Flexible and shifting alliances in the region instead of blocs - opinion

Among other things, the agreement includes a clause stipulating that any aggression against one member of the alliance will be considered aggression against all three.

This alliance is part of a web of agreements that have emerged in the region since October 7.

Taken together, they suggest that the Middle East is no longer divided along the familiar lines between the “Axis of Resistance” and the “moderate” Sunni Arab camp, comprising states that have signed peace treaties with Israel, the Abraham Accords, as well as states willing to cooperate with Israel covertly.

Between these two camps stood Turkey and Qatar – sometimes in harmony and sometimes amid friction and rivalry.

Changes are taking place in both of these former camps. Syria defected from the Resistance Axis following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Remarkably, the Axis has remained intact, albeit weakened, and is now making enormous efforts to regroup and rearm.

The most significant changes, however, are occurring in the other camps. The process began with the creation of the “Group of Eight,” an association of eight Muslim states – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Indonesia, and Qatar – which functioned primarily as a diplomatic platform during the Gaza war.

Then, in March 2026, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt held a quadrilateral meeting that gave birth to the “Quartet” (also known as the R4).

Two months later, the Mecca Agreement was signed – but without Egypt. It is based on an earlier agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Mecca Agreement came as a surprise to the media. However, as early as January 2026, Pakistan’s defense minister told Reuters that a trilateral agreement had already been under discussion for some time.

From the Saudi perspective, the agreement is intended to deter Iran and its proxies. The very fact that it was signed in Mecca symbolizes a determination to seize the initiative, particularly in light of what has been perceived as a Saudi feeble response to aggression against it.

In practical terms, however, the trilateral alliance appears to be an upgraded political declaration, since thus far there has been no Pakistani or Turkish response to attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Given that Pakistan is also mediating between Iran and the United States, the complexity of the new regional alignment is already apparent.

Egypt, for its part, has so far refrained from joining the Mecca Agreement. Egypt has its own considerations, including the peace treaty with Israel and its reluctance to jeopardize the special relations developed with Greece and Cyprus.

Second, Egypt has a different hierarchy of threats, foremost among them the Houthis, the closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the resulting damage to revenues from the Suez Canal.

Two groupings already exist in the Red Sea region. One was established in 2020 and includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Yemen. The second emerged from a Saudi initiative launched in July 2026 – following the Houthis’ declaration of a maritime embargo – to protect shipping lanes in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden.

Fourteen states have so far joined this initiative, including Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. Thus, Egypt has in effect joined its three partners from the Mecca alliance, but in the context of a threat directly affecting it and within a different coalition.

Thus, several conclusions can be drawn from these complex developments:

First, faced with a multitude of threats, regional states increasingly prefer to create flexible alliances that generate some measure of deterrence against their adversaries.

What we may be witnessing is the beginning of a new era of flexible alliances, in contrast to the clear-cut divisions existing before October 7.

Second, the “region” is no longer simply the Middle East, but a broader space that encompasses the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as well. It also includes countries not regarded as part of the Middle East, such as Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and the states of the Horn of Africa.

Historically, this is not entirely new. Pakistan, for example, joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, alongside Britain, Iran, and Iraq, as part of an effort to counter the Soviet and communist threat.

Third, Turkey has skillfully exploited the events to strengthen its regional position. It has managed to overcome the deep rifts that had characterized its relations with Saudi Arabia since the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and with Egypt since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood.

It has established positions of influence in Syria, Qatar, and Gaza – all in pursuit of Erdoğan’s grandiose ambitions.

Fourth, Qatar is absent from all these new arrangements. One can only speculate that, despite having been attacked by Iran, it feels protected by former US president Joe Biden’s 2022 designation of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally and by Trump’s declaration that the United States would regard any armed attack on Qatar as a threat to its own security.

Finally, all these developments have negative implications for Israel. Most importantly, a new regional architecture is emerging of which Israel is not a part.

Before October 7, Israel belonged to a US-led camp opposed to Iran, whose members even engaged in cooperation during the war. Israel now finds itself outside this emerging architecture. This does not necessarily apply to every state in the region – the UAE and Azerbaijan, for example.

The problem is particularly acute in the Red Sea region. Israel shares important security and economic interests with many states there, yet it is excluded from all these emerging frameworks.

The good news is that history shows that alliances and coalitions in the broader Middle East shift frequently. Israel’s cooperation with Iran until 1979, and with Turkey against common adversaries, eventually gave way to peace treaties and normalization agreements with former enemies.

Any Israeli government that comes to power after the elections should therefore draw the necessary lessons from the diplomatic fallout of October 7 and fundamentally rethink Israel’s regional policy.