that judicial intervention can become so expansive that decisions requiring difficult strategic judgments are effectively transferred from elected officials to judges who do not bear direct responsibility for the consequences of military failure.

The government is accountable to the public for defending the country. The IDF’s commanders are responsible for protecting their soldiers and carrying out lawful operations. Judges, by contrast, are responsible for adjudicating legal disputes. These roles overlap, but they are not identical.

When the judiciary addresses questions involving operational timing, intelligence assessments, military control, and the conditions under which displaced populations can return, it must recognize the limits of what can be determined through judicial proceedings alone.

The credibility of the High Court has, in the eyes of its critics, been eroded by what they perceive as institutional arrogance, insufficient regard for the separation of powers, and a tendency to treat contested legal interpretations as superior to the practical realities confronting the state.

Such criticism should not be dismissed as mere political hostility. Public confidence in the judiciary depends on its willingness to demonstrate restraint, explain its reasoning, and recognize that constitutional authority is not the same as unlimited authority.

Yet institutional credibility is also strengthened by the government’s willingness to respect binding decisions while pursuing lawful challenges. A government that wishes to restore the balance of powers must articulate a clear constitutional doctrine, rather than rely on ad hoc defiance.

The objective should be a system in which judicial review remains meaningful without becoming an alternative center of military and strategic command.

In 52 BCE, the Roman statesman Cicero invoked the principle: “Silent enim leges inter arma” –  In time of war, the law falls silent.

The phrase captures a perennial dilemma confronting states at war: legal principles must operate within the realities of armed conflict, and a government cannot permit procedural rigidity to make the defense of its citizens impossible.

On the other hand, Cicero’s maxim should not be interpreted as a license for lawlessness or as a declaration that all legal obligations disappear during war. Its strategic significance is more precise. A legal framework that fails to account for the realities of warfare risks becoming disconnected from the purpose for which the state exists: protecting its people and preserving its capacity to survive.

Israel faces an asymmetric conflict in which armed organizations deliberately operate among civilian populations, exploit legal and humanitarian constraints, and seek to turn international scrutiny into a strategic advantage. This environment demands exceptionally careful distinctions between civilians and combatants, but it also demands a legal framework that allows the IDF to respond effectively to genuine threats.

The 2006 High Court judgment on targeted killings illustrates the dispute. In “Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,” the court did not categorically prohibit targeted killings. It held that their legality must be assessed under the applicable law of armed conflict, including the circumstances of individual operations, direct participation in hostilities, proportionality, and the availability of less harmful alternatives.

Critics argue that this approach, together with the broader expansion of judicial review over military affairs, can impose operational burdens on commanders and create uncertainty over the permissible use of force.

The concern is particularly acute when commanders must make decisions under severe time pressure, with incomplete intelligence, and in environments where an adversary deliberately obscures the distinction between military and civilian activity.

Israel must ensure that its rules of engagement are sufficiently clear to allow soldiers to defend themselves, protect their comrades, and neutralize lawful military targets without unnecessary hesitation. Rules that are unclear, inconsistently applied, or detached from operational realities can place soldiers at additional risk.

The argument that the system prioritizes enemy combatants and hostile civilians over Israeli soldiers must, however, be established through specific examples of rules, decisions, or operational consequences. International humanitarian law does not generally require commanders to sacrifice their own soldiers to protect enemy combatants, nor does it grant civilians immunity when they directly participate in hostilities. It does impose restrictions on attacks, including requirements relating to distinction, proportionality, and precautions.

The appropriate question is whether the interpretation and implementation of those requirements have become unnecessarily restrictive, and whether judicial intervention has contributed to that result.

Israel should insist on a legal framework that protects civilians as required by law without creating unnecessary obstacles to lawful military action. It must also ensure that commanders receive clear legal guidance and that genuine operational judgments are not displaced by judicial second-guessing.

The law must serve a defensible system of national security. It must not become a mechanism through which the state loses the ability to exercise that security effectively.

The deeper strategic problem is the Oslo framework itself.

The Oslo Accords were designed to establish interim arrangements for Palestinian self-government and provide a process toward a negotiated permanent settlement. They divided responsibilities between Israel and Palestinian institutions, creating a system of differentiated authority across Judaea and Samaria.

Three decades later, Israel still confronts armed organizations that reject its existence, seek to acquire increasingly sophisticated capabilities, and exploit political and territorial arrangements to pursue attacks against Israeli citizens.

Complicating matters even further, is the fact that the PA, itself, has become one of the biggest promoters of violence against Jews. Their constant incitement, “pay-for-slay” policy and illegal creation of an army trained to invade Israel all point to the fact that its elimination is long overdue.

Critics of Oslo rightly argue that the framework has failed to deliver the security and political settlement it promised, while leaving Israel responsible for confronting threats within a complicated system of divided authority. They warn that the eventual establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state under present conditions could create a hostile entity with territorial depth, access to strategic routes, and the capacity to threaten Israel's central population centers.

That concern cannot be dismissed as an abstract political objection. A hostile state or quasi-state established within the Territories could fundamentally alter Israel's strategic environment, particularly if its security institutions were unable or unwilling to prevent armed factions from operating- which is exactly the situation that exists today.

