Much has been written about whether a prospective agreement between the US – and possibly Israel – and Iran would be better or worse than the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal.
The JCPOA was not “Obama’s deal.” It was negotiated by and signed off by the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France plus Germany. The IAEA was closely involved. The EU High Representative was a key mediator. It was done as a textbook case of multilateral nuclear diplomacy.
But beyond that and how control of critical international waterways exploits turbulence in energy and other markets, what new lessons have we learnt about geopolitics in the Middle East?
Many assumed that the US bases in the region, built up over many years and continuing some of their most sophisticated armory, would be a key asset in any confrontation with Iran. They would be easily defended. Yet within days of the start of the war, the Iranians had inflicted significant damage on US bases, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain.
Currently in Bahrain, the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet is unusable and none of the previous 9000 staff are in place. The massive US Navy presence in the region has been unable to patrol and control freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Many assumed correctly that the Gulf countries would have success with American-made missile defense systems. Iran had previously used drones to attack Saudi oil infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the LNV installations in Qatar and numerous sites in the UAE and Bahrain have been badly damaged.
Foreign countries assist Iran in its war against US, Israel
Iran appears to have been helped by Chinese-operated satellites. The US government acknowledged that Russian intelligence was also assisting Iran. Now both Saudi Arabia and UAE have turned to Ukraine for help and signed new defense cooperation agreements
Gulf countries may have assumed that having spent billions of dollars on sophisticated US military equipment, they would not be attacked by Iran.
Yet all this equipment – sophisticated fighter aircraft, MQ Predator drones, and advanced ships – has not been engaged in the war, and they have not deterred Iran’s attacks. Arab publics would not have accepted cooperation with Israel easily on attacks on an Islamic country
Israel did defend itself, but the supposed possession of its own nuclear weapons did not prove a deterrent to Iran’s attacks. Yet Israel has been far more transparent than the Gulf States and the US in allowing the media to see the results of damage from Iran’s attacks.
Perhaps the American public assumed the US government would tell the truth in the course of the war. In the Internet age, it would be impossible to obfuscate. Yet American media were told the war was won during the first week and that Iran had not landed a glove on the United States.
A US Congressional report has only now given details of how over 40 US planes were destroyed or damaged by Iran, including over 20 MQ-9 Predator drones at a cost of over $1b.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime is in crisis. Pakistan – a key facilitator of Iran’s nuclear program through the collaboration of Abdul Qadeer Khan – itself is not a member of the NPT with no diplomatic relations, and has been accepted by the US as the main mediator since March. Oman was performing that role up until February, and claimed that a satisfactory nuclear agreement was very close then.
Now China, Russia, the UK and France are divided over future action. Pakistan and Russia may now both have been recipients of some of Iran’s enriched uranium. North Korea’s nuclear program, despite US President Donald Trump’s previous efforts, is flourishing as never before.
Many assumed that Israeli action against Iran would draw the Gulf states and in particular Saudi Arabia closer to Israel. But nothing like that has happened. Israel has faced increased criticism over its aggressive settlement policy in the West Bank and its treatment of humanitarian aid in the stalled Gaza peace plan.
On May 24, all the Gulf states plus Jordan and Egypt condemned the actions of Israel’s Minister of National Security in humiliating members of a humanitarian flotilla. Trump is now promoting his Abraham Accords, trying to impose them as a condition for US defense cooperation.
When they were signed in 2019, Iran immediately accused the Arab states of abandoning the Palestinian cause. Saudi Arabia is now probably further away than ever from the Abraham Accords.
Many assumed that dollar-based sanctions on Iran’s leadership and the IRGC would be effective and that Iran would be brought to its knees if its oil were blockaded. They ignored the impact of cryptocurrency in undermining any sanctions on Iran.
The IRGC have long been using crypto to buy equipment, and Iran has been receiving crypto for its oil and even for tolls for ships going through Hormuz. It may even be that China is continuing to pay Iran in crypto in advance for its oil shipments, which will be delivered after the War ends
Many assumed that in the 4 months of the Iran war the US would have made progress in diminishing Iran’s presence in Venezuela, where they have a drone factory. But the US-approved interim President Delcy Rodriguez has done little or nothing to distance Venezuela from Iran.
And given Trump’s upper hand over Iran, it might have been a good opportunity to revive the Gaza peace plan, which remains stalled. Nothing has been achieved by US diplomacy on Gaza during this time. Nor in the Ukraine-Russia war, where Russia is still receiving significant Iranian assistance.
Whatever the outcome of the Iran war, many old assumptions from those affected will have been jettisoned.
The writer is a former UK diplomat who served, inter alia, as UK ambassador to Cuba and was head of the UK Foreign Office’s Nonproliferation Department in the early 2000s. He is now a Master Lecturer in International Relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University.