The October 7 massacre reinforced the importance of examining what happens when an armed organization possesses territorial control, weapons infrastructure, and the capacity to launch a large-scale attack. The lesson is not that every possible Palestinian political arrangement would necessarily produce the same result. It is that any proposal concerning sovereignty must be assessed against the demonstrated capabilities and intentions of hostile actors.

Israel should therefore reconsider the Oslo framework and develop a security doctrine that does not depend on the assumption that political concessions will necessarily moderate hostile movements or produce lasting peace.

The government should formally terminate or annul the Oslo arrangements through the applicable legal and diplomatic processes, including the consequences for the institutions, agreements, and responsibilities established under them. It must identify which provisions remain binding, what procedures are available for termination or modification, and what arrangements would replace the existing division of authority.

Annulment cannot be treated as a magic formula that automatically resolves every legal question. The legal framework governing the Territories involves more than Oslo alone, and the termination of an agreement would not automatically extinguish every obligation arising under other applicable sources of law.

Nevertheless, the government should be prepared to make the case that the existing framework has failed to provide an adequate foundation for Israel's long-term security and must be replaced by a more sustainable arrangement.

The case for reconsidering Oslo is inseparable from the question of sovereignty.

Advocates of extending Israeli sovereignty over the Territories argue that Israel should exercise clearer and more durable authority over its strategic environment rather than remain indefinitely bound to an interim arrangement that has failed to resolve the underlying conflict.

From this perspective, sovereignty would be intended to establish a more coherent framework for governance, security, administration, and residency. It would also require the government to articulate which legal status applies to different populations and how residency and immigration decisions would be administered.

Clearly, the most important aspect of sovereignty is that it would grant Israel an unrestricted right to determine who may remain in the Territories. This ability to determine the ethnic composition of Judaea and Samaria is critical since the Arab population residing in these areas has shown absolutely no interest in living peacefully with Israel – quite the contrary. Indeed, Arab radicalism has shown no evidence of subsiding regardless as to what positive incentives have been offered by Israel. Given this fact, sovereignty would allow the government to undertake actions designed to encourage the voluntary transfer of the hostile Arab population. Where they would go should not be any of our concern.

While some opponents of this policy have argued that under international law occupying powers don’t have the right to implement such population displacements. My counter argument is that we are not, in fact, an “occupying” power. Rather, we are the legitimate owners of the land in question and, as such, have the right to regulate the composition of its residents. From this perspective, it is the Arabs who are the illegal occupiers of  Judaea and Samaria, who lack any claim to land ownership or residency rights. And while some people may argue this point before the High Court, the application of sovereignty should allow the duly elected government to have the final say in this matter.

Israel's long-term security doctrine must begin with a clear rejection of any arrangement that permits an armed organization to establish an independent military infrastructure capable of threatening the country's population centers.

To this end, the government should pursue four connected objectives.

These objectives are related but distinct. Territorial control alone does not guarantee security. Sovereignty alone does not eliminate hostile intentions. Relocation alone does not dismantle military networks. And judicial reform alone does not provide an operational strategy.

A durable security doctrine must address all of them.

The dispute over northern Samaria represents a wider test of Israel's ability to govern itself effectively under conditions of persistent security threats.

The government must not permit a judicial timetable to substitute for operational judgment. It must present the evidence for continued restrictions, explain the conditions necessary for a safe return, and defend its decisions through a clear legal and constitutional argument.

At the same time, Israel must confront the deeper institutional question raised by the concept of a juristocracy: whether the balance between judicial review and elected authority has shifted so far that judges are exercising influence over security policy without adequate regard for the separation of powers or the practical consequences of their decisions.

The High Court's credibility depends on restraint, transparency, and an appreciation of the limits of judicial authority. The government's credibility depends on demonstrating that its policies are necessary, coherent, and legally defensible.

Cicero's warning remains relevant. A nation fighting for its survival cannot allow legal procedures to become instruments of paralysis. But neither can it assume that abandoning legal constraints will, by itself, produce lasting security.

Israel must reconsider Oslo because the existing framework has failed to resolve the conflict or eliminate the threat posed by armed organizations. It must examine sovereignty as a means of establishing a more coherent political and security structure. It must preserve the IDF's operational capacity and ensure that the rules governing military action are clear, realistic, and consistent with applicable law.

It should also assert the fact that we are not “occupiers,” but the rightful owners of Judaea and Samaria.

Above all, Israel must refuse to confuse temporary calm with strategic success. The objective is not merely to retain control of territory or win a confrontation with the judiciary. It is to prevent the emergence of a hostile political and military entity capable of launching the next October 7.

The hour of decision demands a government willing to confront failed assumptions, reform institutional arrangements where necessary, and place the long-term security of Israel's citizens at the center of every strategic decision.

National sovereignty must mean the capacity to protect the nation. Military freedom of action must be preserved. Judicial authority must have defensible limits. And every proposed political settlement must be judged by whether it reduces the threat to Israel rather than simply postponing the next confrontation.

Israel cannot afford another strategic illusion. It must build a security framework capable of enduring the realities of the conflict it faces – and of preventing those realities from becoming the foundation of its next national catastrophe.